after stating the case: The sole question presented by defendant’s exception is whether the voucher executed by plaintiff at the time he received the draft for $275 bars his recovery of the amount sued for in this action. The amount received by him was all that was due at that time, under the terms of the policy. The proof of claim makes no reference to any claim for future indemnity. It is, of course, conceded that, pursuant to our statute (Revisal, sec. 859), the acceptance of “a less amount than that demanded or claimed to be due in satisfaction thereof” is a valid discharge of the whole amount, if so agreed upon and accepted. But there was no other amount *155 tban tbe $275 paid, “claimed or demanded,” nor was any reference made to any claim or demand for future indemnity for disability thereafter sustained. Tbe plaintiff bad paid defendant in full at tbe date of tbe policy for its contract of indemnity, extending over tbe full period of twelve months, but four of which bad expired. Neither party, so far as appears, desired to put an end to tbe contract or surrender any benefits accruing thereunder. It would be a strange result if; in accepting and acknowledging tbe receipt of tbe exact amount due him at tbe time, tbe plaintiff’s receipt should be construed to be a surrender of all further claim under bis contract with defendant for which be bad paid a full consideration, it will be noted that tbe paper is a printed form used by tbe defendant, attached to tbe draft, tbe signature of which was°required before payment. It is hardly probable that either party understood that it applied to or'covered any other tban tbe claim then made and due. It may be that tbe language of tbe voucher, without reference to tbe proof of claim and other papers attached, would be sufficiently broad to include all claims accruing by reason of tbe sickness of 6 July, 1907, but, when read in connection therewith, we think it manifestly referred to tbe claim then due and for which tbe draft was drawn. Defendant relies upon tbe decision of this Court in Wright v. Railroad,, 125 N. C., 1. In that case tbe damage for which tbe plaintiff sued bad been sustained prior to tbe date of tbe release and was expressly referred to and included therein. Tbe distinction is obvious. It is true that tbe sickness of 6 July, 1907, was sickness from which tbe claim for weekly indemnity arose, but tbe plaintiff’s right to demand indemnity was not for being sick, but for disability caused by sickness, measured by tbe week. For such disability as bad not accrued plaintiff neither bad nor claimed to have any demand. If it be suggested that tbe language used was an agreement to release such claim as might accrue in tbe future, the objection to its validity is found in tbe fact that it is without consideration. He received no more tban be was entitled to, and defendant paid no more tban it was under legal liability to pay. “It is a general principle that tbe release shall be construed from tbe standpoint which tbe parties occupied at tbe time of its *156 execution, and confined to the intention of the parties at the time of such execution. * * * The words employed in a release should not be extended beyond the consideration; otherwise, the courts make a release for the parties which they never intended or contemplated.” 24 Am. and Eng. Enc., 290. The’ case, stated in the simplest form, comes to this: On 31 October, 1907, defendant owed plaintiff $275, and plaintiff held its contract to pay a fixed indemnity for any disability thereafter accruing. Defendant paid the amount which it owed by draft, attaching the voucher. Plaintiff received the draft and signed the voucher.' To extend its language, by construction, to indemnity for disability thereafter accruing would, we think, do violence to the intention of the parties — certainly of the plaintiff, who, if so construed, surrendered a claim for indemnity, for which he had paid in full for no consideration. As a release is a new contract, it must be so construed as to effectuate the intention of both parties. Considered from any point of view, we concur with his Honor’s ruling. The judgment must be Affirmed.