It will be observed that this action was originally brought against Mendenhall & Duvall and they were enjoined from cutting the timber from plaintiffs’ land. Thereafter Thomas, who had been made party defendant, filed an affidavit which was heard before Judge Jones as the basis for a motion to be permitted to cut and remove the timber during the pending of the action. His Honor granted the order, basing his action upon his opinion that the title to the land passed by the deed executed by William H. Wilson to Alice A. Farrer, bearing date August 1, 1859, which title vested in Thomas. The deed from Erame to Thomas contains certain provisions and stipulations, which were argued by counsel, constituting an agreement for maintenance of a lawsuit thereby vitiating the deed. The discussion *645 in tbis Court was largely directed to the validity of the probate of the deed from Wilson to Earrer, the plaintiffs contending that it was invalid for that no seal was attached to the certificate of the commissioner of deeds, and further that the order of registration was defective in that there was no adjudication that the deed had been properly proved before the Commissioner of Deeds. .The power of the commissioner to take acknowledgment or proof of the execution of deeds executed in other States conveying land situate in this State is found in chapter 37, section 5, of The Revised Code. It does not appear from an examination of that section that the commissioner is required to affix any seal to his certificate, the language being: “And duly certified by him, such deed, power of attorney, bill of salé or other instrument, being exhibited in the Court of Pleas and Quarter Sessions of the county where the property is situate, or to one of the Judges of the Supreme Court or of the Superior Courts of this State, shall be ordered to be registered with the certificates thereto annexed.” It is certainly usual for Commissioners of Deeds or affidavits to affix their official seal to certificates made by them. We have carefully examined the several statutes bearing upon the subject and cited in the briefs and find no statute requiring a seal to be affixed to such certificate.

It is further contended that the certificate of the Clerk does not show affirmatively that the Court adjudged the certificate of the commissioner to be in due form or that the proof or acknowledgment was properly taken. It will be observed that the deed was exhibited in open Court, and it may be that upon the trial it will appear from the minutes of the Court that the proper adjudication was made. It would seem that the law would raise a presumption to that effect. We prefer deferring a decision of this question until the cause shall be brought to trial and the evidence, together *646 with the minutes of the Court of Pleas and Quarter Sessions, introduced. There is, however, a view of the case not presented by the briefs which we think it proper to decide, as it affects a matter of interest to the public. The order is evidently based upon the power conferred upon the Court by chapter 666 of the Laws of 1901, the first section of which provides: “That in all actions to try title to timber lands and in all actions for trespass thereon for cutting timber trees, whenever the Court shall find as a fact that there is a bona fide contention on both sides based upon evidence constituting a prima facie title, no order shall be made pending such action permitting either party to cut said timber trees, except by consent, until the title to said land or timber trees shall be finally determined in such action. That whenever in any such action the Judge shall find as a fact that the contention of either party thereto is not in' good faith, and is not based upon evidence constituting a prima facie title, then upon motion of the other party thereto who may satisfy the Court of the bona fieles of his contention, and who may produce evidence showing a prima facie title, the Court may allow such party to cut the said timber trees by giving-bond,” etc. We think that before an order vitally affecting the rights of either party shall be made, such as the permission to cut the timber, the Court shall find as a fact, and incorporate such finding in the order, that the contention of the party against whose claim the order is made is not in good faith and that the contention of the party in favor of whom the order is made is in good faith and based upon a prima facie title. The order in this cause finds neither of these facts and for that reason we think is erroneous.

Serious questions being presented for determination on the hearing of this cause, we think that in the absence of any finding that the plaintiffs’ contention was not made in good faith and that the defendant’s contention was bona fide and *647 based upon a prima facie title, tbe property should have been left in statu quo until tbe final bearing. Without passing upon the other questions argued before us the order of his Honor is reversed.

Reversed.