The plaintiffs’ right of action depends upon the construction of the terms of the deed, and preliminary thereto its efficacy in giving the lien under the statute, the determination of the latter being unnecessary if its terms do not'take in the demand for the debt of the preceding year..

We coincide with the Judge in the opinion that the deed provides for advances then or thereafter to be made in cultivating and bringing to maturity the crops of that year and not to such as were made before its execution. Its terms very plainly indicate this, as a brief reference will show, and they cannot be varied by parol evidence of understandings outside of it.

Nearly fifty years ago, Daniel, Judge, speaking for the Court, said: “In the construction of deeds the first rule is that the intention of the parties is, if possible, to be supported. And the second is that this intention is to be ascertained from the deed itself, that is, from all parts of it taken together. In general no expression can be contradicted or •explained by extrinsic evidence, and the intention collected from the four corners of the deed is to govern the construe *303 tion of every passage in it” Dismukes v. Wright, 4 Dev. & Bat., 206.

Guided by this rule the instrument itself shows clearly the intention of the parties as to the extent of its operation, limiting it to the securing such moneys or advances as were to be used in making the contemplated crops of that year.

It recites the defendant’s purpose of raising a crop on the land during the year 1882, and the agreement of the firm “to make advances to said Henry Bostick,” for the purpose of enabling him to go on “in raising a crop and farming on the land during the year 1882” within defined limits.

Again, it says that- “in consideration'of said advances to he made as aforesaid, Henry Bostick, by these presents, does sell,” &c., “so much com, cotton and other products raised during the present year * * * ' as shall be sufficient to pay for the supplies to be furnished as aforesaid,” &c., and such conveyance “ shall create a lien in favor of said Macon & Lowdermilk Bros, to the extent of the advances made or to be made upon all the crops said Henry Bostick may raise, be interested in or in any wise control during the present year on the above mentioned land,” &c.

Without quoting further provisions contained, it is quite apparent that no pre-existent debt was intended to be secured in giving the lien, and not less that the parties so meant, and such is the legal effect of the deed to create the statutory lien.

We, therefore, concur in the ruling of the Court, brought up by appeal for review, that if all the advances made during 1882 were paid the plaintiff must fail in his action.

There is no error.

No error. Affirmed.