concurring: Since it is the duty of the court below, and also this Court, to sustain a finding by the Industrial Commission, when there is any evidence to support it, I do not see why we should argue further whether the deceased came to his death by reason of asbestosis, or why we should pick out the less favorable testimony of one expert as against several others who testified plainly that he did.

Pneumonia is indeed an infectious disease, but we are made to understand that just as the vulture swoops upon his disabled prey while yet there may be life, the latent germs of pneumonia are ready to take over the lung area when resistance has been destroyed. Pneumonia is such a close incident to lung injuries, and indeed to other injuries, that it is sometimes apparently regarded as merely the hand that opens the gate for the final flight.

*237Following McNeeley v. Asbestos Co., 206 N. C., 568, 174 S. E., 451, when silicosis, an occupational disease, was treated as an accident already within the scope of the then existing Workmen’s Compensation Act, and as such compensable, the Legislature of 1935 added to the list of things compensable under that act a large number of occupational diseases, including asbestosis. We may assume that in part, at least, this addition to the statute was made for the protection of industry, through the regulation of the conditions upon which compensation might be made for occupational diseasés. If there is observable in the statute the suggestion of a policy supposed to protect the industry against imposition, we are not required to go beyond the terms in which it is expressed. Whether the employer has the “edge” of advantage in these positions is a matter for the Legislature and not for us, but it is our duty to approach this case with some degree of liberality toward the labor employed in the industry, since the rule is universally accepted that statutes like the one under consideration are to he liberally construed in favor of the employee. While this does not permit us to set aside any rule established by the Legislature consistent with constitutional limitations, it nevertheless strongly enjoins upon us the duty of resolving fifty-fifty doubts in favor of compensation.

In the present instance we are dealing with what I should consider a very harsh provision of the law, operating more for arbitrary exclusion ■of asbestosis victims than for the reasonable protection of employers against imposition, unless its terms may be rationally explained.

Here are the conditions which have been suggested as standing in the way of compensation: Chapter 123, Public Laws of 1935; Michie’s Code of 1935, section 8081 (7) (o), requires a written notice to an employer within thirty days after a distinct manifestation of an occupational disease, and in case of death, also, a written notice of such death within ninety days after the occurrence. With special reference as to asbestosis, .-section 50%, subsection (g), of the 1935 Law, Michie’s Code of 1935, section 8081 (7) (g), provides: “An employer shall not be liable for any compensation for asbestosis, silicosis or lead poisoning unless disablement or death results within three years after the last exposure to such disease, or, in case of death, unless death follows continuous disability from such disease, commencing within the period of three years limited herein, «and for which compensation has been paid or awarded or timely claim ■made as hereinafter provided and results within seven years after such last exposure.”

We have here alternative conditions affecting compensation in case of death: first, if death follows continuous disability for which compensation has been paid or awarded; and, second, timely claim made, as hereinafter provided. Obviously, if payment has been made for a disability *238caused by asbestosis, or an award made therefor, the employer has notice that such a condition exists. If that has not occurred, then he is entitled to a notice of the condition within thirty days after its manifestation, and notice must be given within ninety days after the death. It is, therefore, first and last, a question of notice to the employer, and it was not intended that in the absence of such a written notice within thirty days after the manifestation of the asbestosis condition it should put the claimant against the alternative bar of his claim, upon the ground that death had not followed continuous disability. What we must deal with— and I see no disagreement as to this — is the question of notice which the statute requires to be given within thirty days after the distinct manifestation of asbestosis, and the ninety days notice after the death.

Similar provisions in insurance policies, as drastic if literally construed, have been relieved against upon the accepted theory that the law does not intend an unreasonable requirement which would defeat justice between the parties, especially when the party charged with liability has not been prejudiced by want of notice. Nelson v. Insurance Co., 199 N. C., 443, 154 S. E., 752; Gorham v. Ins. Co., 214 N. C., 526, 200 S. E., 5; Woodell v. Ins. Co., 214 N. C., 496, 199 S. E., 719; Allgood v. Ins. Co., 186 N. C., 415, 119 S. E., 561; Ball v. Assurance Corp., 206 N. C., 90, 172 S. E., 178. The Court would be loath to admit that the ends of justice were achieved in these cases by court repeal, rather than legitimate construction.

