after stating the facts: The crop in question was vested in possession of the plaintiff as landlord, and he had a paramount lien thereon until the rents and the money due to him for advancements made by him to the defendant to make the crop, were discharged. The statute- (The Code, § 1754) so expressly provides. So far as appears, the lease was indefinite as to the time of its termination, and no particular time was specified therein when the crop should be divided, or when the plaintiff might enforce his lien. In such case, the lease terminates when, within a reasonable time, the crop shall be gathered and *91 divided, and the crop should be divided, in the absence of agreement to the contrary, as soon as conveniently it may be. Indeed, unless otherwise provided by agreement, the crop should be divided from time to time, as considerable parts thereof shall be gathered, especially where the gathering of the whole is delayed for a considerable length of time. There is no reason, ordinarily, why this shall not be done, and reasons of convenience, economy, safety of the parts of the crop gathered, and security of the rights of the parties interested, strongly suggest that it should be.

In this case it does not appear that, by the terms or effect of the contract of lease, the crop was not to be divided, and the plaintiff have his part thereof, until after the whole crop should be gathered. Nor was any reason suggested on the argument, nor can we conceive of any just one, why the plaintiff was not entitled to have his share of the crop gathered at the time he demanded it. His claims were paramount, and had to be satisfied, though they took the whole crop. So the law provides. Why, then, should he delay, or be allowed to delay, the plaintiff in having what was his own?

Hence, the plaintiff was entitled, at the time he brought the action, to have so much of the gathered crop as was necessary to pay the rents due him and to pay for the advancements made by him. But the defendant denied his right in that respect, contending that his right did not accrue until the whole of the crop should'be gathered, and he refused to allow the plaintiff to have any part of the crop. Thereupon the action was brought. On the trial, it appeared that the property — the part of the crop gathered — delivered to the plaintiff was less than the part thereof to which he was entitled as landlord. He got, by virtue of the ancillary proceeding of claim and delivery, only part of what he had the right to have. He ought, therefore, so far as appears, to have recovered.

This case is materially different from Jordan v. Bryan, 103 N. C., 59. In that case, the lease was for the year 1887, *92 and “the time agreed on when the advances made for 1887 should be due and demandable was when all the crops were gathered and divided. There was no agreement as to the time when the crops should be divided.” As we have seen, in the present case, the lease was indefinite as to the time of its termination, and no time vras fixed therein by its terms when the crop should be divided, or when the plaintiff might demand and have his part thereof.

The Court erred in directing the jury to render a verdict in the negative upon the issue submitted to them. The plaintiff is entitled to a new trial, and we so adjudge. It is so ordered. Error.