The only point presented by this appeal, conceded by the attorneys- for both plaintiff and defendant, is whether a judge of the Superior Court can review the findings of fact and law by a referee appointed by consent in an action pending in that court, where the order of reference directs the referee “to hear' and determine all issues and questions of law and fact arising upon the pleadings.” The precise question has been decided by this Court, and it has been repeatedly ruled that the judge has such power. Smith v. Hides, 108 N. C., 249, in which several cases- are cited; Blalock v. Mfg. Co., 110 N. C., 99; Dunavant v. R. R., 122 N. C., 999; Cummings v. Swepson, 124 N. C., 579; Henderson v. McLain, 146 N. C., 329; sec. 525, Pell’s Rev. and cases cited under heading, “Findings of Fact.” It is not contended by the plaintiff that there was no evidence to support his Honor’s finding of fact reversing the finding of fact of the referee, but that it was contrary to the weight othe evidence. In Henderson v. McLain, 146 N. C., 329, this Court said: “The rulings of the judge below upon the exceptions to findings of fact are conclusive, there being evidence upon such findings. Dunnavant v. R. R., 122 N. C., 999, and cases there cited.” We conclude there was no error in the judgment apjiealed from, and the same is

Affirmed.