Can the trial judge, upon the submission of the report of a referee, in a compulsory reference, resubmit the cause to another referee with power to reopen and rehear the same?

C. S., 578, empowers a trial judge to “review the report, and set aside, modify or confirm it in whole or in part,” etc. This supervisory power is broad and comprehensive. Dumas v. Morrison, 175 N. C., 431, 95 S. E., 775. In the exercise of the power the trial judge may recommit the report for the correction of errors and irregularities, or for more definite statement of facts or conclusions of law, and such order recommitting the report for such purpose is not appealable. Commissioners v. Magnin, 85 N. C., 115; Lutz v. Cline, 89 N. C., 186; S. v. Jackson, 183 N. C., 695; 110 S. E., 593; Coleman v. McCullough, 190 N. C., 590, 130 S. E., 508.

It was suggested in the Coleman case, supra: “It may not be inappropriate to suggest that when a cause is remanded to a referee, controversy may be prevented by an order pointing out the special purpose of the recommittal — whether to take additional evidence, or to make additional findings of fact on the evidence taken,- or simply to revise the report.” The practical purpose of a compulsory reference, when exceptions have been filed to the report of the referee, is to develop and specifically delimit the issues to be determined by a jury, for the reason that, in such references, a jury trial is not waived, and.the parties as a matter of law are entitled to have the issues answered by a jury. The apparent meaning of the statute is that the report, duly made by a referee, is before the court rather than the referee making the report; unless, of course, there is evidence or suggestion, at least, that the referee has not properly performed his duty.

The statute further contemplates that the trial judge must act upon the report. Judicial action is confined by the statute to reviewing, *226 setting aside, modifying or confirming in whole or in part the report to the end that the ultimate issues of fact may he produced in bold and clear relief. While the order of the trial judge is based upon discretion, this discretion is bounded by the statute, and as we interpret the record the judgment appealed from does not fall within the boundaries prescribed by law, and was therefore erroneously made. If the report of the referee had been set aside, a different legal situation would have been presented; or if there had been evidence tending to show that the referee had failed to perform his duty as contemplated by statute, then in such event the power of the trial judge to remove him would doubtless be unquestioned.

Reversed.