A judgment non obstante veredicto, in effect, is nothing-more than a belated judgment on tbe pleadings. Jernigan v. Neighbors, 195 N. C., 231, 141 S. E., 586; Iron Works v. Beaman, 199 N. C., 537, 155 S. E., 166; Little v. Furniture Co., 200 N. C., 731, 158 S. E., 490; Buick Co. v. Rhodes, 215 N. C., 595, 2 S. E., 699.

“At common law a judgment non obstante veredicto could be granted only when tbe plea confessed tbe cause of action and set up matters in avoidance which, if true, were insufficient to constitute either a defense or a bar to tbe action. It was entered only upon tbe application of tbe plaintiff, and never in favor of tbe defendant. Under tbe modern practice, it may be given for either party, but only when the party against whom tbe verdict was returned is entitled to judgment upon tbe pleadings. 33 C. J., 1178; Fowler v. Murdock, 172 N. C., 349; Baxter v. Irvin, 158 N. C., 277; Doster v. English, 152 N. C., 339; Shives v. Cotton Mills, 151 N. C., 290.” Jernigan v. Neighbors, supra.

A careful reading of tbe complaint discloses that tbe plaintiff has adequately alleged a contract of sale of tbe locus in quo and a breach thereof resulting in damages. Hence, tbe judgment below cannot be sustained for that tbe plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action.

Tbe judgment itself discloses that tbis was not tbe theory upon which the court acted. It provides in part as follows:

*449 “The Court is of the opinion that notwithstanding the verdict of the jury the plaintiff is entitled to recover only such portion of the purchase money as he has paid, plus interest thereon, and the items which he has paid out for taxes and insurance, with interest thereon. It was admitted by both parties that all of said moneys, with interest, had already been paid to the plaintiff under the terms of an order entered in this cause by Honorable Marshall T. Spears, Judge Presiding at the November Term, 1936, of this court, said order having been entered without prejudice to the rights of either party.

“Although the Court is of the opinion that plaintiff is entitled to recover the purchase money paid by him, plus interest and the other items as aforesaid, yet when said recovery is credited with the amount already received by plaintiff from defendant there is no balance left:

“IT IS NOW, THEREFORE, BY THE COURT ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the plaintiff take nothing further by this action,” etc.

It, therefore, appears, affirmatively, that the Court concluded, as a matter of law, that the amount paid by the defendant to the plaintiff under the judgment of Spears, J., represents the full measure of damages to which the plaintiff is entitled upon proof of the breach of the contract alleged.

The defendant relies upon this payment as a full discharge of its liability. It contends that, conceding the breach of contract, the amount recoverable by plaintiff is the sums so paid by him, with interest. The trial judge concurred in this view. This position cannot be sustained.

In some jurisdictions the rule obtains that where the vendor in an executory contract for the sale of land is guilty of no bad faith or fraud, but the sale fails in consequence of a defect in his title, and the vendee has paid any part of the consideration, he may recover back the money, with interest; but he can recover nothing for the loss of his bargain. Anno., 48 A. L. R., 19. It is upon this rule that the defendant, asserting good faith, relies. But, good faith is a question of fact. Mere allegation of good faith is not proof thereof.

Even so, this rule is not followed in this jurisdiction. The general rule which has been adopted and applied by this Court is this: the damages recoverable for breach of contract by the vendor to convey real estate are only such as may fairly and reasonably be well considered as arising naturally — that is, according to the usual course of things — from such breach, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties at the time they made the contract, as a probable result of the breach. The loss of the vendee’s bargain is assessed upon the basis either of the difference between the contract price and the actual value of the land, or the actual value of the land less the *450 amount, if any, remaining unpaid on tbe contract price. One element taken into account is tbe difference between tbe contract price and tbe actual value of tbe land at tbe time of tbe breach. Anno., 48 A. L. R., pp. 14 and 17.

“Tbe proper measure of damages for tbe breach by a vendor of bis contract to sell real property is the difference between tbe contract price and tbe market value of tbe land at tbe time of tbe breach, plus any part of tbe purchase price which has been paid, with interest.” Howell v. Pate, 181 N. C., 117, 106 S. E., 454; Newby v. Realty Co., 180 N. C., 51, 103 S. E., 909. Good faith on tbe part of tbe vendor does not serve to diminish, nor does bad faith aggravate, tbe damages which naturally and proximately flow from tbe breach of a contract. If tbe defendant has breached its contract to convey tbe locus in quo to the plaintiff, it must suffer tbe consequences under the rule or measure of damages prevailing in this jurisdiction.

Tbe defendant contends here that in any event acceptance by tbe plaintiff of tbe amount paid under tbe order of Spears, J., estops tbe plaintiff from asserting any right to further compensation. In this connection it must be noted that this order, entered at tbe November Term, 1936'— apparently by consent, and at least without exception — provides that tbe payment is made “without prejudice to tbe rights of either party.” Plaintiff’s rights, if any, having been expressly reserved, it cannot be successfully contended that be is now estopped to assert them.

Tbe court below did not decree, or attempt to decree, that any one of tbe several affirmative defenses relied upon by tbe defendant is sufficient in law to constitute a valid defense or to estop tbe plaintiff or bar bis right of recovery. While this question is not presented, perhaps it is not amiss to say that we have carefully examined tbe affirmative defenses relied upon and are of the opinion that neither is sufficient, as a matter of law, to sustain a judgment non obstante veredicto.

In deciding a motion for judgment on tbe pleadings tbe Court is confined to tbe pleadings. Tbe repayment by tbe defendant to tbe plaintiff of the amounts received by it under tbe contract is not alleged. It is admitted by tbe plaintiff. Tbe judgment is based on this admission. It follows that, strictly speaking, tbe judgment entered is not a judgment non obstante veredicto. Even so, we have treated tbe admission in tbe nature of an amendment to the pleadings, or, at least, as a fact of which tbe Court could take judicial notice, and have decided tbe question presented.

The judgment on tbe verdict, tendered by tbe plaintiff, provides for the recovery of a sum in excess of tbe amount to which tbe plaintiff would be entitled on tbe verdict. There was no error in tbe refusal of *451 the Court to sign the same. That the amount in the judgment tendered was due to an error of counsel in preparing the judgment cannot affect this conclusion.

The judgment below was ill advised. Plaintiff’s exception thereto must be sustained to the end that further proceedings may be had on the verdict rendered.

DEFENDANT’S APPEAL.

Appeals are permitted from final judgments and judgments affecting a substantial right. No judgment has been signed on the verdict rendered. Until judgment has been entered, questions presented by exceptions noted during the progress of the trial are not properly before this Court. McIntosh P. & P., sec. 676 (7). Until a judgment is entered against the defendant it is not prejudiced by any error committed in the trial. Its appeal is premature and is dismissed. Smith v. Matthews, 203 N. C., 218, 165 S. E., 350, and cases cited.

On plaintiff’s appeal, Reversed.

Defendant’s appeal, Dismissed.