State v. Casey
State v. Casey
Opinion of the Court
Tbe record contains 236 pages. It took a week to try tbe case and seven counsel for tbe State and defendant argued tbe case to tbe jury. In so important a case, involving life and death, we bave set forth tbe evidence at length. Tbe evidence was direct, tbe testimony of Milton Wood and circumstantial evidence was sufficient to be submitted to tbe jury. Our province is alone to determine — “Tbe Supreme Court shall bave jurisdiction to review, upon appeal, any decision of tbe courts below, upon any matter of law or legal inference,” etc. Art. IY, sec. 8, Const, of N. C.
In S. v. Lawrence, 196 N. C., at p. 564, it is written: “ ‘An exception to a motion to dismiss in a criminal action taken after tbe close of tbe State’s evidence, and renewed by defendant after tbe introduction of bis own evidence, does not confine tbe appeal to tbe State’s evidence alone, and a conviction will be sustained under tbe second exception if there is any evidence on tbe whole record of tbe defendant’s guilt.’ S. v. Earp, ante, at p. 166. See S. v. Carlson, 171 N. C., 818; S. v. Sigmon, 190 N. C., 684. Tbe evidence favorable alone to tbe State is considered— defendant’s evidence is discarded. S. v. Utley, 126 N. C., 997. Tbe competency, admissibility and sufficiency of evidence is for tbe court to determine, tbe weight, effect and credibility is for tbe jury. S. v. Utley, supra; S. v. Blackwelder, 182 N. C., 899.”
Tbe first contention of defendant is in regard to tbe admission of certain evidence, over defendant’s objection, of tbe testimony of several witnesses concerning statements which tbe defendant is alleged to bave made shortly prior to tbe date of tbe alleged homicide, and none of which it is contended were in anywise directed toward tbe deceased, James C. Causey. This evidence was offered by tbe State for tbe purpose of showing motive, malice, premeditation and deliberation.
“It is never indispensable to a conviction that a motive for tbe commission of tbe crime should appear. But when tbe State, as in this case, has to rely upon circumstantial evidence to establish tbe guilt of tbe defendant, it is not only competent, but often very important, in strengthening tbe evidence for tbe prosecution, to show a motive for committing tbe crime.” S. v. Green, 92 N. C., at p. 782; S. v. Stratford, 149 N. C., 483; S. v. Wilkins, 158 N. C., 603; S. v. Lawrence, 196 N. C., at p. 565.
It is true that tbe threats were not in so many words made by defendant Casey against tbe dead man Causey, but circumstantial. What is tbe setting? Tbe defendant Casey was hauling some hogshead stave-
Taking all the statements, we think it was some evidence to go to the jury. These vivid expressions indicated that defendant was harboring a grudge against those who had stopped payment of the $28.75 worth of timber gotten from the John H. Sutton place and also stopping him from hauling any more.
Henry Vest, who lived about a mile and a half from where the car was burned, saw Causey on 3 July driving a Hudson car about 11:30 o’clock, going in the direction of where the car was burned. He saw smoke in the direction about 12 :00 o’clock of where the car was burned. “Vhen I saw the car it had the appearance of having been backed
James C. Causey, on Thursday, 3 July, passed Decatur Nobles’ house driving a Hudson coach, between 11:00 and 11:30, going towards Oak Bridge, the scene of the place where he and the car were found burned. About half hour after Causey passed in the car Nobles saw the smoke about 12:00 o’clock. Jerry'Sutton saw Causey driving the Hudson coach, the same car he had been driving since he had been coming down there. This was about 11:20 or 11:30 when Causey passed.
