The Constitution, Art. Y, see. 1, provides, in effect, that for ordinary purposes the State and county tax combined shall in no case exceed the sum of $2 on the poll and 66% cents on the $100 valuation of property. So far as we are aware, and as to debts and obligations incurred since the provision was established, no departure from this limitation on the amount of taxation has been approved except when and to the extent required to maintain a four months school, as enjoined by Article IX, sec. 3, Collie v. Comrs., 145 N. C., 170, and except when- the tax is levied for a “special purpose and with the special' approval of the General Assembly.” Moose v. Comrs., 172 N. C., 419; R. R. v. Comrs., 148 N. C., 220.

In view of the constitutional provision and the decisions of the Court construing the same, we áre of opinion that the county commissioners of Rockingham County are without power to incur this indebtedness of $200,000, issue the negotiable bonds of the county in evidence of their obligation, and stipulate for a continuing tax to pay the interest and provide a sinking fund which is in excess of the established limitation. Board of Education v. Comrs., 107 N. C., 110; French v. Comrs., supra; Millsaps v. Terrell, 60 Fed., 193.

True, we have held in this jurisdiction that when county commissioners have power to contract a debt or to provide for valid debts already contracted, they may, in the exercise of good business prudence, issue county bonds in evidence of the obligation,' the right of taxation, therefor, being restricted to the constitutional limitations as to debts incurred since the same was adopted. Comrs. v. Webb, 148 N. C., 120; McCless v. Meekins, 117 N. C., 34; French v. Comrs., 74 N. C., 692; Johnston v. Comrs., 67 N. C., 103.

It is true, also, that when the power to issue bonds exists, the mere fact that there is limit on the power of taxation will not always and of itself *629 be beld to invalidate the bonds. Comrs. of Pitt v. McDonald, 148 N. C., 125. But neither of these rulings can be properly extended to uphold a bond issue of this magnitude when, as a part of the same proposition, it is provided that: “All recitals in the bonds are true, and the full faith and credit of the county are pledged to each successive holder, etc., for the punctual payment of principal and interest.” A covenant is given that an annual tax shall be continuously levied to pay the interest and provide a sinking fund to take up the issue as it matures, and it appears,' further, that the tax to be levied and required for meeting this stipulation is in excess of the constitutional limitation above referred to. However desirable the measure may seem, these resolutions of the board of county commissioners, mutually dependent the one upon the other and constituting an entire proposition, are but a piece of local legislation which must, as in other like cases, conform to constitutional requirement, and which are subject to another recognized principle, that when an essential portion is found to be invalid, the entire scheme must fail. Claywell v. Comrs. of Burke County, at present term, and authorities cited.

It is contended for defendants that the power in question arises to the commissioners under and by virtue of chapter 23, sec. 1318, Rev., sub-sec. 27, conferring on county commissioners the power to borrow money for the necessary expenses of the county and provide for its payment, with interest, in periodical installments, termed in the brief the “inherent right of law”; hut we are unable to concur in this view. The subsection appears in the general act providing for county government and in the general enumeration of powers conferred for ordinary governmental purposes, and while it might, under our decisions and in the presence of emergencies, extend to the issue of bonds, keeping the rate of taxation within the constitutional limit, the statute neither is nor does it purport to be a “special act and for a special purpose” within the meaning of the constitutional provision.

Again, it is insisted that under chapter 581, Laws 1899, which is applicable to Rockingham County, the commissioners are now laying a road tax more than sufficient to pay the interest and provide a sinking fund for these bonds, and that defendants can, therefore, rely upon that statute as legislative authority for the present measure. The statute in question confers upon commissioners of certain counties the power to levy an annual tax for general road purposes, enjoins it upon them as a duty, and the amount specified seems to be sufficient to pay the interest and provide a sinking fund for the bonds; but the law, as stated, confers authority to levy an annual tax for road purposes. It contains no authority to issue bonds nor to lay a tax for the purpose of paying interest or providing a sinking fund for same. It is a statute to provide for the construction, improvement, and repairing of roads by cur *630 rent taxation, which could, at any session, be repealed or amended by the Legislature, and is, therefore, a very different proposition from this proposed bond issue, which, by its contract and recitals, may become practically a fixed charge upon the county, compelling an excessive tax levy till the bonds are paid off, principal and interest. Waite v. Santa Cruz, 184 U. S., 302; Dixon Co. v. Field, 111 U. S., 83; Cromwell v. County of Sac, 96 U. S., 31.

The statute of 1899, directing the levy of an annual tax for road purposes, confers no authority to issue these bonds or levy a tax therefor, and this position must also be disallowed. Constitution, Art. Y, sec. 7; R. R. v. Comrs., 148 N. C., 220.

We are not inadvertent to the fact stated in the record, that the proposed bond issue has been sold at par to Sidney Spitzer & Co., Toledo, Ohio. The contract is evidently executory, and the commissioners being, as we have seen, without power to issue the bonds or make a valid contract to do so, no delivery should be made. We do not understand these alleged purchasers to insist on it. Having as yet paid nothing on’their bargain, they could in no event maintain the position or assert any rights growing out of it that they are bona fide holders for value. Howlett v. Thompson, 36 N. C., 301; Fetter’s Equity, p. 95.

There is error, and this will be certified, that the restraining order shall issue as pleaded for.

Error.