There is no doubt that the instrument, under which the Citizens Bank asserts its right to the proceeds of sale now in the hands of the sheriff, is what is known as an agricultural lien, and was drawn and registered in accordance with the statute, C. S., 2480. Unless, therefore, the plaintiff can show a prior valid lien upon the crop of tobacco, the proceeds of which are now claimed by the defendants, the judgment of the court was correct. The lien of the Citizens Bank is, in form and substance, an agricultural lien, and as it was duly registered is entitled to preference over all other liens except the laborer’s and landlord’s liens, to the extent of the advance made under it. The instrument, under which the plaintiff claims these proceeds is in form and substance nothing more than a deed of trust to secure a debt. It is true the lien of it rests upon a part of the crop as well as upon the other property described in it, but this does not necessarily make it an agricultural lien, which is entitled to any special priority under the statute over others existing or otherwise. If the deed of trust was simply given to secure an antecedent debt due to the Bank of Warren, and was not in form, and in fact an agricultural lien, the Bank of Warren acquired no prior lien upon the crop of tobacco over the Citizens Bank. This is settled beyond dispute by the following cases in this Court: Clark v. Farrar, 74 N. C., 686; Patapsco v. Magee, 86 N. C., 350; Wooten v. Hill, 98 N. C., 48. There was nothing on the face of the deed of trust to B. B. Williams, trustee, to secure the debt due to the Bank of Warren, under which the plaintiff claims, to notify subsequent lienors, and especially the Citizens Bank, that it was an agricultural lien, or entitled to any more priority or preference than an ordinary mortgage or trust to secure a plain and simple debt owing by F. B. Newell, Jr., to the Bank of Warren, and when it was thus executed and registered the said bank took the risk of an agricultural lien being after-wards registered which would supersede it as' a first lien upon the crop, and also any subsequent encumbrance by deed or mortgage which is not a lien of the kind mentioned and provided for in the statute (C. S., 2480), and peculiarly protected by it even against a prior encumbrancer.

With reference to this somewhat anomalous lien, which relates back and over-reaches prior encumbrances by special provision of the statute, Justice Davis said in Wooten v. Hill, 98 N. C., 53: “Section 1799 of The Code declares that the lien for advances made to enable the cultivator of the soil.to make the crop, shall, as to the crop made by the aid of such advances, be good' ‘in preference to all other liens existing or *94 otherwise, to tbe extent of such advances/ upon a compliance with tbe provisions of tbe statute, tbe only exception being tbat in favor of tbe landlord (or laborer); contained in tbe following section. Why does not tbe purchaser or mortgagee of tbe crop take with as full knowledge of tbe provisions of this section of The Code as of that which secures tbe rights of tbe landlord ? He takes with a full knowledge tbat if advances shall be necessary to enable tbe cultivator to make tbe crop, and Without which there would perhaps be no crop, such advances shall be a preferred lien upon tbe crop, made by reason of such advances, and tbat this preference shall extend to 'existing’ liens. All laws relating to tbe subject-matter of a contract enter into and form a part of it, as if they were expressly referred to or incorporated in its terms. O’Kelly v. Williams, 84 N. C., 281; Lehigh Water Co. v. Easton, 121 U. S., 391. It impairs tbe obligation of no contract. Land is sold under execution— there is a lien on tbe crop for advances — tbe purchaser buys in subordination to Ibis lien under section 1199 of Tbe Code. Dail v. Freeman, 92 N. C., 351.” It is said in Herman v. Perkins, 52 Miss., 813, tbat, although an agricultural lien may be junior in date to a mortgage, yet tbe right of tbe mortgagee is subordinate to tbe agricultural lien subsequently imposed by tbe mortgagor upon tbe crop. Tbe statute giving tbe lien in Mississippi is not more absolute or imperative than ours. In Stone v. Simpson, 62 Ala., 194, a similar construction was placed upon tbe agricultural lien law of tbat State, and it was held tbat, under the statute, a crop lien bad “precedence over all prior mortgages, and all prior liens, except tbat of tbe landlord for rent.” Tbe same construction has been placed upon similar statutes in New Jersey, Arkansas, and other states. Vreeland v. Jersey City, 37 New Jersey, 574; Case v. Allen, 21 Ark., 217. Justice Bynum observed in Patapsco v. Magee, 86 N. C., at p. 354: “It is needless to speculate wby this provision is made by tbe statute. It is clearly so written, and can be conveniently observed, and if parties will willfully disregard it, they must abide tbe consequences.”

This seems to be tbe law, with respect to such liens, both in this and in other' jurisdictions where tbe same question has been raised, as appears above.

We must bold, as did tbe learned judge who presided below, tbat tbe prior lien upon tbe proceeds of tbe sale of tbe tobacco belongs to tbe defendant, subject to any just and legal charges thereon in favor of tbe sheriff or other officers for their services, and it will be so certified.

Affirmed.