After the issue had been clearly and sharply drawn in this case, on 12 February, 1926, before Grady, J., the board of education, in regular session, on 1 March, 1926, adopted a resolution selecting a suitable site for said school. On the same day the board of county commissioners, in regular session, approved the site so selected.

The resolution of the board of education of 1 March, contained, among other things, this clause: “and upon approval of this resolution by the board of county commissioners, his Honor, Henry A. Grady, before whom this litigation is now pending, may make a final order or a judgment embodying the terms of the agreement.”

Thereafter, in pursuance of the agreement, Judge Grady signed the judgment of 4 March. This judgment, thereupon, by operation of law, became a consent judgment.

The nature, effect and characteristics of a consent judgm'ent are firmly established by an unbroken and unquestioned line -of decisions.

Clarkson, J., in Bank v. Mitchell, 191 N. C., 193, thus states the principle: “If parties have the authority, a consent judgment cannot be changed, altered or set aside without the consent of the parties to it. The judgment, being by consent, is to be construed as any other contract of the parties. It constitutes the agreement made between the *279 parties and a matter of record by tbe court, at tbeir request. Tbe judgment, being a contract, can only be set aside on tbe ground of fraud or mutual mistake.”

Tbe law will not even inquire into tbe reason for making a decree, it being considered in truth tbe decree of tbe parties, tbougb it be also tbe decree of tbe court, and tbeir will stands as a sufficient reason for it. Bank v. Mitchell, 191 N. C., 193; McBachern v. Kerchner, 90 N. C., 177; Vaughan v. Gooch, 92 N. C., 524; Westhall v. Hoyle, 141 N. C., 337; Chemical Co. v. Bass, 175 N. C., 426; Morris v. Patterson, 180 N. C., 484.

It does not appear from tbis record tbat any notice was given to tbe defendant or an opportunity to be beard before said judgment of 6 March was entered. Neither does it appear tbat there was any evidence of fraud or mutual mistake inhering in tbe consent judgment of 1 March. Therefore, under tbe law, tbe judgment of Grady, J., on 6 March, vacating tbe consent judgment of 1 March, was ineffectual. In addition, Judge Bond finds, as a fact, tbat tbe judgment of 1 March was a consent judgment.

It would seem from tbe record tbat tbe reason Judge Grady, on 6 March, attempted to strike out tbe consent judgment of 1 March, was due to tbe fact tbat tbe individual plaintiffs, constituting tbe school committee of Shady Grove School District, were not apprised of tbe judgment and did not consent thereto. Judge Bond ruled “tbat these individuals were unnecessary parties and were bound by tbe compromise resolution adopted by tbe two boards on 1 March, 1926.” Tbis ruling is correct. Tbe local school committee asked for no affirmative relief and are charged with no duty in locating suitable sites for county school buildings.

C. S., 5419, provides tbat tbe county board of education shall be a body corporate, and shall prosecute and defend suits for or against tbe corporation. C. S., 5423, provides tbat tbe county board of education shall institute all actions, suits or proceedings against persons or corporations “for tbe recovery, preservation, and application of all moneys or property which may be due to or should be applied to tbe support and maintenance of tbe schools.”

One of tbe causes of action for tbe mandamus was to require tbe board of county commissioners to provide sufficient funds for tbe maintenance of schools in Sampson County. Tbis cause' of action, under our statute, could be maintained only by tbe county board of education, so tbat tbe consent of tbe local school committee was immaterial. Tbe judgment must be

Affirmed.