after stating the case: This Court has held in numerous cases that the judgment of a justice of the peace *550 ■which has been duly docketed in the Superior Court becomes a judgment of the latter court, under the statute (Revisal, sec. 1479), for the purpose only of creating a lien and of having execution issued thereon within the same time as is limited for judgments originally recovered in that court. Ledbetter v. Osborne, 66 N. C., 379; Hutchison v. Symons, 67 N. C., 156; Birdsey v. Harris, 68 N. C., 92; Adams v. Gay, 106 N. C., ,275; Morton v. Rippy, 84 N. C., 611; McIlhenny v. Trust Co., 108 N. C., 311. The subject is fully discussed by Justice Dillard in Broyles v. Young, 81 N. C., 315, which has been considered in the more recent decisions of this Court as settling the true construction of the statute. The plaintiff in the judgment may move at any time within the ten years after the docketing of the judgment in the Superior Court for the issuing of executions thereon, upon notice to the adverse party, where execution has not issued within three years. Rut this is not a motion for execution to be issued, but an action upon the judgment itself. An action cannot be brought upon the judgment docketed in the Superior Court, for that is a judgment only for the purpose of lien and execution. Tt is not a new and independent causa litis. When it becomes necessary to sue upon the judgment, the action must be brought upon the judgment of the justice. In McIlhenny v. Trust Co., 108 N. C., at p. 314, the Court, after reviewing the authorities, says: “At the time this action began, more than ten years had elapsed next after the judgment was docketed. The judgment was barred after the lapse of seven years from its date, and the right to enforce, it by execution (issuing from the Superior Court) or otherwise was barred after the lapse of ten years next after the time it was docketed.”

But the case of Daniel v. Laughlin, 87 N. C., 433, is decisive of this case, it being a decision upon the very question presented by the facts which have been admitted by the parties. It was a creditor’s suit, as this action is, and one *551 of the plaintiffs declared upon two judgments of a justice of the peace, which had been rendered more than seven years before the action was commenced and also docketed in the Superior Court. The Court held that, as it was an action upon the judgments and not merely a motion for executions, the seven-years statute applied and barred a recovery of the claim. Justice Ruffin thus states the law: “We do not understand counsel who argued the plaintiff’s exceptions in this Court to insist very earnestly upon them. Nor can we ourselves perceive any error in the ruling of the court below. The statute fixes the limitation to actions upon judgments rendered by justices of the peace at seven years in language so plain and positive that it leaves nothing open for construction; and, notwithstanding the fact that the judgments declared on in this case had been docketed, they, continue to be the judgments of the justice for every purpose and intent save those of lien and execution, and as much subject to the limitations prescribed for such judgments as though no transcript of them had ever been forwarded to the Superior Court.”

Counsel have asked us to reconsider that decision and reverse the principle as therein declared, but we must decline to do so, as we think the case was correctly decided. An inspection of the pleadings in this case will reveal the fact that the action is brought directly upon the judgment. It is true the plaintiff seeks to enforce its payment out of the assets— personal assets, we assume', as no other kind are mentioned— in the hands of the administrators, but the relief so sought by the plaintiff does not change the character of the action as being one-upon the judgment. It may well be added that the judgment upon which this suit was brought was barred by the seven-years statute at the time of the intestate’s death. Can it be that it has been revived by his death, so that the plaintiff now occupies a better position with'respect, to it than he did before ? We think not. What Justice Ruffin says *552 in Daniel v. Laughlin, 87 N. C., at p. 436, witb reference to Battle’s Revisal, cb. 45, sec. 40 (Revisal of 1905, sec. 87), is a full answer to tbe question.

The decision of the court upon the case agreed was correct and is sustained.

Affirmed.