Municipal corporations are the creatures of the Legislature, and their powers may be curtailed, enlarged or withdrawn at the will of the creator, whose control over them is limited only by the restriction that no statute will be enforced which impairs the obligation of a contract, interferes with vested rights, or is in conflict with any provision of the organic law of the State or nation. It is too well settled to recapitulate, or even justify discussion, that towns certainly by virtue of an express grant of authority to do so, and according to most authorities by implication arising out of the general welfare clause, if there is no general law to the contrary, are empowered to prescribe a fire limit and forbid the erection of wooden buildings within such bounds as they may by ordinance prescribe. 15 Am. and Eng. Enc., 1170; 1 Dillon Mun. Corp., section 405; Horr & Bemis Mun. Ord., section 222; Keilinger v. Bickel, 117 Pa. St., 326. The weight of authority seems to be also in favor of the proposition that the Legislature has the power to prevent the erection of wooden buildings in such corporations, or to delegate to the municipalities the authority to do so, even where the enforcement of the *849 law or ordinance caiises a suspension of work in the erection of structures of this kind by persons who arc earrang out contracts for their erection made previously with the owners of the land. Cordon v. Miller, 11 Mich., 581; Ex-parte Fiske, 17 Cal., 125. Persons, in contemplation of law, contract with reference to the existence and possible exercise of this authority when it is vested in the municipality. Salem v. Magness, 128 Mass., 574; Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S., 113; Woodlawn Cemetery v. Everett, 118 Mass., 354; Commissioners v. Intoxicating Liquors, 115 Mass., 153. Upon this same principle all agreements for building are deemed to be entered into in view of the contingency that such power may be granted by the Legislature (when it has not already been delegated) while the contract is still in fieri. 15 Am. and Eng. Enc., 1171.

While it might be unreasonable to prohibit even the slightest repairs to wooden buildings standing within the fire limits prior to the passage of a statute or ordinance establishing such limits, the power to prevent repairs is delegated and presumably exercised for the protection of property, and where a wooden structure within the bounds is partially destroyed by fire already it is not unreasonable to require a now roof to be made of material less liable to combustion, or to forbid the repairs altogether when the damage to 'the building is serious, and to that end to compel the owners to give notice to the town authorities of their purpose to repair, and of the character of the contemplated work. Village of Lewisville v. Webster, 108 Ill., 414.

We are aware that there is much conflict of authority as to the reasonableness of ordinances forbidding all repairs or the enforcement of them so as to prevent replacing roofs with the same material used before their destruction. Horr & Bemis, section 223 (214); Brady v. Insurance Co., 11 Mich., 425; Ex-parte Fiske, supra. But in this particular’ *850 instance the Legislature has granted a municipality the power to supervise or prevent the replacing of the roof with another of shingles instead of constructing one of material less liable to destruction, and we are not prepared to question its authority to do so, since, upon the principle already announced, persons contracting with reference to the chances of the granting as well as the exercise of such powers acquire no vested rights, and afterwards voluntarily incurring all of the risks incident to their situation, have no reason to complain of the loss when it befalls them.

The Court imposed a fine of fifty dollars. There was no attempt to enforce the portion of the ordinance imposing a penalty of ten dollars for every hour the' building was permitted to remain. Tl^re may be more doubt as to the reasonableness of that provision. Commissioners v. Wilkins, 121 Mass., 356. But it is not necessary to pass upon a question not fairly raised, and we forbear to do so. The judgment is Affirmed.