Jarvis v. . Swain

Supreme Court of North Carolina
Jarvis v. . Swain, 91 S.E. 358 (N.C. 1917)
173 N.C. 9; 1917 N.C. LEXIS 221
AlueN

Jarvis v. . Swain

Opinion of the Court

AlueN, J.

The determination of the controversy between the plaintiff and the defendant depends on the location of the Latham deed, and this has been found by the jury in accordance with the contention of the plaintiff under instructions free from error.

The principal exception relied on is upon the ground that his Honor charged the jury that the proper way to locate the Latham deed was to begin at Paniego Creek and -reverse the call, but an examination of the record fails to disclose that he so charged.

He did state, as one of the contentions of the plaintiff, that as the beginning of the deed was a stake, it could be located by measuring from the creek, and he followed this with a full statement of the contentions of the defendant.

If, however, he had told the jury that they could begin at the creek, as it was when the deed was made and reverse the line to aid them in locating the beginning corner, it would not have been erroneous.

*13 Tbe rule is, in. running tbe calls of a deed, to begin at tbe beginning corner if it is known or established, and to follow tbe calls in tbeir regular order, and it is said in Harry v. Graham, 18 N. C., 76, and approved in Gunter v. Mfg. Co., 166 N. C., 166, that there is no case in our reports where tbe Court has given its sanction to'tbe correctness of a survey made by reversing tbe lines from a known beginning corner; but it is equally well established that if tbe beginning corner is uncertain and tbe second corner is known or established, that tbe first line may be reversed in order to find tbe beginning; and tbe same rule prevails as to the other corners and lines. Dobson v. Finley, 53 N. C., 495; Norwood v. Crawford, 114 N. C., 513; Clark v. Moore, 126 N. C., 1; Hanstein v. Ferrall, 149 N. C., 240.

In Dobson v. Finley, which has been frequently cited and approved, tbe beginning was at two pines on the south side of a bill, and tbe second corner was a pine, Thomas Young’s corner. Tbe two pines at tbe beginning bad disappeared and tbe beginning corner could not be found, but tbe pine at Young’s corner was found and established, and tbe judge of the Superior Court permitted tbe jury to reverse tbe first line to find tbe beginning corner.

This rule was approved by tbe Supreme Court, tbe Court saying: “Supposing tbe piine to be established at tbe second corner, could the first, a beginning corner, be located by reversing tbe course and measuring tbe distance called for, from tbe pine back — that is, on the reversed course? His Honor ruled that the beginning corner could be fixed in this way. ~We agree with him. If the second corner is fixed, it is clear, to mathematical certainty, that by reversing tbe course and measuring the distance you reach tbe first corner; so there is no question about overruling either course or distance by measuring tbe line, and tbe object is to find tbe corner by observing both course and distance.”

This authority is directly in point, except that tbe facts in this record are more favorable to tbe contention of the plaintiff than in tbe Finley case because here tbe beginning corner is at a stake, an imaginary point, while in the Finley case it was at two pines.

There is

No error.

Reference

Full Case Name
Lucy S. Jarvis v. J. D. Swain.
Cited By
7 cases
Status
Published