The single question presented is as to the proper interpretation of the collateral pledge of the life insurance policies as security for the joint note of the insured and beneficiary therein, J. A. Eynuni and wife, Gertrude II. Bynum, respectively.

We are of the opinion that the liability created by the collateral note is a joint liability of the makers thereof. We think the words of the pledge, following the provision for the application of the funds derived from the sale of the securities, “shall be applied to this obligation, and any surplus to any other note, obligation, bill, overdraft, or open account under which the undersigned shall be bound” connote that the intention of the parties to the contract or note was to pledge the securities to the payment of only such other notes and obligations as were of the same character as the joint liability under the collateral note. “It is well recognized that the object of all rules of interpretation is to arrive at the intention of the parties as expressed in the contract, and, in written contracts which permit of construction, this intent is to be gathered from the entire instrument, and, ... to ascertain the intention, regard must be had to the nature of the instrument itself, the condition of the parties executing it, and the objects they had in view, and the words employed, if capable of more than one meaning, or to be given that meaning which it is apparent the parties intended them to have.” Bank v. Furniture Co., 169 N. C., 180. The natural inference to be drawn from the words “under which the undersigned shall be in any way bound” is that the securities were pledged only for the joint liabilities of the makers. The bank, the payee, framed this pledge, and if it desired to have the pledge extend to the individual and several obligations of the makers of the collateral note, it should have had inserted the words “or either of them,” or words of similar import.

Entertaining, as we do, the opinion that the pledge contained in the collateral note extends only to the joint liabilities of the makers to the payee thereof, we hold that the judgment of the Superior Court which extended the pledge to the individual and several obligations of J. A. Bynum was erroneous.

While the facts are not altogether analogous, the reasoning in Bank v. Furniture Co., supra, and Newsome v. Bank, 169 N. C., 534, is apposite to this case. To the same effect is the case of- Bank v. Scott, 123 N. C., 538, which is also authority for holding that the words “we” and “our” used in a collateral note, as in this case, import joint obligations. See, also, Heffner v. Bank, 311 Pa., 29, 87 A. L. R., 610, and Torrance v. Bank (C. C. A., 3d Cir.) 210 Fed. Reporter, 806.

The judgment below is reversed.

*439 Under the stipulation contained in the record, the cases wherein G. C. Barbour and L. C. Jackson, respectively, are codefendants with J. A. Bynum and wife, Gertrude H. Bynum, will be governed by this opinion and judgments therein will be entered accordingly.

Reversed.