We are entirely satisfied that the assignee, in respect to this transaction, succeeds only to the rights of M. Rountree & Co., his assignors, and. that the case is to be determined bv the same principles which would *106 be applicable if there had been no assignment. Wallace v. Cohen, 111 N. C., 103; Southerland v. Freemont, 107 N. C., 565 ; Woodruff v. Bowles, 104 N. C., 211. This being so, we are of the opinion that the doctrine laid down in Whitehead v. Morrill, 108 N. C., 65, is decisive of the question before us and fully sustains the ruling of the Court below. The mortgage executed by the Griffins secured the payment of a note of $312.91 due by them to M. Rountree & Co., and also advances to be made by the said firm. All of this indebtedness was payable on the first of November, 1893, but before this date the said M. Rountree & Co. indorsed the note to the plaintiffs, who for the purposes of this action must be regarded as purchasers for value. By reason of this indorsement the said M. Rountree & Co. became liable to the plaintiffs, and as the other indebtedness is still in their hands (or, what is the same thing, in the hands of their assignee) the case very plainly falls within the principle of Whitehead v. Morrill, supra. If it be conceded that the mortgage as to the advances is to be treated as an agricultural lien (Townsend v. McKinnon, 98 N. C., 103), and therefore entitled to priority as against the adverse liens of other persons, we do not see how this can militate against the conclusion we have reached. The amount of the advances thus secured was, like the note, due the said Rountree & Co., and as between them and the indorsers of the note its payment was, upon the principle of Whitehead’s case (supra), postponed, and it is immaterial whether it was entitled to priority over the claims of third parties.

Affirmed.