It is clear from the evidence that the deceased had no knowledge of the cause of his serious condition and, therefore, had no occasion to file any notice of it; nor, indeed, was there such a distinct manifestation of his disease as would inform him, a layman, of the condition, and apparently no physician or other competent person had given him any such information. His disease was a fact but he was unaware of it. A similar situation prevailed with regard to the widow in filing her claim. She had no knowledge whatever that the deceased had asbestosis or was suffering from any other compensable disease. She was informed of this after the autopsy, and the Commission, properly I think, found that she filed her claim within the ninety days after it was incumbent upon her so to do. This is the reasoning applied in the analogous cases cited, where the doctrine of liberal construction was not so imperative. Is the rule less commendable where our construction is required to be liberal ?

In no event has the defendant been prejudiced by a want of notice, unless, indeed, the technical defenses upon which it relied have not been found good. The fact that the man was afflicted with asbestosis, and the manner in which it had affected his lungs, was made clear by the autopsy. It was a condition which could not be simulated, faked, or suddenly produced; and, inevitably, it came from years of inhalation of asbestos *239dust and particles, and tbe daily lesion of lung tissue, and tbe filling up of tbe lungs witb inert matter and scar tissue tbrougb all tbat period. Whether tbe provisions in tbe original unamended act, Miebie’s Code of 1935, section 8081 (dd), relating to tbe finding by tbe Commission tbat an employer is not prejudiced by want of notice, applies to tbis case, I do not tbink it necessary to inquire. If it does, tbe Commission in setting forth tbe facts witb regard to tbe notice, and adjudging tbe claim to be compensable thereunder, may be deemed to have found tbat a want of notice is not prejudicial to tbe employer.

Tbe independent fact whether tbe deceased was disabled from normal labor has been questioned. Attention has been called to tbe fact tbat be did labor up to tbe time be left for Litbonia, Ga., as conclusive on tbe point. Tbe expert evidence in tbis case clearly indicates tbat be was disabled from normal labor, notwithstanding tbe fact tbat be did actually labor, and notwithstanding tbe fact tbat be gave no notice of tbe condition, himself being unaware of it. There is no question here of total disability. Whether bis labor was actually normal, we may-judge from tbe circumstances.

For a long period of time tbe deceased bad violent paroxysms of coughing during tbe mornings. Tbe paroxysms were so violent as to force tbe blood into tbe vesicles of bis skin until bis face became violently red. Tbe absence of oxygenation was apparent from tbe fact tbat at such times bis nails became black. Here was tbe most violent attempt of nature to expel not only tbe grinding asbestos particles witb which bis lungs were subsequently found to be impregnated, but also tbe fibrous scar tissue which bad taken tbe place of tbe open air cells, necessary to bis existence by tbe intake of air and oxygen. Tbe condition of bis lungs, although tbe cause of it was not apparent to tbe deceased, was indicated by tbe rales which accompanied bis difficult breathing. Thus, witb bis lungs torn by asbestos particles, which it was impossible for him to absorb or cough up, and filled witb fibrous instead •of cell tissue, be left his employment and went to Georgia, where tbe condition continued — without tbe abnormal temperature which would indicate tbat pneumonia bad supervened, for a period of time. Then pneumonia ensued, which tbe expert witnesses stated was tbe result of tbe asbestosis. When tbe time came to fight tbis, be was already half ■drowned witb solid matter:

But even if tbe man worked down to tbe last moment, tbis is not •conclusive as to bis disability. Tbe distinction is clearly brought out in tbe evidence of tbe experts who testified tbat be was disabled and should not have been at work.

Men are constituted differently. One may be inclined to quit work, .and do so, when bis physical powers are attacked by disease or injury, *240and consider himself totally disabled or disabled from normal employment. Conscientious experts passing on bis case will agree with him. Another, who has suffered greater impairment, will desperately arise to the emergency under the pressure of what is euphoniously called “economic necessity,” and which often means the necessity of fighting off starvation from the hungry mouths of his dependents, and will fight his handicap and carry on with a determination, intensity and courage that will not suffer abatement until his dead hands fall from the loom.