The testimony of numerous witnesses was to the effect that the defendant Casey had a grudge and had made threats against the man in the Atlas Plywood Corporation who was responsible for stopping the Goldsboro Lumber Company at Dover, N. C., from paying him the $28.75 and stopping him from getting any more timber off the Sutton place. Graham had told Casey that Causey had charge of the logging operations. What happened is now told by Milton Wood: “I got up with defendant Casey at Sam Smith’s house. . . . After he turned off on this road he drove down a mile or more down to a little by road, after a while he came to a little small piece of woods, and I asked him where he was going, and he said he was going down through the islands. After a little while he got to a railroad, and I looked up ahead of me just before we got to the railroad and saw this big car coming. Mr. Casey drove up to the foot of the railroad and stopped his truck and got on the ground and by that time, Mr. Causey in the car ahead of us had stopped his car. The railroad was between them and Mr. Causey could not pass this truck. Mr. Casey was already on the ground, and he walked around on the right-hand side of Mr. Causey’s car, and Mr. Causey and Mr. Casey had not said a word, and Mr. Casey reached in his pocket and got a black looking pistol from his pocket. I could not swear as to the pistol. (Shows witness pistol.) This looks like the pistol. I remember this little place here on the side of it. He had it about this close to my face (indicating). Mr. Casey took his pistol out and shot Mr. Causey twice and Mr. Causey’s head fell backwards, and after he was dead he (Casey) come back to the truck where I was and he told me if I told it he would kill me if I was the last one on God’s earth, and I told him I would not tell it, and he put his pistol back in his pocket and went back to the car and opened the car and got Mr.
These threats to show motive, malice, premeditation and deliberation, were admissible in evidence — the probative force was for the jury.
“A threat to' kill or injure someone, not definitely designated, is admissible in evidence, when other facts adduced give individuation to it so that as it is generally held, the jury may infer'that they were against deceased; but there is authority requiring it to appear to a reasonable certainty that defendant directed the threat against deceased, and holding, if the evidence leaves that matter in doubt, that the doubt must be resolved in defendant’s favor and the threat excluded,” etc. 30 C. J\, part sec. 417, at p. 190. Sec. 418: “Threats made by defendant against a class to which deceased belonged, and prima facie referable to deceased, although his name is not mentioned, are admissible against defendant. Thus threats against policemen, persons of a certain nationality, the members of the family, or any person visiting a certain woman, are admissible, where deceased was a member of the class referred to.” S. v. Wishon, 198 N. C., 762.
The second contention of defendant is in regard to the admission of certain evidence over defendant’s objection, offered by the State, concerning the condition of the pistol found by the officers at Bradley’s home, in Greene County, in the room in which the defendant Casey took a bath. We must get the setting again, and see how far Wood’s
Casey was boarding at Mrs. Beddard’s; stayed there the night of 2 July, and on the morning of 3 July she fixed breakfast-for him. She expected him back and fixed dinner for him, but he did not come for it. Nor did he spend the night of 3 July there. He went to the Bradley’s and ate there. Wood testified that Casey “did not get a drop of blood on him except a little spot on one of his sleeves.” Wood and Casey, according to Wood’s testimony, after the second trip to the burning car, went down the Greenville Highway and turned off to the left and went five or six miles to the Bradley home, where Casey had his washing done. Casey went in the room, took a bath and when he came out “he had on a clean shirt.” Casey told Evans he lived at the Bradley’s. Evans testified, and his testimony was corroborated by others: “I later went to the Bradley home. I think it was on the 9th or 11th of July; I am not positive which day. I found this pistol that has been shown here in court at the Bradley home (shows witness pistol). This is the pistol I got at the Bradley home. When I found the pist.ol two chambers of the pistol had been freshly fired. There were some loaded cartridges in the pistol. Two of the chambers had been recently fired, fresh powder burns (witness indicates by use of pistol the freshly fired chambers). I took a piece of paper, in the presence of Mr. Garner, the coroner, and run through the barrel and it showed fresh powder, damp, showing that it had been freshly fired.”
We think this evidence in regard to the pistol a circumstance with the other evidence, as above set forth, to go to' the jury — the probative force was for them to determine.
We think there is nothing in the third contention. There was sufficient evidence on the part of the State to justify the jury in finding that the deceased came to his death as a result of the wounds inflicted by the accused.
The fourth contention is in regard to the failure of the court below to submit to the consideration of the jury the element of manslaughter. There is no evidence of manslaughter on this record. There are no facts on this record from the testimony of Wood or defendant Casey that would justify the court to submit to the jury the contention of defendant “that a fight ensued upon a chance meeting between the deceased and the accused, in which the accused lost his life.” The de
It is well settled that where the evidence is sufficient to justify a charge on the aspect of manslaughter, it is the duty of the court to give it, and if this is not done it will be held' for error.
