Columbus Oil Co. v. Moore

Supreme Court of North Carolina
Columbus Oil Co. v. Moore, 163 S.E. 879 (N.C. 1932)
202 N.C. 708; 1932 N.C. LEXIS 197
CoNNOR

Columbus Oil Co. v. Moore

Opinion of the Court

CoNNOR, J.

In Lipscomb v. Cox, 195 N. C., 502, 142 S. E., 779, it is said: “The right of either party to poll the jury in both criminal and civil actions is firmly established by the decisions in this State. The predominant purpose of the poll is to ascertain if the verdict as tendered by the jury is the ‘unanimous verdict of a jury of good and lawful men in open court’ as prescribed by the Constitution, Art. I, sec. 13, for criminal causes. One of the first cases dealing with the subject is S. v. Young, 77 N. C., 498. The Court held: ‘When the verdict has been received from the foreman and entered, it is the duty of the clerk to cause the jury to hearken to their verdict as the court has it recorded, and to read it to them, and say: “So, say you all.” At this time any juror can retract on the ground of conscientious scruples, mistake, fraud or otherwise, and his dissent would then be effectual.’ It is held to the same effect in In re Sugg’s Will, 194 N. C., 638, 140 S. E., 604: ‘The right to poll the jury is recognized in order that it may be ascertained whether or not the verdict as tendered is the unanimous decision of the jurors. If it is found by such poll that one juror does not then assent to the verdict as tendered, such verdict cannot be accepted, for it is not as a matter of law the unanimous decision of the jury.’ In Trantham v. Furniture Co., 194 N. C., 615, 140 S. E., 300, the Court said: ‘The verdict of a jury is sacred. It should represent the concurring judgment, reason and intelligence of the entire jury, free from outside influence from any source whatever.’ The decisions of this State establish the principle that the verdict of a jury, to be effectual, must be free from outside influence of whatsoever kind or nature. Wright v. Hemphill, 81 N. C., 33, Petty v. Rousseau, 94 N. C., 362, Mitchell v. Mitchell, 122 N. C., 332, Lumber Co. v. Lumber Co., 187 N. C., 417, Alston v. Alston, 189 N. C., 299.”

*711 In the instant case, the defendant had the right to have the jurors polled, for the purpose of ascertaining before the verdict tendered by them was accepted by the court and recorded, whether or not each juror assented thereto. The request for the poll was made in apt time. It was error, however, for the court to allow the motion of counsel for defendant that he be permitted to poll the jurors, under the supervision of the court. It has been the uniform practice in this State for the poll to be made by the judge or by the clerk, under the direction of the judge. This practice is in accord with the principle upon which the poll of the jurors is allowed. To permit counsel for either party to conduct the poll would violate the principle that no outside influence should be exerted upon jurors with respect to their verdict.

After the issue or issues in an action, civil or criminal, have been submitted to the jurors, and they have come into open court, and announced that they have agreed upon their verdict, either party to the action may request the judge to poll the jurors, or to have them polled by the clerk, with respect to the verdict tendered by them. When the request is made in apt time, it is the duty of the judge to comply therewith. The poll, however, must be conducted by the judge, or by the clerk, under his direction. It is error for the judge to permit counsel for either party to examine the jurors, collectively or individually, for the purpose of impeaching them or their verdict. Even when the judge or the clerk under his direction, conducts the poll, the only question addressed to the jurors should be substantially as follows: “Is this your verdict, and do you now assent thereto?” It would manifestly be improper for the judge or the clerk to> attempt to impeach the jurors or their verdict by seeking to ascertain by an examination of each of the jurors the grounds upon which the jurors had agreed upon their verdict. Counsel for a party to the action cannot be permitted to do what neither the judge nor the clerk would be permitted to do.

It was error in the instant case for the judge to permit counsel for defendant to examine the jurors for the purpose of showing that their verdict was not unanimous, or that the verdict tendered by them was a compromise verdict. It was likewise error for the judge to decline as a matter of law to receive the verdict, upon facts found by him, from evidence elicited by such examination. For this error the judgment in this action is reversed, and the action is remanded that judgment may be entered on the verdict, in accordance with the motion of the plaintiff.

Reversed and remanded.

Reference

Full Case Name
Columbus Oil Company v. W. M. Moore and john.W. Moore, Trading as Moore's Service Station.
Cited By
5 cases
Status
Published