It is not at all necessary, however, to go into that matter, since we are here dealing with the question of notice, and on this question I am impelled to agree with the findings of the Full Commission and of the Superior Court, and, therefore, concur in the result reached here.

dissenting: A careful examination of the record discloses that all of the evidence tending to show that the deceased, prior to his death, suffered from asbestosis is hearsay, being largely based on an unsworn unidentified report by the United States Public Health Service. All of the evidence tends to show that the death of the deceased was caused by pneumonia, a germ disease or infection, and that the only effect that asbestosis could have had' in contributing to his death lies in the fact that it had a tendency to lower his resistance. There is no-evidence that pneumonia was not sufficiently virulent to have caused death irrespective of the existence of asbestosis. Pneumonia being an infectious disease reference might be had to the medical reports relied on in which it is made to appear that he was suffering both from infected tonsils and pyorrhea — conditions which are resistance reducing and provide a fruitful field for the lodgment of pneumonia germs. And the medical testimony tends to show that lobar pneumonia (the cause of the death of the deceased) is more prevalent in strong, apparently healthy, normal individuals than in any other type; that pneumonia patients die not from the condition of the lungs but from the toxemia the presence of bacteria produces; and that the disease is no more prevalent in cases of asbestosis than it is in other patients.

Much could be said as to these aspects of the evidence which make it. appear that the presence of asbestosis was incidental and that it could not be said that it was the efficient proximate cause of his death as indicated by the testimony of Dr. Easom, chairman of the Advisory Medical Committee appointed under the Occupational Disease Law and Director of the Industrial Hygiene Division of the Board of Health of the Industrial Commission, as follows: “I think it is very probable that the pneumonia might have been fatal without the asbestosis, he might have died of pneumonia even without the asbestosis; there is no way in the world of proving that this man would have or would not have died *241without having the asbestosis . . . it is my opinion that pneumonia is no more prevalent in cases of asbestosis than it is in other patients . . . in my opinion the asbestosis played no significant part in his death . . . most pneumonia patients die from the toxemia from the bacteria that is present. I do not believe that the presence of the asbestosis had any effect one way or the other on the toxemia.” Dr. Murphy, a member of the Industrial Commission Advisory Medical Committee, testified to like effect.

Dr. Stewart, who attended the deceased during his illness, frankly stated: “I don’t know what asbestosis is.” His opinion and the opinions of other doctors who testified were based upon evidence that was wholly incompetent. But as I view the record it is unnecessary to debate the question of proximate cause of death. The claimants have no right to compensation under express terms of the statute.

Ch. 123, Public Laws 1935, amends the Workmen’s Compensation Act so as to add sec. 50%, providing for the payment of compensation in certain cases of occupational diseases. As thus amended, sec. 50% (g) provides that “an employer shall not be liable for any compensation for asbestosis . . . unless disablement or death results within three years after the last exposure to such disease, or, in case of death, unless death follows continuous disability from such disease, commencing within the period of three years limited herein, and for which compensation has been paid or awarded or timely claim made as hereinafter provided and results within seven years after such last exposure.”

Under this section the claimant must prove that the disablement or death resulted within three years after the last exposure to such disease unless it is shown that compensation was paid or awarded or timely claim made, as provided in the act, prior to death. In that event it is sufficient to show that the death resulted within sevén years after the last exposure. However, the act expressly provides that there shall be no liability for the payment of compensation in either event unless death follows continuous disablement from such disease commencing within three years after the last exposure. Proof thereof is a condition precedent to recovery, as is the provision for notice.

Disablement or disability as used in this section, as expressly defined in the statute 50% (g) in respect to cases of asbestosis, means “the event of becoming actually incapacitated because of such occupational disease from performing normal labor in the last occupation in which remu-neratively employed.”

The deceased continued in his employment until 25 March, 1937, at which time he quit work for the purpose of taking a pleasure trip to Georgia. Before leaving for Georgia he contracted a severe cold |ol-lowed by pneumonia from which he died 1 April, 1937. He was not *242then and bad never been disabled from asbestosis as defined in tbe statute. Tbe Commission found as a fact “that tbe deceased never knew be bad asbestosis.” How, tben, could bis death follow “continuous disability from sucb disease . . . for wbicb compensation bas been paid or awarded 'or timely claim made” ?

Tbe plaintiffs bave failed to establish tbe conditions under wbicb tbe employer is liable for compensation. Tbe case is plainly not within tbe terms of tbe statute.

Whether these restrictions upon tbe right of recovery in case of death from asbestosis unduly limits tbe right to compensation is not for us to determine. Tbe Legislature bas written tbe statute in clear and unmistakable language and it is our duty to apply it as written.

