(after stating the case). The rule has long been recognized and enforced in equity, that forbids one who by parol has entered into contract with another to sell and convey him land, upon faith in which the latter is permitted to improve the premises, to reclaim the land without com; pensation for the increased value thereof. It has been extended by statute to cases where there is no privity or contract relations between the parties, and where the expenditure in labor and money has been made in the bona fide and reasonable belief of ownership; and this claim for remuneration may be made and the damages assessed at or after the trial of the action to recover the premises. The Code, §473.

The defendant has in this case elected to demand that the allowance be ascertained when the action is tried, and the Court in giving judgment denies, or at least does not recognize, the defendant’s right to such remuneration, for the assigned reason that the alleged agreement was made by a woman under coverture and not in writing. This ruling is predicated upon the proposition that the agreement is an absolute nullity, not calculated to mislead any reasonable person and'induce a belief that he has any right, legal or equitable, to enforce a claim for remuneration for what he voluntarily and with such knowledge spends in improving the property. In this the Judge was acting in accordance with what is said by RuKKIN, J., delivering the opinion in Scott v. Battle, 85 N. C., 184, who, in pointing out the difference between a contract made by one sui juris and one under the disability of marriage, uses this language: “ In no case will the law imply a promise on her part, and every one who deals with her is held to do so with a knowledge of her disability. It is this disability of a married woman to make any contract, which, we think, distinguished her case from those in which a purchaser under a parol contract, void under the statute, has been allowed his claim for a restoration of the purchase money paid and compensation for his betterments.” Then *399 referring to the grounds upon which relief is granted, he asks: “ Can this reasoning hold good when there exists, as in the case of a feme covert, no power to contract, and when, indeed, the law itself declares she shall not do so?” We reproduce these remarks of the very learned Judge who spoke, not so much with a view of recognizing their correctness as a'statement of the law, as to show that the ruling upon the trial, in ignoring altogether the claim for better-ments, was intended to be, as in legal effect the judgment is, a denial, direct, of the defendant's right to compensation, as set out and demanded in the answer, and not a decision merely upon other points, leaving this open for presentation afterwards. The effect of a final judgment concludes every matter in controversy in the pleadings, in which legal and equitable remedies are blended, unless, as in this case, by statute a future opportunity is allowed to assert a claim and it is not put forward to be passed on at the trial. But, in fact, it is asserted in the ‘ answer and refused by the Court, and being an adjudged matter, whether correctly or erroneously, and no appeal taken to review the ruling upon assigned error at the time, the judgment must stand.

Such was the view entertained by the Judge to whom the subsequent application for allowance for improvements was addressed, and in his adjudipation we find no error. The rules of practice as established must be maintained, and cannot give way to cases of hardship growing out of a mistake as to their operation, however, in particular cases, their operation may be severe and harsh.

There is no error, and the judgment is affirmed.