The defendants, at the close of plaintiff’s evidence and at the close of all the evidence, made motions for judgment as in ease of nonsuit. C. S., 567. The Forsyth County Court overruled the motions, and on appeal to the Superior Court the ruling of the Forsyth County Court was sustained, and in this we can see no error. We think the evidence sufficient to be submitted to the jury.

It is well settled that “Admissions by agents, made while doing acts within the scope of the agency, and relating to the business in hand, are admissible against the principal when such admissions may be deemed a part of the res gestee, but such admissions are not admissible to prove the agency; the agency must be shown aliunde before the agent’s admissions will be received.” Lockhart’s Handbook on Evidence, sec. 154, citing numerous authorities. Hunsucker v. Corbitt, 187 N. C., at p. 503.

In Bobbitt v. Land Co., 191 N. C., at p. 328, we find: "Hoke, J., in Powell v. Lumber Co., 168 N. C., p. 635, speaking to the question, says: ‘The general agent is said to be one who is authorized to act for his principal in all matters concerning a particular business or employment of a particular nature. Tiffany on Agency, p. 191. And it is the reeog- *593 nized rule that such an agent may usually bind his principal as to all acts within the scope of his agency, including not only the authority actually conferred, but such as is usually ‘confided to an agent employed to transact the business which is given him to do,’ and it is held that, as to third persons, this real and apparent authority is one and the same, and may not be restricted by special or private instructions of the principal unless the limitations sought to be placed upon it are known to such persons or the act or power in question is of such an unusual character as to put a man of reasonable business prudence upon inquiry as to the existence of the particular authority claimed. Latham v. Field, 163 N. C., 356; Stephens v. Lumber Co., 160 N. C., 107; Gooding v. Moore, 150 N. C., pp. 195-8; Tiffany on Agency, p. 180, 184, 191, et seq. The power of an agent, then, to bind his principal may include not only the authority actually conferred, but the authority implied as usual and necessary to the proper performance of the work intrusted to him, and it may be further extended by reason of acts indicating authority which the principal has approved or knowingly or, at times, even negligently permitted the agent to do in the course of his employment. Law Reporting Co. v. Grain Co., 135 Mo. Rep., p. 10-15; 31 Cyc., 1326-1331.’ Furniture Co. v. Bussell, 171 N. C., 485; Ferguson v. Amusement Co., ibid., 665; Brimmer v. Brimmer, 174 N. C., 439; Lumber Co. v. Johnson, 177 N. C., 51; Cardwell v. Garrison, 179 N. C., 478; Strickland v. Kress, 183 N. C., 536.”

In Pick v. Hotel Co., 197 N. C., at pp. 112-13, the following principle is laid down: “Another position of the appellant is this: the appointment of an agent to purchase personal property does not authorize such purchase when the title is retained to secure payment of the agreed price. As no funds were given the agent to pay for the furniture he had the implied power to make the purchase on the credit of the defendant. In Brittain v. Westall, 137 N. C., 30, it is said: ‘It may be taken as a settled principle in the law of agency that if express authority to buy on a credit is not given to an agent, but he is authorized to make the purchase and no funds are advanced to him to enable him to buy for cash, he-is, by implication, clearly authorized to purchase on the credit of his principal, because when an agent is authorized to do an act for his principal, the means necessary for the accomplishment of the act are impliedly included in the authority unless the agent be in some particular expressly restricted.’ Ruffin v. Mebane, 41 N. C., 507; Swindell v. Latham, 145 N. C., 144. In the law of agency this rule also is in force: ‘Whenever a principal has placed an agent in such a situation that a person of ordinary prudence, conversant with business usages and the nature of the particular business, is justified in assuming that such agent is authorized to perform in behalf of his principal the particular *594 act, and snob particular act bas been performed tbe principal is estopped from denying tbe agent’s authority to perform it.’ 21 R. C. L., 856.”

Tbe most serious aspect presented on tbe record, but we tbink tbe evidence sufficient to be submitted to tbe jury, is set forth in tbe following principle of law: “Tbe fact that tbe third person (in this instance tbe bank), declares be does not care who tbe principal is or that be is satisfied with tbe credit of tbe agent (Campbell), is evidence, but not conclusive against tbe liability of tbe principal (Sklut).” Amer. Law Inst., Restatement of the Law of Agency, Tentative Draft 4, sec. 376, page 21, et seq.

We tbink tbe citations of law as above set forth are applicable to tbe facts in this- controversy.

Tbe question of ratification and estoppel does not arise on tbe appeal, as these issues were not answered by tbe jury. Any discussion would be academic. From a careful examination of tbe record, tbe well prepared and exhaustive briefs of counsel on both sides of tbe controversy, we see no prejudicial or reversible error. Tbe numerous exceptions and assignments of error made by defendants cannot be sustained. There was sufficient evidence to be submitted to tbe jury on tbe issues. They have been decided in plaintiff’s favor. Tbe jury decide tbe facts. In tbe law we find no error. Tbe judgment of tbe court below is

Affirmed: •