The first question for decision is whether the deed of D. A. Jefferson conveys to his son, R. O. Jefferson, an estate in fee or an estate for life only, with remainder to his “boy children.”

It will be noted that in the conveying clause the grant is to “R. O. Jefferson heirs and assigns,” and in the habendum' clause we have “to the said R. 0. Jefferson and his heirs and not to assign only to his brothers for their only use and behoof forever,” and the warranty is made “to the said R. O. Jefferson and his heirs and assigns.” While it does not appear in the evidence, it seems probable that the draftsman used some printed form which he endeavored to adapt to the purpose of the parties, with such changes as seemed suitable.

*338Tbe portion of the habendum clause which, restrains any assignment except to the brothers of the grantee is equally consistent with the assignment of the life estate as with an assignment of the fee, and it throws little light upon a proper construction of the deed.

Defendant’s counsel strenuously contend that we must confine ourselves to the more formal parts of the deed as controlling interpretation, and for reasons mostly technical, arising from the frequent use of the word “heirs,” as above stated, it is insisted that the effect is to convey to the grantee R. O. Jefferson an estate in fee simple. But we feel impelled to consider, as expressive of a different intent, the clause written into the instrument between the conveying and the habendum clauses: “This deed is conveyed to the said grantee to him his lifetime and then to his boy children.” This provision cannot be regarded as a mere interpretative expression of the grantor as to the effect of his deed. It is an essential part of the instrument and, standing alone, would be sufficient to convey the lands in the manner and with the effect indicated. It must, therefore, be compared, and if possible reconciled, with other parts of the deed, in order to give effect to its intention, as construed from its four corners.

It is obvious that if we are guided only by other parts of the deed which, because of the use of the word “heirs” would carry to the grantee the estate in fee, we should have to ignore entirely the mention of the grantee’s life estate, the direct reference to the boy children, and the remainder which the grantor desired them to have, and, in fact, would be compelled to strike the whole clause from the deed, no matter how prominently the grantor thrusts it upon our attention. This, we think, would be to ignore a part of the deed which in comparison with the more formal technical expressions used elsewhere might be considered the clearest expression of intent to be found in the instrument, and explanatory of its seemingly contradictory expressions. Even if we should consider some repugnancy to exist, it is still our duty to construe the deed upon consideration of all its parts in such a way as to give effect to that which we find to be its true intent. Triplett v. Williams, 149 N. C., 394, 63 S. E., 79; Midgett v. Meekins, 160 N. C., 42, 75 S. E., 728; Gold Mining Co. v. Lumber Co., 170 N. C., 273, 87 S. E., 40; In re Dixon, 156 N. C., 26, 72 S. E., 71. See annotations to Triplett v. Williams, supra, p. 399.

Amongst the technicalities discarded in the modern rules of interpretation, as pointed out in Triplett v. Williams, supra, and cases following, is the artificial importance given to clauses in the deed, the labels they bear, and the order in which they occur. Even those technical words which, under the common law and by virtue of long use have come to designate the particular kind of an estate conveyed, nothing else appear*339ing, must give way to clearer expressions of intent if they are found in other parts of the instrument. In that case we find expressions pointedly applicable to the present case. With reference to the use of the word “heirs,” we find: “All conveyances of land executed since the passage of the act” (Act of 1879, C. S., 991) “are to be taken in fee simple, unless the intent of the grantor is plainly manifest in some part of the instrument to convey an estate of less dignity. It is the legislative will that the intention of the grantor and not the technical words of the common law shall govern. . . . The insertion of the word ‘heirs’ in the premises was evidently in deference to an established formula and creates, in our opinion, no repugnance between the granting clause and the habendum, inasmuch as the same estate would pass to the plaintiff whether this word he inserted or omitted.” We apprehend that the same principle applies here, although the expression of intent occurs elsewhere than in the habendum.

In Jones v. Whichard, 163 N. C., 241 (246), 79 S. E., 503, Justice HoTce, speaking for the Court, said: “In Triplett v. Williams, supra, this Court, in a well sustained opinion by Associate Justice Brown, announced the decision that although a deed in its terms professed to convey an estate to a grantee and its heirs, it would not have the effect of conveying a fee simple when it clearly appeared from the habendum or other portions of the instrument that it was the intent to convey only a life estate.” Italics supplied.

We hold that the effect of the deed from D. A. Jefferson to R. 0. Jefferson was to convey to R. 0. Jefferson an estate for life only, with remainder in fee to his “boy children.” 0. S., 991.

Under the rule favoring early vestment of estates, and since one of the boy children, Nolan Jefferson, was in esse at the time the deed was made, the remainder immediately vested in him, subject to be opened up, however, to admit the after-born children mentioned in the evidence. Powell v. Powell, 168 N. C., 561, 84 S. E., 860; Waller v. Brown, 197 N. C., 508, 149 S. E., 687; Poe v. Journegan, 175 N. C., 261, 95 S. E., 495. Consulting the chronology of births and deaths above given, we find that, in accordance with the statute of descents, the interests of the children who were born and who died subsequently to the making of the deed, devolved upon the plaintiff, C. D. Jefferson, and Nolan Jefferson.

