Gant v. Provident Life & Accident Insurance
Cases that cite this one
20 later published cases cite this decision.
- Quinn v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance (S.C. 1961)
- Elrod v. Prudence Mutual Casualty Co. (S.C. 1965)
- Bowab v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. (La. Ct. App. 1963)
- DiMartino v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance (Pa. Super. Ct. 1963)
- Peirson v. American Hardware Mutual Insurance Co. (N.C. 1959)
- Ray v. Hospital Care Ass'n (N.C. 1952)
- Johnson v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co. (N.C. 1951)
- McDowell Motor Co. v. New York Underwriters Insurance (N.C. 1951)
- The Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Curry (Fla. 1945)
- Ellis v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co. (Va. 1938)
- Brown v. Life Casualty Ins. Co. (La. Ct. App. 1933)
- Conyard v. Life & Casualty Insurance (N.C. 1933)
- Jolley v. Jefferson Standard Life Insurance (N.C. 1930)
- Carson v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance (Clark County Court of Common Pleas 1960)
- Barnes v. Great American Ind Co. (Ohio Ct. App. 1938)
- Taft v. Maryland Casualty Co. (N.C. 1937)
- Johnston v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co. (N.C. 1931)
- Lloyd v. Columbus Mutual Life Insurance (N.C. 1931)
- Kelly v. Raleigh Granite Co. (N.C. 1931)
- Maness v. Life & Casualty Insurance (Tenn. 1930)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
Only one question is presented for decision by defendant’s several assignments of error on this appeal: Was the bodily injury, which all the evidence shows was sustained by her on 10 January, 1927, the result of plaintiff “being struck ... by a moving automobile” ? Unless this question can be answered in the affirmative, it must be conceded that plaintiff cannot recover in this action. Defendant is liable to plaintiff only under the terms of the policy; if the injury which she sustained is not included within the terms of the policy, plaintiff cannot recover.
There was no evidence at the trial tending to show that plaintiff in fact was struck by a moving automobile, and thereby injured; all the evidence tended to show that she was struck by a plank. Can the language of the policy be so construed by the court that it may be held, upon all the evidence, as a matter of law, that plaintiff was struck by a moving automobile, because the evidence shows that she was struck by a plank which was thrown against her by the revolving wheel of an automobile ?
If the language of the policy is uncertain or ambiguous, and is susceptible to more than one construction, the court will adopt .and apply that construction which is most favorable to the insured. If, however, there is no uncertainty or ambiguity in the language of the policy, there is no occasion for judicial construction; the rights and liabilities of the parties must be determined in accordance with the plain, ordinary, and popular sense of the language which they have used in their contract. Penn v. Insurance Co., 158 N. C., 29, 73 S. E., 99.
In the instant case the liability of the defendant under the policy which plaintiff accepted, is expressly limited by language which is free from uncertainty or ambiguity. This language, therefore, cannot be so construed as to enlarge defendant’s liability, in order that plaintiff may recover upon the facts shown by the evidence. As there 'was no evidence *125 from which the jury could find that plaintiff was injured by “being struck by a moving automobile,” we must hold that there was error in the refusal of the court to allow defendant’s motion, at the close of the evidence, that the action be dismissed as upon nonsuit. To the end that the action may be dismissed, in accordance with this opinion, the judgment is
Reversed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.