The natural interpretation of the evidence of the plaintiff as to the declaration of the agent of the defendant is that the declaration was made while the agent was engaged in the work- of scalinglogs for the defendant, for the purpose of ascertaining the true measurement, and so understood, is competent.

The rule as to the admissibility of such evidence is stated in Gazzam v. Insurance Co., 155 N. C., 340, to be that, “The competency of the declarations of an agent of a corporation rests upon the same principle as the declarations of an agent of an individual. If they are narrative of a past occurrence, as in Smith v. R. R., 68 N. C., 107, and Rumbough v. Improvement Co., 112 N. C., 752, they are incompetent; but-if made within the scope of -the agency and while engaged in the very business about which the declaration is made, they are competent. McComb v. R. R., 70 N. C., 180; Southerland v. R. R., 106 N. C., 105; Darlington v. Telegraph Co., 127 N. C., 450.”

His Honor properly refused to give the instruction prayed for. If the defendant owed Bryson & Griffith on the logging contract, and at the time they assigned the contract to the plaintiff they agreed that the plaintiff should have the amount due them, he was entitled to recover it.

No error.