Tbe Workmen’s Compensation Act (cb. 120, Public Laws 1929, as amended by cb. 123, Public Laws 1935) further provides that no compensation shall be paid for asbestosis “unless written notice of tbe first distinct manifestation of an occupational disease shall be given to tbe employer in whose employment tbe employee was last injuriously exposed to tbe hazards of such disease or to tbe Industrial Commission within thirty days after sucb manifestation, and, in case of death unless also written notice of sucb death shall be given by tbe beneficiary hereunder to tbe employer or tbe Industrial Commission within ninety days after occurrence.” Sec. 50½ (o). Two separate and distinct notices are required: (1) Notice of tbe first manifestation of tbe disease prior to tbe death of tbe employee; and (2) written notice of sucb death within ninety days after death occurs. Tbe provisions of tbe statute bave not been complied with either as to tbe notice prior to death or to tbe notice after death.

Tbe Commission found that tbe claimants made out notice and claim for compensation '19 July, 1937, and filed sucb notice and claim with tbe employer and tbe Industrial Commission 20 July, 1937, wbicb was more than 90 days after death occurred 1 April, 1937. Therefore, tbe conclusion of tbe Commission that sucb notice was served within 90 days, as required in section 50½ (o), is not supported by tbe record.

In this connection it is well to note that tbe provisions of sec. 50% (o) clearly make tbe provisions of sec. 22, ch. 120, Public Laws 1929, inapplicable, for it is provided that notice is deemed to bave been waived: (1) Where the employer or insurance carrier voluntarily makes compensation payments therefor; or (2) within tbe time above limited, bas actual knowledge of tbe occurrence of tbe disease or of tbe death and its cause; or (3) by bis or its. conduct misleads tbe injured employee or claimant reasonably to believe that notice and/or claim, bas or bave been waived. And it does not appear that notice bas thus been waived by tbe defendants.

*243Rut if it be conceded, as tbe majority opinion asserts, that tbe provisions of sec. 22, cb. 120, Public Laws 1929, are controlling as to notice in the case at bar, then we must bear in mind tbat it is there provided tbat “no compensation shall be payable unless such written notice is. given within thirty days after the occurrence of the accident or death, unless reasonable excuse is made to the satisfaction of the Industrial Commission for not giving such notice and the Commission is satisfied that the employer has not been prejudiced thereby.” If the claimants, seek to excuse the failure to give notice under the terms of this provision the burden is on them. They did not seek to so show. Even had they done so the Commission has not found that such facts appear to its. satisfaction as it is required to do before the want of notice becomes immaterial. Singleton v. Laundry Co., 213 N. C., 32. As the Commission has not found “reasonable excuse” to its satisfaction or that “the employer has not been prejudiced thereby,” the failure to give notice is. material even under this section.

Furthermore, it is apparent from the record that no effort was made to-substantially comply with the provisions of 50½ (r).

A careful reading of the pertinent statute leads me to the conclusion that it clearly appears that the Legislature intended that there should be no compensation paid for death from asbestosis unless the employee,, during his lifetime, at least recognized that he was suffering from asbestosis and had made claim for, or the employer had voluntarily made-payments of, compensation; and, unless thirty days notice of the existence of asbestosis was given prior to death and notice of death was served within ninety days thereafter, or waived as provided by the-statute. If this be correct the claimants are not entitled to compensation.

I am aware of and in full accord with the rule of liberal interpretation when the Workmen’s Compensation Act is under consideration. However, this rule when followed to its fullest extent does not require us to write into the statute provisions the Legislature has elected to omit or to disregard positive provisions therein contained.

I am unable to agree with the reasoning in the majority opinion or with that in the concurring opinion to the effect that we are dealing only with the question of notice. As I view it the failure to give the required notice is a secondary feature of the case. The plaintiffs have failed to-establish the right to compensation in the first instance, irrespective of notice.

The hearing Commissioner was correct in his conclusion that no compensation should be awarded. We should so hold and reverse the judgment below.

We do not think that the exception and assignment of error made by defendants to the judgment, as signed by the court below, can be sustained. Asbestosis cases have been before this Court heretofore. McNeeley v. Asbestos Co., 206 N. C., 568 (1934); Swink v. Asbestos Co., 210 N. C., 303. These cases were prior to the amendment of 1935.

