The statute (Pr. Acts 1885, ch. 40, sec. 56) makes it a misdemeanor to violate an ordinance of “The City of Statesville,” and the general statute (The Code, §3820) makes it a misdemeanor to violate the ordinance of any town or city, and the offender may be fined not exceeding fifty dollars, or imprisoned not exceeding thirty days. Of course, such ordinances must be valid — such as the town or city has authority to make. State v. Langston, 88 N. C., 692;. State v. Brittain, 89 N. C., 574.

*720 The statute (The Code, §3818) gives the Mayor, or other chief officer of such towns or cities, jurisdiction of such offences. State v. Cainan, 94 N. C, 880; State v. Crenshaw, Id., 877; State v. Debnam, 98 N. C., 712; State v. Smith, 103 N. C., 403. So (hat the Mayor had jurisdiction in this case, if, indeed, the offence, as charged, was committed, and for the present purpose, it must be taken that it was. But it is earnestly contended by the defendant’s counsel that the ordinance in question—that above recited—creates no offence; that it is void, because it is its purpose to create an offence defined, recognized and punishable by the general laws of the State, of which the Superior, Criminal and Inferior Courts have jurisdiction, and he relied mainly on Town of Washington v. Hammond, 76 N. C., 33; State v. Edens, 85 N. C., 522; State v. Langston, supra, and State v. Brittain, supra. The contention is that the acts forbidden by the ordinance-, of themselves, constitute a public nuisance.

We think otherwise. The mere obstruction of a waterway, so that water shall accumulate on the street, or so as to prevent the flow of water through, or from, the streets, does not per se and necessarily constitute a public nuisance. The obstruction might be slight, occasional, temporary— such as would not interfere with the use of the street or occasion perceptible harm. Such obstruction would not constitute such a nuisance unless it should interfere with the use of the street — hinder, delay, impede, or render less safe and convenient travel on foot, or otherwise, over it, or cause the water to accumulate, remain, become stagnant, and give rise to noxious vapors and the like, along and near the street.

The very purpose of the ordinance is to prevent such nuisances — to go beyond, extend and enlarge the advantage, convenience and protection ordinarily afforded by the general law's of the State. State v. Edens, supra; State v. Cainan, supra. The ordinance was, therefore, valid, and a viola *721 tion of it constituted the offence charged, not very formally, but sufficiently, in the warrant.

The affidavit and warrant constituted one proceeding, and embodied the criminal charge — the violation of the ordinance — not a nuisance, in the ordinary legal sense. State v. Sykes, 104 N. C., 695. The facts stated in them, and the express reference therein to the ordinance, plainly charged, and it was intended thereby to charge, a violation of the ordinance, and the words, “ thereby damaging said street,” etc., which the Court allowed to be stricken from the warrant, could not change or affect the nature of the offence charged — they were mere surplusage, serving no necessary purpose.

The mere addition in an indictment of unnecessary words applicable to another and higher offence than that charged, does not vitiate the indictment or change the nature of the offence. Hence, in State v. Keen, 95 N. C., 646, where the indictment charged a misdemeanor, it was held that, charging the act to have been done “feloniously” was no substantial ground of objection — this unnecessary word was treated as surplusage. State v. Thorne, 81 N. C., 555; State v. Edwards, 90 N. C., 710; State v. Watts, 82 N. C , 656; State v. Slagle, id., 653.

The amendment of the warrant complained of was really not necessary, but clearly the Court had authority to make it — it did not change the nature of the offence, and the Mayor had jurisdiction thereof. State v. Smith, 103 N. C., 410, and cases there cited.

There is error. The judgment quashing the warrant must be set aside, and the case disposed of according to law.

Error.