Tbe matters in controversy determined by tbe referee are largely questions of fact and bis findings were adopted and approved by tbe court. As there is abundant evidence to support them, they are not the subject of review by this Court.

The conclusions of law follow from tbe findings of fact and are of a character that need not be discussed by us, as they involve no principles of general importance. Tbe action is brought to recover upon tbe part of Corpenning & Co. a balance due on contract for construction of defendant’s railroad. Hemphill & "Wilson claim as subcontractors of Corpenning & Co.

Tbe entire controversy is covered by tbe report of tbe referee and tbe amounts due each claimant specifically determined.

Tbe defendant lays much stress upon tbe assignment of error relating to interest allowed upon tbe sums adjudged to be due under tbe contract. Tbe amounts adjudicated would bear interest as against an individual debtor under our statute, and we see no reason why tbe same law does not apply to defendant.

It is claimed that defendant is an insolvent corporation in bands of a receiver appointed by-the Federal Court, and that “as a general rule after property of an insolvent passes into tbe bands of a receiver interest is not allowed on claims against tbe fund.”

Under tbe law of this State tbe appointment of a receiver for a corporation does not have tbe effect eo instanti to stop tbe interest upon all of its interest-bearing obligations.

Tbe defendant relies on tbe above quotation from Thomas v. Car Co., 149 U. S., 95-116. Tbe question there presented was whether interest should be allowed on car rentals accruing during receivership, and tbe ground for not, allowing interest was because tbe funds fell far short of paying tbe mortgage debt.

In a subsequent case of Iron Co. v. S. A. L. Ry., 233 U. S., 267, this case is commented on and explained, and it is held that “Tbe general rule that interest is not allowed after property of tbe insolvent is in custodia legis is not based on loss of interest-bearing quality, but is a necessary *728 and enforced rule incident to equality of distribution between creditors of assets which, in most cases are insufficient to pay all debts in full.” The Court further says: “For manifestly the law does not contemplate that either the debtor or the trustee can by securing the appointment of a receiver stop the running of interest on claims of the highest dignity.”

The debts established against this defendant are of high dignity and take precedence under our law of many other classes of indebtedness, as they are based upon construction work and labor and material furnished and are properly adjudged to be liens upon the property. That such indebtedness continues to bear interest after appointment of a receiver is expressly adjudicated in Iron Co. v. S. A. L. Ry., supra, where the claim was of somewhat similar character.

Upon a review of the record, we find no error of law, and the judgment is

Affirmed.

The costs of this Court will be taxed against the defendant.