(after stating the case). It is too well settled to admit of further question, that when the single bond of co-obligors is presumed by the lapse of ten years next after its maturity to be paid, as provided by the statute (Rej vised Code, Ch. 65, §18), such presumption of payment can not be rebutted so as to charge one of such obligors, by the naked admission of the other that the bond had not been paid, made in the absence of the obligor sought to be charged.

The simple admissions of the obligor sought to be charged is not sufficient to rebut the presumption of payment, because the bond may have been, and the presumption in such case is, that it was paid by the co-obligor, and the like admissions of the latter, made in the absence of the former, are insufficient to repel the presumption as to the former, because such admissions are mere hearsay, and therefore incompetent evidence and cannot be heard. The co-obligors do not stipulate by implication in the joint obligation — the bond — that each may hind the other by his admissions, made *183 after the bond shall be due; if this ever was so in principle, it certainly did not remain so after the enactment of the statute (Rev. Code, ch. 65, §22,) which provided that such admissions shall not rebut the presumption of payment created by statute.

The learned counsel for the appellant contended earnestly on the argument here that this statute did not embrace single bonds, and the presumption of payment of them; that it extended only to promissory notes, and admissions of par^ ties made after the dissolution of the partnership. This is a misapprehension of the meaning of the statute. Such bonds in this State are made negotiable, and they and promissory notes are put on the same footing with inland bills of exchange by the statute. (Rev. Code, ch. 65, §22). They are denominated in this statute, “ bonds or sealed notes,” and are treated as promissory notes under seal. When therefore the statute (Rev. Code, ch. 65, §22) embraces in terms, “ suits to recover any debt or demand due from any firm after the dissolution thereof, or the makers of any promissory note,” &c., it embraces suits to recover debts due from the makers of single bonds — sealed notes — to which the statute of presumption of payment applies, as well as the class of promissory notes that may be absolutely barred by the statute of limitation. It is insisted that §22 applies only to the latter class of notes, because it employs the terms, “ after the statute of limitation shall have barred the same,” that is, the promissory note.

This is a very narrow interpretation, and one that does not remedy the evil intended to be suppressed. Why should such declarations and admissions of a partner, made after dissolution of the partnership, and the like admissions of one of two or more makers of a particular class of promissory notes, be rejected as incompetent evidence, and the like admissions of a co-obligor in a single bond received as competent? We can conceive of no substantial reason for such *184 distinctions, and the necessity for the application of this remedial provision is as great in the one class as the other class of promissory notes. The words just recited are clearly used in a comprehensive and remedial sense, and apply generally, whenever pertinent, to the statute of limitations, of which the section of which they are part is a part. The presumption of payment provided for is embodied in §18 of the statute of limitations, and it is construed to embrace single bonds, though they are not named in terms. This section, though not strictly a statute of limitations, is so denominated in a general sense, and hence it is made a part of the chapter denominated in the Revised Code “ Limitations And although it does not create an absolute bar, it does, in a sense, create a conditional bar, such as is embraced in §22, referred to above.

This, we think, is a reasonable interpretation of the statutory provisions referred to, but if it were otherwise, it has been repeatedly decided expressly in several cases, that such admissions and declarations of the co-obligor as those excluded on the trial, were not competent evidence as against the co-obligor sought to be charged. We cannot, for a moment, think of disturbing these decisions. On the contrary, we again declare that they are founded in principle — are just and reasonable. Pearsall v. Houston, 3 Jones, 346; Campbell v. Brown, 86 N. C., 376; Rogers v. Clements, 92 N. C., 81.

The judgment taken against the co-obligor by default, or for want of an answer, put in evidence on the trial by the plaintiff, as to the defendant, could have no greater force or effect than his admissions or declarations — it could hardly be treated as an admission at all, not even by implication— it was not founded upon his admission or confession, but upon his default; it might be questioned whether the plaintiff in this judgment was entitled to have it for the debt by such default, as upon the face of the bond it appeared to be paid. Lane v. Richardson, 79 N. C., 159. This, however, is *185 not material here. It is clear that the judgment, put in evidence, could not effect the present defendant, as insisted by the plaintiff. Rogers v. Clements, supra.

We think the Court properly excluded the declarations of the co-obligor. Judgment affirmed.

No error. Affirmed.