after stating the facts: The plaintiff was ex officio Treasurer of the county by virtue of his election to the office of Sheriff, and became, in the same way, Treasurer of the County Board of Education. The Code, §§ 768 to 771. For his services in collecting and disbursing the ordinary county fund, The Code (§ 770) declares that he shall “receive as a compensation in full of all services required of him such sum, not exceeding one-half of one per cent, on moneys received, and not exceeding two and a half per cent, on moneys disbursed by him, as the Board of Commissioners of the county may allow: Provided, that in counties where his compensation cannot exceed two hundred and fifty dollars, the said Treasurer may be allowed a sum not exceeding two and a half per cent, on his receipts and disbursements."

The plaintiff alleges in the sixth paragraph of the complaint that an allowance has been made to him of two and a half per cent, of the sum total' received and disbursed by him in the capacity of Treasurer for the County Board of Education for the five years from 1881 to 1885, both inclu *199 sive. He alleges further, in .substance, that the defendants have not only refused to audit and allow the sum demanded for services as Treasurer of the county, but have refused to audit or allow any commissions to him, and have assigned as the reason for failing to comply with his demand that they denied their legal liability to pay him any compensation as County Treasurer, and proposed to make him an allowance only when forced to do so by judgment of the Court.

The plaintiff is required, as Treasurer of the Board of Education, to file a separate bond with different conditions from those embraced in that given in his capacity of County Treasurer, and in case of any breach an action must be brought by the County Board of Education; whereas for any default in accounting for the county funds proper, he must be sued by the Board of County Commissioners. The Code, §§ 766 and 2554; County Board of Education v. Bateman, 102 N C., 57. We do not, therefore, concede the correctness of the position taken by the defendant, that the admission by the plaintiff that an allowance had been made to him for collecting and paying out the educational fund was an acknowledgment of a settlement in full for his services in both capacities. And we cannot concur in the view that the plaintiff, in alleging in the third paragraph of the complaint! that he has accounted for all moneys received and disbursed by him as Treasurer of the county for five years preceding the year 1885, has admitted that the defendants have made him an allowance on the moneys so accounted for, or audited or paid his claim, especially when he subsequently says, in explicit terms, that they have refused to either audit or pay, and have invited him to resort to his legal remedy.

It is well settled that where County Commissioners are clothed by law with power to make or not to make any allowance at all to an officer for his services, as they may think *200 best for the public welfare, the Court cannot control their discretion by a writ of mandamus. But where they refuse to entertain the question or exercise the discretion given to them in reference' to it, the Courts will enforce action by mandamus, where no other legal remedy exists. Moses on Mandamus, p. 104. In the case of Boner v. Auditor, 65 N. C., 643, while conceding the unqualified discretion of the auditor in allowing or rejecting claims presented against the State, Justice Reads, delivering the opinion, said: “ The most this Court could do, would be to order the Auditor 'to examine the claim and report the fact, with his opinion, 'to the General Assembly.”

If the Board of County Commissioners refused, therefore, to entertain the plaintiff’s request to consider his claims and say whether he was, in their opinion, entitled to any compensation for his services, we think that there is no other remedy provided by law but a mandamus to compel action upon the subject. If the defendants deny that they refused to act as alleged, then an issue was thereby raised, and should have been submitted to the jury preliminary to entertaining the motion for a writ of mandamus. We are not prespared to admit that the defendants had such absolute discretion that they could compel a Sheriff to assume grave responsibility in the receipt and collection of the whole county fund proper, and to file a bond and subject himself to the risk incident to the accountability thus devolved upon him, and then deny him any compensation whatever after he had rendered a faithful account of his trust. Such a construction of the law would practically confer upon the County Commissioners the power to compel an officer objectionable to them to resign for want of support, and stretch’ their discretion to provide for a favorite who supplanted him.

We think that the law, fairly interpreted, was intended to give to every County Treasurer a compensation for his labor and responsibility, that in no case should be less than *201 two and a half per cent, per annum, on the amount collected, where it cannot exceed two hundred and fifty dollars.

The judgment of nonsuit must be set aside, and a new trial granted.

Venire de novo.