(1) Do Fidelity Bonds Nos. 1096651, dated 21 May, 1926, and 1267548, witb endorsement thereon, constitute one bond or contract of indemnity, or are they separate and independent contracts of indemnity ?

(2) Was notice given by tbe plaintiff as required?

(3) Was claim for loss given in accordance witb tbe terms of tbe contract ?

Tbe first bond, or No. 1096651, provided tbat “tbe right to make a claim hereunder shall cease at tbe end of fifteen months after tbe termination, expiration, or cancellation of this bond.” According to finding of fact No. 80 invalid loans made between 21 May, 1926, and 21 May, 1929, aggregate $21,698.90. Obviously no claim was made for these loans within a period of fifteen months from 21 May, 1929, and hence there could be no recovery for losses sustained from 21 May, 1926, to 21 May, 1929, when Bond No. 1267548 was given, unless tbe two bonds are to be deemed and construed as one contract. Tbe first bond, or Bond No. 1096651, provided tbat it should “continue in force until terminated or canceled as hereinafter provided.” Tbe method specified in said bond for such termination or cancellation rested upon “a written notice stating when tbe cancellation takes effect served on employer or sent by registered letter ... at least thirty days prior to tbe date tbat the cancellation takes effect.” There is no evidence and no finding of fact tbat such notice was ever given. Consequently, it must be determined whether Bond No. 1267548, given on 21 May, 1929, is in itself a termination and cancellation of tbe former bond. Bond No. 1267548 carried a rider constituting a part of tbe bond itself, and this rider contained tbe following clause, to wit: “(a) This individual bond is issued as a continuation of tbe individual bond . . . numbered 1096651, dated 21 May, 1926. (b) And tbe said old bond and this renewal bond shall be deemed one bond, (c) Tbe company’s aggregate liability under both bonds for all loss or losses shall not exceed tbe greatest amount for which tbe company is liable under one of tbe said bonds.” *334 Tbe foregoing language is plain and unequivocal, and it would seem manifest that the defendant surety company has chosen apt words to weld the two instruments together and mate them one. It has been held that “when two or more papers are executed by the same parties at the same time, or at different times, and show on their face that each was executed to carry out the common intent, they should be construed together.” Perry v. Surety Co., 190 N. C., 284, 129 S. E., 721. Moreover, if the language of the instrument or instruments is ambiguous, they must be construed most strongly against the defendant, who chose words to suit itself and sold them tO' the bank for compensation for the purpose of indemnifying against loss occasioned by unfaithful officers. In addition, it has been generally held that in determining the meaning of an indefinite contract, the .construction placed upon the contract by the parties themselves will usually be adopted by the Court. Wearn v. R. R., 191 N. C., 575, 132 S. E., 576; Cole v. Fibre Co., 200 N. C., 484, 157 S. E., 857; Loan Association v. Davis, 192 N. C., 108, 135 S. E., 463.

In. view of the language of Bond No. 1267548, the construction thereof by the parties, and the pertinent principles of law, it is concluded that the two bonds constitute one contract of indemnity, and therefore Bond No. 1096651, as amended and modified by Bond No. 1267548 bases liability upon certain express conditions specified therein, to wit: (a) “That the employer shall, within a reasonable time and at all events not later than thirty days after discovery of loss hereunder, notify the surety thereof,” etc. (b) “That claim for loss hereunder shall be itemized with full particulars, including the amount and date of each item, . . . and presented to the surety within three months after the discovery of such loss.” (c) “That any suit . . : to recover against the surety on account of loss hereunder shall be brought before the expiration of twelve months from the discovery of such loss,” etc. In other words, liability rests upon notice in thirty days after discovery of loss, itemized proof of loss within three months after such discovery and suit within twelve months from such discovery.

The bank was closed on 3 October, 1931, and on 6 November, 1931, the liquidating agent wrote a letter to1 the surety declaring the intention of plaintiff “to put you on notice as to shortage which has become apparent.”

The referee concluded that the notice of loss given by the liquidating agent complied with the contract. This conclusion was approved by the trial judge and there was competent evidence to support it. The liquidating agent testified that he mailed a letter giving the notice “within three or four days after I discovered the certificates of deposit outstanding, which were marked paid upon the register.”

*335 On 19 December, 1931, an itemized proof of loss was submitted to tbe defendant specifying in detail certain claims arising from tbe unlawful and wrongful acts of tbe principal in tbe bond. Tbis proof of loss was furnished “witbin three months after discovery of such loss.” There are certain discrepancies between tbe proof of loss so furnished and tbe proof produced at tbe trial, but tbe referee concluded that tbe proof of loss was in compliance with tbe contract and tbis conclusion was approved by tbe trial judge, and there was evidence to support such conclusion.

Tbe record discloses that tbe suit was brought witbin twelve months from tbe discovery of tbe loss and a careful study of tbe findings of fact, tbe exceptions thereto, and tbe rulings of tbe trial judge do not convince tbe Court of reversible error.

Tbe question of liability of tbe surety upon both bonds was not presented in tbe trial court, and for that reason has not been considered in determining tbe rights of tbe parties in tbe case.

Affirmed.