We agree with the trial court that the irregularities here in question are mere clerical errors, calculated to mislead no one, and that they ought not to be regarded as fatal defects in the title offered.

The decision in Lane v. Royster, 118 N. C., 159, 24 S. E., 703, is authority for holding that the error in transcribing the signature of one *631 of tbe commissioners, W. R. Whitson, as “W. R. Whitmire,” was so obviously a mistake as to mislead no one and that it ought not to affect the title. In the cited case, a mortgage executed by “Patrick lane and wife, Zilpha Lane,” was recorded as having been signed by “Patrick Savage and wife, Zilpha Savage.” This was held to be a clear inadvertence. To like effect is the decision in Smith v. Lumber Co., 144 N. C., 47, 56 S. E., 555, where the register of deeds, by patent inadvertence, omitted to copy the signatures at the end of the deed.

In the case at bar, it is admitted that the commissioners’ deed is regularly registered in all other respects and that it is properly cross indexed in the name of “W. R. Whitson.” See, also, Mitchell v. Bridgets, 113 N. C., 63, 18 S. E., 91.

In respect of the irregularity appearing in the clerk’s fiat to the deed from H. R. Loar and wife to A. R. Hanson, it is sufficient to say that the case of Kleybolte v. Timber Co., 151 N. C., 635, 66 S. E., 663, is ample authority for upholding this registration. Speaking to a similar inadvertence in that case, Walker, J., delivering the opinion of the Court, said: “The certificates are all before us, and we can see that they are ‘in due form.’ It may be true that the certificate of the clerk of the Supreme Court of New York, as to the authority of the notary public, was unnecessary, but it will be observed that the clerk makes two adjudications — first, that the certificate of the said clerk is ‘in due form and according to law’; and, second, that ‘the foregoing and annexed deed of trust is adjudged to be duly proven.’ From what source could the clerk of the Superior Court of Swain County have derived any knowledge of the due execution of the deed, or of its probate, except from the certificates of the notary? The clerk of the Supreme Court of New York did not certify to either fact, but simply to the official character of Edward Carroll, Jr., as a notary. We are as competent to pass upon the correctness of the certificates as the clerk, or, at least, I suppose we are, and we should be. If he adjudges the execution of the deed to have been duly proven and orders it to be registered, and acts upon certificates which, in fact, as we can plainly see, are in due form, how vain and idle to argue that he has not ‘substantially’ complied with the law.” See, also, Cozad v. McAden, 150 N. C., 206, 63 S. E., 944.

The judgment decreeing specific performance upon the facts agreed will be upheld.

Affirmed.