The will of W. G. Yelvington was construed by this Court in an opinion filed 29 September, 1920, in the case of Cole v. Thornton, 180 N. C., 90. In disposing of the question the Court said: “This being the correct rule of construction, and it being kept in mind that the life tenant, Mary J. Yelvington, is dead, and that no children have ever been born to the daughter Alice, the devise would read ‘to my daughter Alice in fee, but if she die leaving no living issue, then to the heirs at law of my wife, Mary J. Yelvington,’ and, if so, if children are born, she has the fee, and if there are no children, she would still be the owner in fee as the only heir of Mary J. Yelvington, and, in either event, can convey in fee.”

The original record in Cole v. Thornton, supra, discloses that it was contended that W. G. Yelvington did not intend to convey to his daughter Alice a fee simple but only a life estate, “or at most an estate in common with her children, if any, which would make her present estate contingent upon her dying without leaving living issue.” Consequently, it is clear that the identical proposition now in controversy was expressly adjudicated in the case of Cole v. Thornton, supra. If the construction of the will of William G. Yelvington were an open question, there might be a sharp division of opinion upon the merits of the controversy, but the former opinion of the Court in Cole v. Thornton has become a rule of property and determinative of the rights of the parties.

Affirmed.