State v. . Hill
State v. . Hill
Opinion of the Court
Secrecy is usually a part of the evidence of á felonious intent, but it is not an essential accompaniment so as to make it incumbent on the State to show an attempt to conceal the taking in every instance. State v. Powell, 103 N. C., 424; State v. Fisher, 70 N. C., 78. In the most favorable aspect of the testimony as to the manner of taking and carrying the meat out of the store, the question of the intent of the defendant was one for the jury, and whether he went out of the store carrying it in front of him or under his overcoat, it was proper for the Court below to leave the *783 jury to determine whether it was taken to the wagon at the request of Charles Godwin, and under the belief that God-win had bought it, or whether it was the purpose of the defendant to deprive the true owner of it and convert it to his own use.
If the Solicitor abused his privilege, as counsel for the State, in his comments in reference to the color of the defendant, it was not such an extreme case as to take it out of the general and well-established rule that the Court may either stop counsel at the time or caution the jury in its charge not to be influenced by the remarks complained of. Greenlee v. Greenlee, 93 N. C., 278 ; State v. Bryan, 89 N. C., 531; Kerchner v. McRae, 80 N. C., 219; State v. Weddington, 103 N. C., 364; Hudson v. Jordan, 108 N. C., 10. We must not be understood as holding that as a reply to what had been said by the defendant’s counsel the remarks of the Solicitor upon this subject were not within the line of fair and legitimate debate. There was No Error.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- State v. John Hill.
- Cited By
- 4 cases
- Status
- Published
- Syllabus
- Larceny — Felonious Intent — Secrecy—Remarks of Counsel. 1. While secrecy is usually a part of the evidence of felonious intent it is not such an essential accompaniment of larceny as to require the State, in every instance, to prove an attempt to conceal the taking. 2. Where, in the trial of an indictment for larceny, there was conflicting evidence as to the manner in which the defendant took and carried from a store a piece of meat, it was proper in the Court to leave the question of felonious intent to the jury. 3. Where the Solicitor, in reply to a remai'k by the defendant’s counsel that the defendant was a respectable white man, said to the jury that he himself was a colored man, and that if defendant was a colored man the jury would convict him in five minutes on the evidence, the error (if any) in permitting such remark to the jury was cured by a caution by the Court, in its charge to the jury, not to be influenced by the remarks complained of.