It follows that the deed of R. O. Jefferson to the defendant conveyed only his life estate in the property, which has terminated by the death of the grantor. The defendant derives his title from Nolan Jefferson, and thereby acquired a one-half undivided interest in the lands, which he holds as cotenant with the plaintiff.

In view of the conclusion we have reached, it becomes unnecessary to discuss the evidence relating to the alleged mistake of the draftsman of *340the D. A. Jefferson deed, or the exceptions based thereupon, since we are convinced that the trial judge committed no error in his instruction to the jury on the bar of the statute of limitation. The other instructions were free from error.

In the trial, we find

No error.

dissenting: It was said in Triplett v. Williams, 149 N. C., 394, 63 S. E., 79, that “all conveyances of land executed since the passage of the Act (ch. 148, Laws 1879, now C. S., 991) are to be taken to be in fee simple, unless the intent of the grantor is plainly manifest in some part of the instrument to convey an estate of less dignity.”

Here, we have a deed with all of its operative provisions conveying an estate in fee simple. Whitley v. Arenson, ante, 121. Following the description of the land conveyed are these words: “This deed is conveyed to the said grantee to him his lifetime and then to his boy children.” In the granting clause, however, which precedes this expression, and twice thereafter (1) in the habendum and (2) in the warranty, the grantor uses words of inheritance to make known the character of the estate conveyed. Can it be said, therefore, that “such conveyance in plain and express words shows, or it is plainly intended by the conveyance or some part thereof, that the grantor meant to convey an estate of less dignity”? C. S., 991. I think not.

Conceding that the significance of a deed, like that of a will, is to be gathered from its four corners, Triplett v. Williams, supra, it is not to be overlooked that the four corners are to be ascertained from.the language used in the instrument. Brown v. Brown, 168 N. C., 4, 84 S. E., 25; McIver v. McKinney, 184 N. C., 393, 114 S. E., 399; Heyer v. Bulluck, 210 N. C., 321, 186 S. E., 356. We must not pass by the crucial expressions employed by the grantor. If we do, we shall make the deed rather than interpret it. McCallum v. McCallum, 167 N. C., 310, 83 S. E., 250. “When language is used having a clearly defined legal signification, there is no room for construction to ascertain the intent; it must be given its legal meaning and effect.” Campbell v. Cronly, 150 N. C., 457, 64 S. E., 213.

In some respects, the case resembles Wilkins v. Norman, 139 N. C., 39, 51 S. E., 797. There, in the granting clause, and in the habendum, the conveyance is to “Berrick Norman, to him, his heirs and assigns forever.” Following the usual covenant of warranty is a clause undertaking to limit the estate to the life of the grantee and his wife, with remainder to three of “their heirs,” naming them. This latter clause was held to be repugnant to the estate already conveyed, and was disregarded. To like effect is the decision in Blackwell v. Blackwell, 124 N. C.. 269, 32 S. E., 676.

*341Perhaps the nearest ease in support of a different interpretation is that of Willis v. Trust Co., 183 N. C., 267, 111 S. E., 166. But there, in the warranty, was a limitation over in case the grantee should die without issue or bodily heirs living at the time of her death. Here, we have no such limitation over in any part of the deed.

The sentence following the description does not purport to lessen or to qualify the estate originally granted. Its language is purely interpretative. But even if it be regarded as expressive of the grantor’s intent, it is at variance with the formal provisions of the deed fixing the quality of the estate as a fee. The intention to convey a fee simple, thrice expressed, and favored by the law, is not overborne by this sentence. Bagwell v. Hines, 187 N. C., 690, 122 S. E., 659; Johnson v. Lee, 187 N. C., 753, 122 S. E., 839.

The grantor understood, and so provided in the habendum, that the grantee would have the right to convey the property absolutely and in fee simple to his brothers. The grantee did convey it to his brother, 0. M. Jefferson, in 1914, with full covenants of warranty, and 0. M. Jefferson has been in possession of it ever since. "Without objection, the draftsman of the deed testified as follows: “My father told me that he wanted R. 0. Jefferson’s boy children to have this land after R. O. Jefferson’s death if he died before he had opportunity to sell, before he made conveyance to one of his brothers. . . . The deed represents that to the best of my knowledge.” So, unless the clear purpose of the grantor is to be defeated, the deed in question must be held to convey an estate in fee simple. The voiding of the partial restraint on alienation is apparently upon the assumption that it is annexed to a grant in fee. Combs v. Paul, 191 N. C., 789, 133 S. E., 93; Wool v. Fleetwood, 136 N. C., 460, 48 S. E., 785; Williams v. McPherson, 216 N. C., 565, 5 S. E. (2d), 830. Compare Greene v. Stadiem, 198 N. C., 445, 152 S. E., 398.

Moreover, if the interest conveyed be construed to he a life estate with power in the grantee, as expressed in the habendum, to sell to his brothers in fee, and the life tenant has sold to one of his brothers, does not this give the purchaser a fee? Smith v. Mears, 218 N. C., 193, 10 S. E. (2d), 659; Chewning v. Mason, 158 N. C., 578, 74 S. E., 357.

My vote is for a reversal of the judgment below.