The plaintiff acquired a contingent remainder for life in one-half of the land in controversy under the will of his father, W. II. Scott, and he became the owner in fee of all other interests therein except those of W. T. Scott and his wife under thé deed executed to him by the heirs and devisees of W. H. Scott. The contingent interest was the subject of sale and passed by the deed executed to W. T. Scott (Kornegay v. Miller, 137 N. C., 659; Beason v. Amos, 161 N. C., 359; Hobgood v. Hobgood, ante, 485), and, therefore, when the plaintiff executed his deed to W. T. Scott purporting to convey the land itself in fee, he parted with his title, and as these facts appear in the complaint, his Honor properly held that no cause of action was stated.

There is no allegation of mistake or fraud, and the plaintiff does not ask to have his deed corrected, and if the plaintiff should be permitted to recover he would have to do so in the face of his allegation that he has conveyed the land in fee, which he cannot do. Weeks v. Wilkins, 139 N. C., 217.

Affirmed.