Lloyd v. Columbus Mutual Life Insurance
Cases that cite this one
19 later published cases cite this decision. The 18 that cite it most often are listed here.
- Harleysville Mutual Insurance v. Packer (4th Cir. 1995)
- Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Fields (N.C. Ct. App. 1992)
- Pennell v. United Insurance (Tex. 1951)
- Marshall v. Washington National Insurance Company (N.C. 1957)
- Ætna Life Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn. v. Bidwell (Tenn. 1951)
- Brown v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co. (Ky. Ct. App. 1975)
- Prudential Life Insurance Co. of America v. Boyce (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970)
- Laraway v. Heart of America Life Insurance Co. (W. Va. 1969)
- Kirk v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company (N.C. 1961)
- Thomas v. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. of Idaho, Inc. (Idaho 1960)
- Detmer v. United Security Insurance Company (Mo. Ct. App. 1958)
- United Ins. Co. v. Pennell (Tex. App. 1951)
- Spence v. Washington National Insurance (Ill. App. Ct. 1943)
- Dirst v. Aetna Life Insurance (Iowa 1942)
- Taft v. Maryland Casualty Co. (N.C. 1937)
- Conyard v. Life & Casualty Insurance (N.C. 1933)
- Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Martin (9th Cir. 1933)
- Hanes v. . Shapiro (N.C. 1915)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
Is a Ford one and a half ton truck, used principally for hauling milk, “a private automobile of the pleasure-car type ?”
The plaintiff insists that the words “private automobile of the pleasure-car type” is an ambiguous term requiring parol evidence as an aid to arriving at the sense and meaning of the words used. The Court does not concur in this view. Anderson v. Ins. Co., 197 N. C., 72; Grant v. Ins. Co., 197 N. C., 122; Jolley v. Ins. Co., 199 N. C., 269.
There is no material controversy between the parties with reference to the facts. Hence the question whether a Ford truck used principally for hauling milk is a “private automobile of the pleasure-car type,” becomes a bald proposition of law.
The motor vehicle statute of North Carolina recognizes the difference between automobiles and trucks. This difference appears from C. S., 2612, which levies license fees for motor vehicles. The license fee for an automobile is based upon horse power, and that on motor trucks is based upon carrying capacity or tonnage.
An automobile truck was defined in American-La France Fire Engine Co. v. Riordan, 6 Fed. (2d), 964. The Circuit Court for the Second *724 Circuit said: “An automobile truck is a vehicle for the conveyance for commercial purposes over ordinary roads, and the average type of that kind of vehicle is especially designed both in its propelling mechanism and in its body construction for that function.” Referring to a statute taxing motor trucks, the Supreme Court of Kansas in Filson v. Johnson, 222 Pac., 742, said: “They are designed for and put to different uses, and the provision defining a motor truck in effect declares that the purpose or use of the vehicle shall determine the classification. If the owner rebuilds and converts an automobile originally designed and sold to be used as a pleasure car, into a motor truck, which he uses to transport commodities, goods and merchandise, produce, or freight, it is his intention and use that governs.”
The word “type” used in the policy implies the idea of classification.
Manifestly, the truck in which plaintiff’s intestate was riding at the time of his death was by intention, use and construction a commercial vehicle and so classified by the North Carolina statute. Consequently the coverage clause of the policy issued by the defendant did not, upon the evidence, include the accidental death of plaintiff’s intestate, and the ruling of the trial judge is upheld.
No error.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.