Under the common law, “tbe tenant for life, or bis representative, shall not be prejudiced by any sudden determination of bis estate because such a determination is contingent and uncertain. Therefore, if a tenant for bis own life sows tbe lands, and dies before harvest, bis executor shall have tbe emblements or profits of the crop, for tbe estate was determined by tbe act of God, and it is a maxim in tbe law that actus dei nemini facit injuriam. Tbe representatiyes, therefore, of tbe tenant for life shall have tbe emblements to compensate for tbe labor and expense for tilling, manuring, and sowing tbe lands, and also for tbe encouragement of husbandry, which being a public benefit, tending to tbe increase and plenty of provisions, ought to have tbe utmost security and privilege tbe law can give it.” 2 Bl. Com., 122; Taylor on L. and T., 355; Gee v. Young, 1 Hay, 17; Poindexter v. Blackburn, 36 N. C., 286.

*231 “A tenant of lands for an uncertain term, such, as a tenant for life or at will, is entitled by way of emblements to tbe annual production of bis annual labor, altbougb bis estate may bave been terminated by tbe act of God or of tbe law before be shall bave harvested tbe same. Where tbe tenant for life makes a lease for years, and dies before tbe expiratiop. of tbe term, tbe undertenant or -tenant for years is likewise entitled to emblements.” 24 Oye., 1070-1.

Tbe General Assembly.of this State, having in mind these principles and considering tbe injustice to tbe remainderman-of withholding from him tbe part of tbe rent f<?r bis land accruing after tbe life estate bad fallen in, enacted tbe statute which is now section 1990 of tbe Eevisal, which reads as follows: “Where any lease for years of any land let for farming on which a rent is reserved shall determine during a current year of tbe tenancy by tbe happening of any uncertain event determining tbe estate of tbe lessor, tbe tenant, in lieu of emblements, shall continue bis occupation to the end of such current year, and shall then give up such possession to tbe succeeding owner of tbe land, and shall pay to such succeeding owner a part of tbe rent accrued since tbe past payment became due, proportionate to tbe part of tbe period of payment elapsing after tbe termination of tbe estate of tbe lessor to tbe giving up of such possession.”

Before this statute was passed tbe remainderman would bave received no part of tbe rents in controversy, and bis right now is, therefore, dependent upon tbe construction of tbe statute, which was considered in King v. Foscue, 91 N. C., 116, in which it was held that it was its plain purpose to extend tbe lease for tbe current year to tbe extent of occupancy upon tbe part of tbe tenant until tbe end of tbe lease year current at tbe time of tbe death that terminated it.

Tbe lease is not valid except as supported by tbe consideration to pay rent, and if tbe lease is extended, it would seem to follow that it was only upon condition that tbe rent reserved shall continue, and that it alone should be paid. Tbe language of tbe statute is that tbe tenant shall pay to tbe succeeding owner a part of tbe rent accrued since tbe last payment became due proportionate to tbe part of tbe period of payment elapsing after tbe termination of tbe estate of tbe lessor. No rent has accrued except under tbe terms of tbe lease.

If tbe construction contended for by tbe plaintiff could be maintained, it would render it difficult for a life tenant to make a contract of lease, as tbe tenant would be subject to tbe danger of paying rent under tbe lease for a part of tbe year, and if tbe lease was terminated by death, be could be'held responsible for a higher and different rent by tbe remain-derman.

*232 We are, therefore, of opinion that the ruling of his Honor was correct. There is no allegation in the complaint demanding payment of rent for the time the land was occupied by the tenant after 1 November, 1912, the end of the current year under the lease, until its surrender by the defendants — a period of about two months.