State v. Capps
Cases that cite this one
17 later published cases cite this decision.
- State v. Wall (N.C. 1982)
- State v. Smith (N.C. 1982)
- State v. . Craton (N.C. 1845)
- State v. Tirado (N.C. 2025)
- State v. Juarez (N.C. Ct. App. 2015)
- King v. State (Ala. Crim. App. 1987)
- State v. King (N.C. 1986)
- State v. Barrett (N.C. Ct. App. 1974)
- State v. Williams (N.C. 1973)
- Hill v. Commonwealth (Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976) 1931)
- People v. . Jernatowski (N.Y. 1924)
- State v. . Pasour (N.C. 1922)
- State v. . Brinkley (N.C. 1922)
- State v. Brinkley (N.C. 1922)
- State v. . Cox (N.C. 1910)
- Tyner v. United States (Okla. Crim. App. 1909)
- State v. . Lance (N.C. 1908)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
after stating the case. The defendant’s counsel at the close of the testimony requested the Court to give certain instructions to the jury, which it refused to do, but we do not deem it necessary to consider or discuss them, as all of the questions intended to be presented by the other exceptions of the defendant are raised by the defendant’s exception to one of the instructions given by the Court in its charge to the jury. The Court charged the jury correctly in regard to murder in the first degree, and also as to the circumstances under which the defendant would be entitled to an acquittal, but told the jury that in no view of the evidence could they convict him of manslaughter, and in this 'connection the jury were instructed as follows: “If you find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant shot the deceased with a gun, inflicting a wound from which death resulted, but you are not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the shooting and killing were the result .of wilful premeditation and deliberation, then your verdict should be that of murder in the second degree. If it resulted from wilful premeditation and deliberation, then your verdict should be guilty of murder in the first degree. In no view of the evidence, if you believe it, can you return a verdict of manslaugh- ■ ter.”
The question then is, was there any evidence, if the testimony is considered in the most favorable light for the, defendant, upon which the jury could have returned a ver-, ' diet that the defendant was guilty only-of manslaughter? The defendant could not have his case presented here in a more favorable aspect for him than it is by this charge
There is no principle in the criminal law better settled than that, where the killing with a deadly -weapon is admitted, or proved, in the sense that it is established as a fact in the case, the law implies' or presumes malice, and at common law the killing, if nothing else appears, is murder. State v. Willis, 63 N. C., 26; State v. Johnson, 48 N. C., 266; State v. Brittain, 89 N. C., 481. When this implication is raised by an admission of proof of the fact of killing, the burden is upon the defendant of showing-all the circumstances of mitigation, excuse or justification to the satisfaction of the jury. State v. Johnson and State v. Willis, supra; State v. Vann, 82 N. C., 631; State v. Barrett, 132 N. C., 1005, and that burden continues to rest upon him throughout the trial. State v. Brittain, supra. As malice is an implication or presumption raised by law from the fact of the killing, it must needs be a mat
We have examined the testimony set forth in the record with great care and have been unable to find anything which tends in law to extenuate the crime of which the defendant was convicted, and there is certainly nothing to excuse it. Instead of rebutting the implied malice, the evidence tends to strengthen and confirm the presumption raised against the defendant from the act of killing with a deadly weapon. The malice necessary to constitute murder may exist, though there was no intent to kill or even to injure the particular
We believe the authorities cited support the general rule laid down, and several of the cases, while not presenting precisely the same facts, cannot be distinguished in principle from the case under consideration. In Clark’s Criminal Law, p. 190, the rule is thus substantially stated: Where a person does an act with knowledge that it will probably cause death or grievous bodily harm to some person, although he has no actual intention to injure any person, but may wish the contrary, and death ensues from his act, he is guilty of murder. Thus, if a man recklessly throws from a roof into a crowded street a heavy piece of timber which kills a person in the street, or if he intentionally fires a pistol in a crowded street and kills another, in either case it is murder. In Pool v. State, supra, the Court says: “The law infers guilty intention from reckless conduct; and where the recklessness is of such a character as to justify this inference, it is the same as if the defendant had deliberately intended the act committed. When therefore one recklessly fires a pistol with criminal indifference as to the consequences and another is killed, it is not necessary, in order to constitute this killing murder, that the accused should at the time of firing have been engaged in the commission of some unlawful act, independent of and in addition to the reckless firing itself.” In Brown v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 17 S. W. Rep., 220, it
The defendant, on the cross-examination of some of the State’s •witnesses, proposed to show that he had been friendly with Mary Tuten and her family at the time when the homicide was committed, and also proposed to show certain facts 'and circumstances from which his friendly feeling towards
The evidence in this case tends to show that the defendant’s anger was aroused by the refusal of Georgia McCul-loch to come to the door of the house when he called her, and perhaps by what Florence Tuten said to. him at the time. This reference to the testimony is made, not so much to show that there was evidence in the case of actual malice, as to show that the evidence not only does not rebut the implication of malice, but rather tends to confirm it.
The defendant excepted to the judgment upon the ground that the punishment imposed is excessive. The sentence of the Court was entirely within the limit fixed by the law. It imposed only the extreme punishment for manslaughter. We do not think, in any view of the evidence, that it was excessive. State v. Miller, 94 N. C., 904.
Uj>on a review of the whole case, our conclusion i§ that-the rulings and charge of the Court were correct.
No error.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.