We have carefully examined the affidavits and exhibits filed in this cause and find nothing that in our opinion entitles the plaintiffs to enjoin the appellant, J. R. Davis, from carrying on the business of a druggist in the town of Waynesville. The defendant Sprague is bound by his contract with the plaintiffs not to engage in that business at the place named, but the defendant Davis is not under any such obligation. Indeed, there is no contract whatever between him and the plaintiffs. Pie bought a stock of drugs from Sprague, it seems, as he was free to do. ITe secured the payment of the purchase-money therefor to Sprague by giving him a mortgage thereon, and as mortgagor he is in possession and was engaged in carrying on the business when stopped by the injunction order *649 issued in this cause, which not only enjoins the defendant Sprague and his agents and servants, but also the defendant Davis and his agents and servants. • Now, while it is true that in some sense the mortgagor of a stock of goods may be said to be the agent of the mortgagee, that principle has no application, we think, to the matter now under consideration. It cannot bo seriously contended that Sprague is violating a contract not to engage in the business of a druggist in Waynesville merely because he has a lien on a stock of drugs at that place.

'We find in the evidence adduced no substantial foundation for the plaintiffs’ allegation that the mortgage made by Davis to Sprague is a sham, and that Davis is merely the agent of Sprague. If, in fact, ho is such agent the injunction against the defendant Sprague and his agents is sufficient for the plaintiffs’ purposes. They produce no proof whatever, as it seems to us, that the appellant is Sprague’s agent — only facts that might raise a suspicion that he is. To stop his lawful business upon the evidence now before us seems unreasonable. Error.