We are of the opinion that a new trial should be granted, because of the rejection of the testimony offered by the plaintiffs.

It is true, that if the deed were executed under duress, and for that reason void, it could not be validated' by the fact which the plaintiffs sought to prove. But it was not offered for that purpose, but to rebut “ the allegation that she signed said mortgage through fear of her husband.” The alleged fact that, a year after she signed the deed which is the subject of this controversy, she voluntarily (as far as we can see) joined the plaintiffs in the execution of the rejected deed of mortgage upon a part of the same land, and for the purpose of paying plaintiffs’ mortgage debt, would, it seems to us, be clearly relevant to the issue before the jury. They might well have inquired, why did she not repudiate the whole transaction instead of recognizing it by joining in the execution of the second deed ? It may be that she could have fully explained her act so as to repel the imputed inconsistency ; but, be that as it may, we think the plaintiffs were entitled to the testimony offered.

Error. Venire de novo.