after stating the case: On proof of the death of the member, presentation of the policy by the beneficiary and denial of any liability by the company, a prima facie right of recovery is established, and defendant, claiming to be relieved by reason of nonpayment of dues or other like default, has the burden of proof in reference to such defenses. Harris v. Junior Order, etc., 168 N. C., 357; Wilkie v. National Council, 147 N. C., 637; Doggett v. Golden Cross, 126 N. C., pp. 477-480.

The decisions also very generally hold that in case of doubt and uncertainty as to the meaning of a contract of insurance it shall be resolved in favor of the insured. Jones v. Casualty Co., 140 N. C., 262; Kendrick v. Ins. Co., 124 N. C., 315; Bank v. Ins. Co., 95 U. S., 265; Vance on Insurance, p. 592.

A proper application of these recognized principles to the facts in evidence is in full support of the charge of the trial judge, “that, on the evidence, if believed by the jury, the plaintiff had the right to recover.”

It is insisted for defendant that no recovery should be allowed because, at the time of his death, Frank Lyons, the member, was in arrears for monthly dues, and this was in violation of the .stipulation in the policy, “that the brother knight shall be a member in good standing at the time of his death, and that the records of the grand lodge and of the subordinate lodge shall sustain the same.” But, in our opinion, this stipulation for “good standing” in reference to the nonpayment of dues, etc., must be interpreted and controlled by the constitution and by-laws of the company, and a reference to these regulations shows that a member can only be suspended when he has failed to pay his dues for six months and has been notified to pay the same, and, on examination of the facts in evidence, there was no testimony offered as to any demand for these dues or of any notice of the action by the local lodge in reference thereto, and it furthermore affirmatively appears that, at the time the order of expulsion was made the plaintiff was only in arrears for the space of five days, and, according to its own constitution, the local and subordinate lod<re was without power or jurisdiction to make any such order, and plaintiff’s right of recovery should in no way be affected by it — a position that is in accord with riyht reason and is well supported by authority. Supreme Lodge v. Dalberg, 138 Ill., 509; Womans Catholic Order v. Haley, 86 Ill. Ct. App., 330; Mulroy v. Knights of Honor, 28 Mo. Appeals, p. 463.

The case of Wilkie v. National Council, 151 N. C., pp. 527-528, to which we were referred on the argument, is not to our minds, in contravention of this view. In that case it was proved that the deceased *411 member bad been in arrears for eight months and, on his right to recover, the policy contained stipulation that recovery was on condition that the member, at the time of his death, should be in good standing in the subordinate lodge and also a member in good standing of the financial benefit department, etc., etc., and the constitution and by-laws of the order in reference to these stipulations was shown to be as follows: “A member of the council who is thirteen weeks or more in arrears for dues forfeits all his rights and privileges except that of being admitted to the council chamber during its sessions.” And, further: “Any brother who is thirteen weeks or more in arrears shall not be entitled to any sick benefits, nor shall he, in case of death, be entitled to death benefits.” '

It will thus be seen that in 'Wilkie’s case the default was much more pronounced and the constitution much more exacting, or, rather, it is entirely different from the one before us.

There is no error, and the judgment on the verdict is affirmed.

No error.