*231Tbe General Assembly of North Carolina, at its regular session of 1935, passed a comprehensive act (chapter 123) in reference to occupational diseases, amending the "Workmen’s Compensation Act, Public Laws 1929, chapter 120, “And to provide for securing the payment of compensation in certain cases of occupational disease.” The pertinent parts — chapter 123. . . . Sec. 50½. (a) The disablement or death of an employee resulting from an occupational disease described in paragraph (b) of this section shall be treated as the happening of an injury by accident within the meaning of the North Carolina Workmen’s Compensation Act and the procedure and practice and compensation and other benefits provided by said act shall apply in all such cases except as hereinafter otherwise provided. The word ‘accident,’ as used in the Workmen’s Compensation Act, shall not be construed to mean a series of events in employment, of a similar or like nature, occurring regularly, continuously or at frequent intervals in the course of such employment, over extended periods of time, whether such events may or may not be attributable to fault of the employer, and disease attributable to such causes shall be compensable only if culminating in an occupational disease mentioned in and compensable under this act: Provided, however, no compensation shall be payable for asbestosis and/or silicosis as hereinafter defined if the employee, at the time of entering into the employment of the employer by whom compensation would otherwise be payable, falsely represented himself in writing as not having previously been disabled or laid off because of asbestosis or silicosis, (b) The following diseases and conditions only shall be deemed to be occupational diseases within the meaning of this act: . . . (24) Asbestosis. (25) Silicosis. . . . (c) The term ‘disablement’ as used in this section as applied to cases of asbestosis and silicosis means the event of becoming actually incapacitated, because of such occupational diseases, from performing normal labor in the last occupation in which remuneratively employed,’ ” etc. The act provided money through the Industrial Commission for medical and engineering studies, examinations, etc. The United States Public Health Service supplemented these funds through the North Carolina State Board of Health. As a result the Division of Industrial Hygiene was established in North Carolina.

The act also provides for “Advisory Medical Committee”: “‘(m) Except as herein otherwise provided, in case of disablement or death from silicosis and/or asbestosis, compensation shall be payable in accordance with the provisions of the North Carolina Workmen’s Compensation Act.’ . . . ‘(o) Unless written notice of the first distinct manifestation of an occupational disease shall be given to the employer in whose employment the employee was last injuriously exposed to the hazards of such disease or to the Industrial Commission within thirty *232(30) days after such manifestation, and, in case of death, unless also written notice of such death shall be given by the beneficiary hereunder to the employer of the Industrial Commission within ninety (90) days after occurrence, and unless claim for disability and/or death shall be made within one (1) year after the disablement or death, respectively, all rights to compensation for disability or death from an occupational disease shall be forever barred/ ” etc.

The Commission set forth “The deceased had been employed in the asbestos industry in North Carolina almost continuously since 1925. For some time before his death and during his last illness he had all the characteristic symptoms of a true asbestosis, but no doctor had so diagnosed it and told him; therefore, the deceased did not have a ‘distinct manifestation’ as provided for in section 50% (°)- The Commission has held in several cases against the Standard Mineral Company that the ‘first distinct manifestation’ is when the employee is told by competent medical doctors that he has asbestosis or silicosis. No claim for compensation could be filed until there was a diagnosis of asbestosis. The first diagnosis of asbestosis was the autopsy report.”

The Commission found: “That Dr. Easom’s X-ray diagnosis, based upon two examinations, January 27, 1936, and March 23, 1937, was first degree ground glass appearance and asbestosis of both lower lung fields.”

The Commission found: “That the widow first knew that her husband, W. S. Blassingame, had asbestosis some time after the autopsy report was filed, May 10, 1937; that notice and claim for compensation were made out July 19, 1937, and filed both with the defendant employer and the Industrial Commission July 20, 1937, or within 90 days as required in section 50% (o').” The Occupational Disease Act, including “asbestosis,” was passed in 1935 — chapter 123. It was an act to amend the 'Workmen’s Compensation Act (chapter 120, Laws 1929). This act says that “All laws and clauses of laws in conflict herewith are hereby repealed.” Therefore, the Occupational Disease Act must be construed in pari materia.

In Real Estate Co. v. Sasser, 179 N. C., 497 (499), it is said: “Amendments are to be construed together with the original act, to which they relate, as constituting one law. The old law should be considered, the evils arising under it, and the remedy provided by the amendments adopted, which shall best repress the evils and advance the remedy. 36 Cyc., 1164, and cases cited.” S. v. Kelly, 186 N. C., 365 (372).

