Tbe defendant’s motion to dismiss tbe action must be determined by tbe question wbetber tbe evidence, wben construed most favorably for tbe State, is legally sufficient to convict. If it is, or if there is any evidence in tbe record to sustain tbe counts on which tbe defendant was convicted, tbe exception must be overruled. S. v. Carmon, 145 N. C., 482; S. v. Walker, 149 N. C., 528; S. v. Carlson, 171 N. C., 823. In tbe absence of direct and positive proof, tbe State is often required to rely upon circumstantial evidence; and wben a fact is to be proved by such evidence, tbe finding of tbe jury is not dependent entirely upon belief in tbe truth of tbe testimony, since tbe jurors must not only believe tbe witnesses, but must also draw from their testimony tbe inferences arising from tbe facts proved. Snowden v. Bell, 159 N. C., 500. All tbe circumstances disclosed by tbe evidence, taken in their entirety; must be considered and weighed by tbe jury in drawing such inferences, and in determining tbe guilt or innocence of tbe defendant.

There was evidence for tbe State tending to show that on 24 June, 1921, Newsome, Pulliam, Scott, Flynn, Wooten, and Dunnigan, deputies of tbe sheriff, went to tbe defendant’s home with a search warrant;-that Newsome went down tbe branch on tbe right of tbe defendant’s home and found a furnace under which there bad been a fire; that a few hundred yards away be found tubs in a thicket, and a place from which a still bad been removed; that 25 or 30 steps nearer tbe defendant’s home and about 200 yards therefrom be saw a still (which meantime bad been discovered by Pulliam), under which fire bad recently been burning, and tubs in which there bad been a quantity of beer; that there was a path leading from tbe still bouse toward tbe defendant’s dwelling; that two kegs and several fruit jars, which contained liquor, were found —one of tbe kegs containing two or three gallons and tbe other about five; that after two of tbe officers bad gone to tbe defendant’s bouse, they saw tbe defendant’s wife go into a room and put under tbe bed a fruit jar, which contained more than a quart of whiskey, while another found a small quantity in tbe cellar; that tbe jars found in tbe bouse corresponded in size with those found in tbe field. There was evidence tending to show that tbe defendant’s character was bad as to tbe manufacture of liquor, and there were various other circumstances tending to *837 show bis guilt. This evidence was clearly of sufficient probative force to require its submission to the jury on each count, and on a motion to dismiss, the defendant’s evidence in rebuttal need not be considered. S. v. McMillan, 180 N. C., 742; S. v. Bush, 177 N. C., 551; S. v. Horner, 174 N. C., 789. S. v. Prince, ante, 788, is easily distinguishable in that there was an absence of evidence which could reasonably be construed as connecting the defendant in that case with the offense charged. The motion to nonsuit, and the defendant’s prayer that if the jury believed the evidence they should ■ acquit the defendant, and that there was no evidence tending to show that the defendant aided another in the unlawful enterprise, were properly declined.

His Honor could not have granted the defendant’s request to instruct the jury that the location of the distillery on the land of another should be considered as tending to show that the defendant was not guilty on either count, without invading the province of the jury, and expressing an opinion upon the weight and effect of the evidence.

Newsome, a witness for the State, was permitted to testify, over the defendant’s objection, that about ninety days before the trial, or possibly •in the preceding September, he found a still at night about 800 yards from the defendant’s house, and that it had been in operation during the night. It will be borne in mind that the defendant was convicted of the manufacture of liquor, and of having it in possession for the purpose of sale. If he owned or controlled or had in possession the still or the liquor, the question of his purpose or intent at once became both relevant and material. Evidence of circumstances sufficiently connected with the main charge are competent to show purpose or intent. They are regarded as part of a series of circumstances which, when connected and correlated, are deemed to be competent in proof of the main fact. This principle is illustrated by the opinion in S. v. Stancill, 178 N. C., 686, in which it was held that proof of the commission of other like offenses to show the scienter, intent, or notice is generally competent when the crimes are so connected or associated that such evidence will throw light upon that question. A discussion of the authorities may be found in S. v. Simons, 178 N. C., 679, in which the same principle is stated with clearness by the Chief Justice.

The defendant’s exceptions to questions propounded by the solicitor to the witness Dean on cross-examination manifestly constitute no ground for a new trial. If the evidence elicited was immaterial it was also harmless. ~We have examined the defendant’s objections to the testimony of the witness Swain, and find them to be without merit. Upon the whole record we find

No error.