It will be observed that the peremptory instruction of the trial judge to the jury was apparently based upon a statement by the defendant on cross-examination relating to the purchase of a pint of liquor from Walt Davis rather than upon the testimony offered at the trial upon the bill of indictment. It does not appear that the defendant purchased the liquor from Davis within two years, or indeed whether it was purchased within the State of North Carolina. The burden of proof is on the State tó show that the crime was committed within two years, and a failure to make such proof should be taken advantage of by the defendant by a request to instruct the jury. S. v. Francis, 157 N. C., 612, 72 S. E., 1041, S. v. Brinkley, 193 N. C., 747, 138 S. E., 138. The record discloses, however, that after the court had directed a verdict counsel for defendant stated that he had further evidence and the court remarked, “It wouldn’t help you any.” Thus the defendant was precluded from offering evidence as to when and where the'purchase from Davis had been consummated if such evidence was available. The principle covering this case, as disclosed by the record, is thus declared in S. v. Hardy, 189 N. C., 799, 128 S. E., 152. “In S. v. Estes, 185 N. C., 752, it is held that it is a recognized principle that a trial judge is not justified in directing a verdict of guilty in a criminal action, but where as an inference of law the uneontradicted evidence if accepted as true, establishes the defendant’s guilt, it is permissible for the court to instruct the jury to return a verdict of guilty if they find the evidence to be true beyond a reasonable doubt. The law in this State, as repeatedly declared by this Court, is that a plea of not guilty, to a criminal charge, at once calls to the defense of defendant the presumption of *659 innocence, denies the credibility of evidence for the State; and casts upon the State the burden of establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. S. v. Singleton, supra. These words are'hot mere formalities, but express vital principles of our criminal jurisprudence and criminal procedure. These principles ought not to he readily abandoned, or worn away by invasion. As said by Justice Hall, In re Spier, 12 N. C., 492, nearly a century ago, ‘Although a prisoner, if unfortunately guilty, may escape punishment in consequence of the decision this day made in his favor, yet it should be remembered that the same decision may be a bulwark of safety to those who, more innocent, may become the subjects of persecution, and whose conviction, if not procured on one trial, might be secured on a second or third, whether they were guilty or not.’ ”

New trial.