“In S. v. Johnson, 161 N. C., 264, there was no error in the charge as given, and it was held, Associate, Justice Brown delivering the opinion: ‘That there was not a scintilla of evidence upon which a verdict of manslaughter could have been based.’ In S. v. Teachey, 138 N. C., 598, the same ruling was made: ‘That no element of manslaughter was presented.’ And on the facts in evidence the same position seems to be fully justified in S. v. Bowman, 152 N. C., 817. See S. v. Chavis, 80 N. C., 353.” S. v. Merrick, 171 N. C., at p. 794-5; S. v. Ashburn, 187 N. C., at p. 725; S. v. Hardee, 192 N. C., 533.
The fifth contention of defendant is in regard to the failure of the court to declare and define the law of alibi, and give the contentions of the defendant arising thereon from the evidence.
The defendant contends that from the entire charge there is not a place in it where the word “alibi” is used. This may be so> but the court gave in the charge the testimony of defendant and the material witness in reference to the time of day Casey claimed he was at the burning car on 3 July, and fully set forth this contention of defendant and his witnesses that he got on the scene after the car was burning and at an hour of the day when he could not have committed the crime. The court below fully charged in regard to reasonable doubt. We can see nothing that could prejudice the defendant by not calling it “alibi.” The jury in the charge were given all the evidence bearing on this aspect, and from the charge we see no- prejudicial error.
In S. v. Steadman, 200 N. C., 768, this Court said: “The court below fully set forth the facts and contentions in the charge as to the alibi set up by defendants. S. v. Melton, 187 N. C., 481.”
We can see no evidence that would class Milton Wood as an accomplice of the defendant Casey. No instruction was prayed for by defendant Casey on this aspect, but in this jurisdiction the unsupported evidence of an accomplice, if believed by the jury, is sufficient to- convict. See S. v. Ashburn, supra.
It seems that while this appeal was pending in this Court the defendant’s counsel made a motion for mistrial, because certain of the jurors were alleged to have been prejudiced, and for a new trial for newly discovered evidence, before Judge G. Y. Cowper. He refused both
Tbis case presents a sad tragedy. Tbe evidence was to tbe effect tbat defendant Casey was obsessed — “nursing bis wrath to keep it warm”— witb a wrong be felt bad been done him by the Atlas Plywood Corporation, or by Causey working for tbe Atlas Plywood Corporation, representing tbe corporation in its logging operations in tbe woods, in stopping tbe payment of a timber bill of Casey’s — tbe timber claimed to bave come off tbe corporation’s land, and stopping tbe removal of any more timber off the land which was also claimed by Sutton. Tbe evidence is all to tbe effect tbat tbe defendant Casey, in cutting and selling tbe timber acted in good faith, as be cut it off land claimed by another. Unfortunately, Casey, driving a Chevrolet truck, meets Causey driving a Hudson coach in tbe forest. Tbe cars and actors in tbe tragedy face each other. Revenge was in tbe heart of defendant Casey, and instead of appealing to tbe law of bis land, be applied tbe law of tbe jungle. He shot and killed Causey, and, no doubt seeking payment for bis timber, pulled him out of bis car, took some money out of bis pocket, and then put bis body back in the car, put gasoline on bis body and tbe car and burned Causey and tbe car up. Tbe body of Causey was so burned tbat it could not be identified, but many of bis personal effects were found, among them was a band ring and tbe inscription on tbe inside was as follows: “M. W. C. to J. C. C., Deer. 27, 1900.” Tbat was tbe date of bis wedding. All these years be bad carried tbis memento. Tbe evidence all indicates tbat be was an industrious man of high character, and be left a widow and children. He bas suffered a horrible death for tbis unfortunate controversy. Casey bas been convicted by a jury of bis countrymen of murder in tbe first degree, which carries witb it tbe penalty of death. He also left children.
From a thorough examination of a long record, in law we can find
No error.
Reference
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- STATE v. HERMAN CASEY
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