The appealing defendants, Southeastern Express Company and B. E. Haynes introduced no evidence on the trial of the action in the General County Court of Buncombe County, North Carolina, and at the close of plaintiff’s evidence, made a motion for judgment as in case of nonsuit, C. S., 561. This motion was overruled, defendants excepted and assigned error. Upon motion for nonsuit evidence which makes for plaintiff’s claim, or tends to support her cause of action, whether offered by plaintiff or elicited from defendants’ witnesses, will be considered in its most favorable light, and plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable intendment and inference to be drawn therefrom. The issue submitted and the answer thereto was as follows: “Was the plaintiff injured by the negligence of the defendants, Southeastern Express Company and B. E. Haynes? Answer: Yes.”

The jury awarded plaintiff damages. The defendants excepted, assigned error and appealed to the Superior Court and made the same motion in the court below, which was overruled and appealed to this Court. We can see no error in overruling the motion of the appealing defendants. The sole question was there any sufficient, competent evidence of actionable negligence to be submitted to the jury. The evidence was to the effect that plaintiff, on Saturday afternoon, 26 November, 1932, was on Haywood Street, in Asheville, N. 0. The safety street signs are green and red. Before crossing the street, plaintiff stopped for the red light and the line of traffic to pass. The truck of the South *245 eastern Express Company, B. E. Haynes at tbe wheel, passed, and G. W. Reams, driving a Buick Sedan, followed tbe truck and stopped. Sbe started to cross between tbe “white lines” on tbe street. The traffic “stopped for signals” — “I bad a perfect right to pass” — “I bad tbe right of way.” Tbe Reams’ car backed and tbe bumper of tbe car struck plaintiff’s right knee and threw her to tbe pavement and sbe was seriously injured. Tbe truck stopped in front of tbe Bon Marche and tbe Reams’ car behind it. Reams testified: “We (Reams and tbe driver of tbe truck), both sat there for probably a minute or maybe more. During that time be was just sitting there looking back this way to tbe rear of tbe truck, back at my car. He was making no motions during that time we were sitting there. About a minute we were just both sitting there. I glanced back just then, probably at tbe end of that minute, and saw tbe street was clear. I didn’t see a soul anywhere. When I glanced back around to tbe front, tbe express truck was already in motion. I tapped my born and moved back. I didn’t move back over three feet. ... I felt something strike tbe rear fender. I immediately reached down and pulled up tbe emergency brake. I got out and went around to tbe other side of tbe car as fast as I could. When I got there, this lady, Miss Sherwood, was on Haywood Street upon her bands and knees getting up. ... In other words, there was not room enough for me to cut out and go around the truck. . . . There was room enough for a man to walk in behind tbe bumper of my car and tbe back of tbe truck.” After tbe ear struck plaintiff: “I looked back this way at tbe back end of my car and tbe express truck and this man, driver of tbe truck, was standing behind tbe truck in tbe act of taking a package out of tbe back of tbe truck. . . . Tbe last I saw of tbe driver be was going into tbe door of tbe Bon Marche with a package in bis arms and this metal notebook. I did not see him again at tbe time. . . . When I backed, tbe truck in front of me was in motion, backing towards me. I blew my born. Before I started backing I blew tbe born.”

Tbe plaintiff contended that tbe appealing defendants were violating ten traffic ordinances of tbe city of Asheville. Tbe one mainly relied on is as follows: “Section 45. No motor vehicle or vehicle shall be turned around on any public street in tbe congested district, but if tbe driver of such vehicle desires to travel in a direction opposite to tbe direction in which said vehicle is beaded said driver must proceed around tbe block in order to make such turn and no motor vehicle or vehicle shall be driven in a backward direction except so far as is absolutely necessary to avoid accident or to proceed on its way. . . .”

It is well settled in this jurisdiction that tbe violation of a statute or ordinance intended to prevent injury to persons or property, is negli *246 gence per se, but to become actionable negligence, there must be a causal connection between the injury sustained and the statutory prohibition. The violation of the statute or ordinance must be the proximate cause or one of the approximate causes of the injury complained of. Ledbetter v. English, 166 N. C., 125; Godfrey v. Coach Co., 201 N. C., 264 (267); S. v. Durham, 201 N. C., 724 (732); Johnson v. R. R., 205 N. C., 127 (132); Barrier v. Thomas and Howard Co., 205 N. C., 425 (427). Where the violation of an ordinance is admitted or established by the evidence, it is ordinarily a question for the jury to determine, whether such negligence is the proximate or one of the approximate causes of injury which resulted in damage. Godfrey, supra, p. 267. The famous “Squib case” is similar to the present. Scott v. Shepherd, 2 W. Bl., 892, cited in Shirley’s Leading Oases in the Common Law (3d Eng. Ed.), p. 259: “Mr. Shepherd, of Milbourne Port, determined to celebrate the happy deliverance of that august and wise monarch James I, in the orthodox fashion; and, with that intention, he some days before the 5th laid in a plentiful pyrotechnic supply. Being not only of a pious and patriotic spirit, but also a man not destitute of humour, he threw a lighted squib into the market house at a time when it was crowded with those that bought and sold. The fiery missle came down on the shed of a vender of ginger-bread, who, to protect himself, caught it dexterously and threw it way from him. It then fell on the shed of another ginger-bread seller, who passed it on in precisely the same way; till at last it burst in the plaintiff’s face and put his eye out.

Scott brought an action against the original thrower of the squib, who objected that he was not responsible for what had happened, when the squib had passed through so many hands; but, though he persuaded the learned Mr. Justice Blaclcstone to agree with him, the majority of the court decided that he must be presumed to have contemplated all the consequences of his wrongful act and was answerable for them.”

The appealing defendants contended: “The jury having found that the defendant, Reams, was guilty of no negligent act, the court should have set aside the answer of the jury to the third issue, as a matter of law, and rendered judgment in favor of the appellants, Haynes and the Southeastern Express Company.” This contention cannot be sustained.

Contrary to the ordinance, the driver of the truck backed it, after being warned by Reams — by blowing his horn — and then, Reams backed his car to avoid the truck and the bumper struck the plaintiff. The matter was properly left to the jury. The charge of the learned judge in the General County Court of Buncombe is not in the record, the presumption is that the court charged the law correctly applicable to the facts. In the judgment we find

No error.