At the close of plaintiffs’ evidence the defendant in the court below made a motion for judgment as in case of nonsuit. C. S., 567. The court below sustained the motion and in this we can see no error.

The plaintiff Clifford Warren testified, in part: “On November 20, 1939, I gave notice to Mr. Breedlove to vacate the premises at the end of the 1939 crop year. I went to see him and told him I wanted to rent him the farm if I could, because it was time to rent it, if it was going to be rented, and he told me that he had the farm rented for two years, and that he was not going to rent it again.”

The latter part of 1939 plaintiffs brought an action of ejectment before a justice of the peace to dispossess defendant. The defendant claimed that he had rented the land for two years, 1939 and 1940. The justice of the peace decided in favor of defendant and plaintiffs took no appeal.

*386 Plaintiff Clifford Warren further testified: “During 1939, the defendant and myself got along nicely. He treated me all right. He worked hard and paid me $1,500.00 or something for my part, and I would not swear he didn’t pay me over $2,000.00.”

The defendant furnished two mules to work the crops. Plaintiffs had a chattel mortgage on same. Defendant had paid plaintiffs the price of one mule and interest in the 1939 settlement. Plaintiff testified: “After our 1939 settlement, I suggested to Mr. Breedlove that there be a contract drawn up between us for 1940. Mr. Breedlove said, ‘I have already made my contract with you, and I am going to stick to mine, and you stick to yours!’ ”

In planting the crop in the spring of 1940, defendant had broken up around 20 acres of land and had fixed his plant beds for tobacco. Fertilizer was sent defendant by plaintiffs to finish planting his corn for 1940.

The plaintiffs and defendant wrote letters setting forth their respective rights in regard to the 1940 crops. In April, 1940, plaintiffs brought a second ejectment (the present) suit against defendant to dispossess him. The justice of the peace decided in favor of plaintiffs, the defendant appealed to the Superior Court, and the justice of the peace required a $1,500 bond for the rent, which defendant was unable to give. Plaintiffs took claim and delivery for the mules and possession of the crops that defendant had planted and also the farming implements which were plaintiffs’, and left defendant without anything to farm. The defendant when ejected had planted 12 acres in corn and 10 acres in wheat, and has never received anything for the corn and wheat. In dispossessing defendant in the spring of the year everything was taken, and he and his wife and several children were turned out of house and home.

The contract between plaintiffs and defendant for 1939, which applied to 1940, was on the same terms. In 1939 there was no tobacco control and defendant planted about 15 to 18 acres of land in tobacco. Plaintiff testified: “There was no provision made between us in case of control of tobacco for 1940.” In 1940, 3.6 acres was all the tobacco allotment made on this particular farm by the Government. Defendant claimed that in lieu of tobacco for 1940, the 40.05 cotton allotment he should be permitted to plant. Plaintiffs denied defendant this right and insist here that the threat to plant cotton forfeited the lease. When the ejectment proceeding was instituted, plaintiffs contend that defendant had made arrangements to plant cotton and had said he would, and had purchased the fertilizer. But plaintiff testified: “I could not swear of my own knowledge that Mr. Breedlove was going to plant cotton.”

N. C. Code, 1939 (Michie), sec. 2365, in part, is as follows: “Any tenant or lessee of any house or land, and the assigns under the tenant or legal representatives of such tenant or lessee, who holds over and *387 continues in tbe possession of the demised premises, or any part thereof, without the permission of the landlord, and after demand made for its surrender, may be removed from such premises in the manner hereinafter prescribed in either of the following cases: 1. When a tenant in possession of real estate holds over after his term has expired. 2. When the tenant or lessee, or other person under him, has done or omitted any act by which according to the stipulations of the lease, his estate has ceased,” etc.

The basis and scope of summary ejectment in actions between landlord and tenant are established by sec. 2365, supra. The only section of said statute which could possibly fit the facts in this case is subsection 2.

Plaintiff testified: “Q. Your reason for getting him out now is that he planted some cotton; will you tell this jury if this man planted one hale of cotton ? Ans.: No. He has made an effort to plant cotton, of my own knowledge, by putting out fertilizer.” No demand was made by plaintiffs on defendant to surrender the premises. The affidavit so states, but there was no evidence to the effect.

Upon a motion of nonsuit, all the evidence, whether offered by the plaintiff or elicited from defendant’s witnesses, is to be considered in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and he is entitled to every reasonable intendment thereon and every reasonable inference therefrom.

There was no sufficient evidence to be submitted to the jury that the plaintiffs made a demand on defendant to surrender the premises or that defendant had ever planted cotton, and in so doing breached his contract with plaintiffs. Defendant said he would, but he had not when this action was instituted. Defendant could change his mind, there was a locus poenitentiae. Plaintiffs jumped before they were spurred. A mere gesture of a breach does not constitute a breach.

In another aspect of the case, plaintiffs are barred from recovering. A lease is construed most strongly against the lessor. Here the lessor made no stipulation covering the eventuality of changes in Federal Crop Control policies, but contracted with defendant for the farming of a specific area and specific crops. Defendant correctly insists upon his rights under the contract. Plaintiffs must suffer any inconvenience resulting from their lack of foresight in failing to provide for adjustments in line with Government allotments later to be made.

In the language of the statute, supra, and evidence, we think that the defendant tenant has done no act or omitted to do any act by which, according to the stipulations of the lease, his estate has ceased.

For the reasons given, the judgment of the court below is

Affirmed.