The assignment of the judgment to Reddin for the use and benefit of the appellees was a legitimate transaction, and the latter could compel him to a due observance of their equitable rights. It is very clear, as the authorities cited by the appellees’ counsel abundantly show, that the appellant purchased the judgment subject to their rights and equities. Jordan v. Black, 2 Murphy, 80; Moody v. Sitton, 2 Ired. Eq., 382; Bank v. Bynum, 84 N. C. 24; Havens v. Potts, 86 N. C., 31; Freeman on Judgments, § 427; Black on Judgments, §§ 953, 956. See Sherwood v. Collier, 3 Dev., 380; Ferebee v. Doxey, 6 Ired., 446; Barringer v. Boyden, 7 Jones, 187.

*152 The appellees did not discharge the judgment by the deposit of money they made; it continued in,force for their benefit. There was, however, no valid reason why they might not ask the Court to declare and treat it as satisfied and discharged, and this might be done by motion, certainly in the absence of objection as to the course of procedure.

Judgment affirmed.