The following provisions were then in existence, in which there is no conflict: Section 8081 (dd), in part: “Every injured employee or his representative shall immediately on the occurrence of an accident, or as soon thereafter as practicable, give or cause to be given to the employer a written notice of the accident. . . . Unless it can be shown that *233the employer, his agent or representative, has knowledge of the accident, or that the party required to give such notice had been prevented from doing so by reason of physical or mental incapacity, or the fraud or deceit of some third person; hut no compensation shall be payable unless such written notice is given within thirty days after the occurrence of the accident or death, unless reasonable excuse is made to the satisfaction of the Industrial Commission for not giving such notice and the Commission is satisfied that the employer has not been prejudiced thereby.”

Section 8081 (ff) : (a) The right to compensation under this article shall be forever barred unless a claim be filed with the Industrial Commission within one year after the accident, and if death results from one accident, unless a claim be filed with the Commission within one year thereafter.” This section, like the amendment of 1935, says, similar to the old act, “shall be forever barred.”

The claim was filed within two weeks after date of letter of Dr. Easom transmitting his report, and the autopsy report of the United States Public Health Service to Dr. Stewart, of Lithonia, Ga. The Commission has found that the widow first knew that her husband had asbestosis some time after 10 May, 1931, which was the date of the autopsy report of the United States Public Health Service; that notice and claim was made 19 July, 1931, and filed 20 July, 1931. Thus it will be seen that it was humanly impossible for the widow to have given notice of such death (death resulting from asbestosis) within ninety days after the death. To construe this section as contended by the defendants would be to deny the benefits conferred by the act in this and all similar cases. The context of the Compensation Act does not favor such a strained or technical construction. The cause of deceased’s death could only be ascertained by autopsy, as above set forth, and notice was given within ninety (90) days after discovery and action brought within one (1) year.

In Johnson v. Hosiery Co., 199 N. C., 38 (40), this Court said: “It is generally held by the courts that the various Compensation Acts of the Union should be liberally construed to the end that the benefits thereof should not be denied upon technical, narrow, and strict interpretation.” We see nothing prejudicial to defendants.

In II Schneider, "Workmen’s Compensation Law (2nd Ed.), part sec. 554, at pp. 2002-3, we find: “ ‘The courts may not interfere with the findings of fact, made by the Industrial Commissioner, when these are supported by evidence, even though it may be thought there be error.’ ‘The rule ... is well settled to the effect that, if in any reasonable view of the evidence it will support, either directly or indirectly, or by fair inference, the findings made by the- Commission, then they must be regarded as conclusive’ (citing a wealth of authorities). Courts cannot *234demand tbe same precision in the finding of Commission as otherwise might be if the members were required to be learned in the law.”

In IV Schneider, Workmen’s Compensation Law (supplement), page 592, it is said: “ ‘Undoubtedly, if any party feels that the Commission’s findings of fact are not clear, leave the reason for its conclusion and award in doubt, or should be amplified for any other reason, he should ask the Commission to modify them by making additional findings instead of complaining in the appellate court that findings of fact, which are not inconsistent with the result reached, do not contain a finding concerning all disputed questions of fact which must necessarily have been decided in order to make and support the award.’ State ex rel. Probst v. Haid (Mo.), 62 S. W. (2d), 869 (August, 1933), quashing certiorari (App.), 52 S. W. (2d), 501.”

There is no evidence that the Commission found that the lack of the notice was prejudicial to the employer. The statute does not provide that the notice to the employer is a condition precedent (Wilson v. Clement Co., 207 N. C., 541), but it does provide that .the claim, if not made within one year by the claimant, “shall be forever barred.” This provision does not apply to the 90 days, and from a reasonable construction of the statute it seems to have been intentionally omitted. The Commission found that the widow filed the notice “within 90 days” as required by sec. 50½ (o), supra. If the widow is barred, what about the minor? Taking the intent of the statute, that under the facts and circumstances of this case it was never contemplated that the widow should make claim without being able to make a truthful one, and this was an impossibility until after the autopsy. By analogy see Nelson v. Ins. Co., 199 N. C., 443.

