after stating the facts: This Court has held that trees growing upon land can be conveyed for the purpose of being cut and removed therefrom within a fixed time; that they are to be considered as realty, and that the title to such of them as are not cut within the prescribed time remains in the grantor, and does not pass by the deed. Bunch v. Lumber Co., 134 N. C., 116; Hawkins v. Lumber Co., 139 N. C., 160; Lumber Co. v. Corey, 140 N. C., 462; Midyette v. Grubbs, 145 N. C., 85; Timber Co. v. Wilson, 151 N. C., 154.

In the Bunch case we quoted with approval the doctrine as stated in Strasson v. Montgomery, 32 Wis., 52, as follows: “The conveyance is of all the trees and timber on the premises, with the proviso that the vendee should take the same off the land within four years. It is well settled, on principle and by authority, that the legal effect of the instrument is that the vendor thereby conveyed to the vendee all of the trees and timber on the premises which the vendee should remove therefrom within the prescribed time, and that such as remained thereon after that time should belong to the vendor or to his grantee of the premises.”

So in Hawkins v. Lumber Co., supra, we held, in regard to the same matter : “It is an established principle in this State that growing timber is a part of the realty, and deeds and contracts concerning it are governed by the laws applicable to that kind of property. The true construction of this instrument how before the Court is that the same ■conveys a present estate of absolute ownership in the timber, defeasible as to all timber not removed within the time required by the terms of the deed. A construction substantially similar has been placed on- such ■deeds in the larger timber-growing States where contracts of this character are not infrequent,” citing several cases for the position.

Under these authorities, the legal effect of the deed from the appellant to the Camp Manufacturing Company is that it conveys only the trees that were cut by the latter, and those not cut within the time fixed by the deed belonged to the grantor; and, further, that the deed conveyed only such trees as are described in it, that is, those then owned by the appellant and of the prescribed dimension. This instrument *303 itself, in form and substance, evidences only a sale of tbe trees, and that is the legal designation of the contract. It does not, on its face, purport to do anything but convey the trees to the grantee, or so many of-a given dimension as are thereafter cut within the prescribed time. It was not necessary that the price should be paid down in cash, or that notes should be given for it. It could not then be ascertained definitely what it would be, and not until it was known how many of the trees would be cut. This did not change the character of the transaction as a sale, for that is certain which can be made certain by reference to something else'. “The price may be left to be fixed in such manner as may be agreed upon in the contract of sale, as by the market price of the commodity at a certain time and place or by any other method by which it can be determined with reasonable certainty. So the price may by agreement be left to be fixed in accordance with a valuation of the goods to be subsequently made by some third person.” The Camp Manufacturing Company was, therefore, not authorized by the deed to cut any other trees. The instruction of the court, when considered in connection with what precedes it, and the reference in the instruction to trees under a certain dimension, which is mentioned in the deed, being cut by the Camp Manufacturing Company, shows that it had reference to the authority, given to said company by the deed, to cut trees, and as thus treated, it was too broad. The Camp Manufacturing Company could cut, under the terms of the deed, only such trees as are described therein, and if it cut other trees the appellant would not be liable therefor, unless it gave some authority, apart from the deed, to do the act. Its authority given by the deed to cut trees of a certain dimension did not, of course, extend to trees not of that kind, and the Camp Manufacturing Company would be liable alone for the trespass if it did cut other trees, in the absence of any proof showing that the appellant participated in the cutting or was in some way connected with it. “It is the general rule that one who counsels, advises, abets, or assists in the commission by another of an actionable wrong is responsible to the injured party for the entire loss or damage. But mere knowledge that a tort is being committed against another will not be sufficient to establish liability. There exists no legal duty to disclose. Nor will the mere presence of a person at the commission of a trespass or other wrongful act by another render him liable as a participant. It is also well settled that the liability of one who has not actively participated may be established where the wrongful act is ratified by him. But mere acquiescence in the commission of a tort after the act does not make the person thus acquiescing a party to the wrong or liable therefor as a joint tort-feasor, since, to be liable, he must not only have *304 assented to tbe wrong, but tbe act must bave been done for bis benefit or bave been of a nature to benefit bim. Ratification will not be established from mere knowledge, approval, or satisfaction. It bas been said tbat ‘To bold one responsible for a tort not committed by bis orders, bis adoption of and assent to tbe same must at all events be clear and explicit, and founded on a clear knowledge of tbe tort wbicb bas been committed.’ Tbe ratification must be founded on full knowledge of tbe facts constituting tbe wrong wbicb bas been committed or a purpose without inquiry to take tbe consequences.” 38 Cyc., 485 and 486. Tbe Camp Manufacturing Company was authorized by tbe deed to enter upon tbe land and cut and remove trees, but not trees wbicb did not come within tbe description of tbe deed; and for this reason tbe instruction was calculated to mislead tbe jury as to tbe law and tbe nature of tbe appellant’s liability for tbe trespass of tbe Camp Manufacturing Company, if there was any liability on its part. Tbe instruction, as we bave said, manifestly referred to an entry upon tbe lands under tbe deed, to cut timber, and this extended tbe appellant’s liability for tbe excessive acts of tbe other company beyond its legitimate scope. The acceptance of rent, without any knowledge of tbe source from wbicb it came, or for what it was given, -would not create liability for tbe tort or trespass of tbe Camp Manufacturing Company, as we bave seen by tbe above reference to 38 Cyc:, p. 486. Tbe receipt of tbe money must be such as -would amount to a ratification of tbe trespass, or, under some circumstances, it might be evidence of a participation therein. Tbe instruction requested by tbe appellant is correct in principle, and should bave been given, unless it has been extended to too many of the^ issues. We do not see now bow it affects tbe seventh issue. If tbe appellant did nothing more than convey the trees be then owned of a certain kind and dimension, and merely received tbe price therefor, we do not see bow it can be liable for the trespass of tbe Camp Manufacturing Company in cutting trees not described in tbe deed. If A. conveys to B. a certain tract of land, be is not liable to 0. because B. takes possession not only of tbe tract conveyed to bim by A., but also of an adjoining tract belonging to 0. In tbat case B. bas simply done something not authorized by A. to be done. Plaintiff may be able to show tbat, under all tbe facts and circumstances of tbe case, the jury should find tbat there was concert of action between tbe companies or that tbe appellant did so act as to authorize tbe trespass, and if it did not do so originally, it bas since so acted as to ratify or indorse it.

It may be tbat tbe facts of tbe case are such as to make the Camp Manufacturing Company a proper party to this action, especially if it will be contended tbat tbe two corporations are really one and tbe same; *305 but we leave tbis matter for tbe consideration of counsel, without any suggestion from us as to tbe course tbat should be tahen.

There was error in tbe instruction given by tbe court, which requires tbat a new trial should be had.

New trial.