Denny v. . Snow
Cases that cite this one
20 later published cases cite this decision.
- STARK EX REL. JACOBSEN v. Ford Motor Co. (N.C. 2012)
- Broughton v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey (N.C. 1931)
- Jenrette Transport Co. v. Atlantic Fire Insurance (N.C. 1952)
- Wall v. Trogdon (N.C. 1959)
- Fleming v. Twiggs (N.C. 1956)
- Foreman-Blades Lumber Co. v. City of Elizabeth City (N.C. 1947)
- Mitchell v. . Melts (N.C. 1942)
- Mills v. . Moore (N.C. 1941)
- Mills v. Moore (N.C. 1941)
- Cummings v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad (N.C. 1940)
- Mercer v. . Powell (N.C. 1940)
- Mercer v. Powell (N.C. 1940)
- Plyler v. Charlotte Country Club (N.C. 1938)
- Harris v. Schoonmaker (Wyo. 1936)
- Jones v. . Bagwell (N.C. 1934)
- Jones v. Bagwell (N.C. 1934)
- Lynch v. . Telephone Co. (N.C. 1933)
- Lynch ex rel. Lynch v. Carolina Telephone & Telegraph Co. (N.C. 1933)
- Shuford v. . Brown (N.C. 1931)
- Shuford v. Brown (N.C. 1931)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
At tbe close of plaintiff’s evidence and at tbe close of all tbe evidence, tbe defendant made motions in tbe court below for judgment as in case of nonsuit. O. S., 567. We think the motions should have been granted.
From a careful review of tbe evidence, we do not think it is of sufficient probative force to have been submitted to tbe jury. It raised a suspicion, a conjecture, a guess, a surmise, a speculation, but there must be more than this, more than a scintilla of evidence, to take a case to tbe jury, and we do not find it on this record.
“A verdict or finding must rest upon facts proved, or at least upon facts of which there is substantial evidence, and cannot rest upon mere surmise, speculation, conjecture, or suspicion. There must be legal evidence of every material fact necessary to support the verdict or finding, and such verdict or finding must be grounded on a reasonable certainty as to probabilities arising from a fair consideration of the evidence, and not a mere guess, or on possibilities.” 23 C. J., pp. 51-52. S. v. Johnson, ante, 429.
We see no reason to set forth the evidence. It was fully discussed and the case ably argued on the hearing. We have gone into the record fully and thoroughly, mindful of the fact that a jury has passed on the evidence, but with the responsibility resting on us we cannot say the evidence, which was wholly circumstantial, was sufficient for the court below to have submitted it to the jury. The judgment below is
Reversed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.