In S. v. Humphries, 210 N. C., 406 (410), Devin, J., for the Court says: “The object of all interpretation is to determine the intent of the lawmaking body. Intent is the spirit which gives life to a legislative enactment. The heart of a statute is the intention of the lawmaking body. Trust Co. v. Hood, Comr., 206 N. C., 268; S. v. Earnhardt, 170 N. C., 725. In the language of Chancellor Kent: ‘In the exposition of a statute the intention of the lawmaker will prevail over the literal sense of the terms and its reason and intention will prevail over the strict letter. When the words are not explicit, the intention is to be collected from the context, from the occasion and necessity of the law, from the mischief felt and the remedy in view, and the intention is to be taken or presumed according to what is consonant with reason and good discretion.’ 1 Kent Com., 461.”

In Cooley Blackstone, Intro, sec. 2, page 53, we find: “Intent as expressed. The fairest and most rational method to interpret the will of the legislator is by exploring his intention at the time when the law *235was made, by signs the most natural and probable. And these signs are either the words, the context, the subject matter, the effects and consequences, or the spirit and reason of the law. . . . (p. 54) As to the effects and consequences, the rule is, that where words bear either none, or a very absurd signification, if literally understood, we must a little deviate from the received sense of them. Therefore the Bolognian law, mentioned by Puffendorf, which enacted ‘that whoever drew blood in the streets should be punished with the utmost severity,’ was held after long debate not to extend to the surgeon, who opened the vein of a person that fell down in the street with a fit.”

The Industrial Commission found, among other facts, the following: “That the immediate cause of the death of the deceased was pneumonia superimposed upon asbestosis; that the degree of asbestosis with which the deceased was suffering prior to contracting pneumonia had the effect of lowering his resistance to the pneumonia germ which, according to medical science, is ever present in the human body; that the general condition of the deceased produced by such lowered resistance or inability to ward off pneumonia was the inciting or proximate cause of the fatal development of pneumonia and death of the deceased was proximately caused by the condition of the deceased which was produced and brought about by a weakened condition and lowered resistance due to asbestosis with which the deceased was and had been suffering for some time prior to the time he was stricken with pneumonia. . . . That the widow first knew that her husband, W. S. Blassingame, had asbestosis some time after the autopsy report was filed May 10, 1937; that notice and claim for compensation were made out July 19, 1937, and filed both with the defendant employer and the Industrial Commission on July 20, 1937, or within 90 days, as required by section 50% (o); that the deceased never knew he had asbestosis.”

The only exception and assignment of error made by the defendants is to “the judgment as signed.”

In Lassiter v. Telephone Co., 215 N. C., 227 (230), it is said: “It is established in this jurisdiction that the findings of fact made by the Industrial Commission, if supported by competent evidence, are conclusive on appeal and not subject to review by the Superior Court or this Court, although this Court may have reached a different conclusion if it had been the fact finding body.”

In Tindall v. Furniture Co., 216 N. C., 306 (310), it is written: “And the application of the rule of the conelusiveness of the findings of the Industrial Commission as to controverted issues of fact, when based on competent evidence, is not defeated by the fact that some of the testimony offered may be objectionable under the technical rules of evidence appertaining to courts of general jurisdiction, as pointed out in Maley *236v. Furniture Co., 214 N. C., 589, and Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U. S., 197.” There was circumstantial evidence.

The hypothetical question we think proper under our decisions. A similar hypothetical question was admitted in Shaw v. Handle Co., 188 N. C., 222 (tried before Devin, J.), and approved by this Court. In that case the question was the cause of the death of two men in the cabin of a boat. It was alleged that the boat was operated by a gasoline engine which was old, worn out and defective and would blow gas fumes out of the engine into the cabin. The weather was cold and the windows closed. The hypothetical question was answered: “Gas poisoning, monoxide poisoning” (carbon monoxide gas). Cabe v. Parker-Graham-Sexton, Inc., 202 N. C., 176; Keith v. Gregg, 210 N. C., 802 (807). In this case we think the hypothetical questions assume facts which the evidence directly, fairly and reasonably tends to establish, and were competent. The probative force was for the Commission.

The facts were fully sufficient to justify the Industrial Commission’s finding of fact that the proximate cause of death was asbestosis. The facts are distressing- — a young man, a bread-winner with a wife and child, in the performance of his duty to his employer, in an industry fraught with danger, was weakened by the inhaling of asbestos dust, and died from its effects. His lungs were practically closed by “ground glass appearance.”

None of the contentions of the defendants can be sustained. There was sufficient competent evidence for the Commission to find the facts upon which they found defendants’ liable. It has been said repeatedly by us that the findings of fact are binding on us.

We see no error in law. The judgment of the court below is

Affirmed.