The sole question to be determined is whether the net proceeds received for the wrongful death of Elmer Thomas Badgett, while engaged in interstate commerce, shall be apportioned according to our statute of distribution. The answer must be in the affirmative. In re Stone, 173 N. C., 208, 97 S. E., 216.

The appellant contends that since the recovery was based upon the provisions of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, the proceeds must be apportioned among the beneficiaries of the deceased according to the pecuniary loss each has sustained. We think the overwhelming weight of authority is to the effect that in an action for wrongful death under this Act, the jury may apportion the award as contended by the appellant and that a recovery under the Act, by way of compromise, may be apportioned in a similar manner where the court supervises and approves the compromise. But, where the settlement is made in the discretion of the personal representative without the advice or approval of the court, we think the award must be distributed under the provisions of our statute of distribution.

The funds now in the hands of the administratrix have the same status such funds would have if they had been recovered in an action under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act and the jury had awarded damages in solido.

This Court has repeatedly approved the apportionment of awards by the jury in actions brought for wrongful death under this Act. Horton v. R. R., 175 N. C., 472, 95 S. E., 883; Strunks v. Payne, 184 N. C., 582, 114 S. E., 840; Gerow v. R. R., 189 N. C., 813, 123 S. E., 473; Wimberly v. R. R., 190 N. C., 444, 130 S. E., 116; McGraw v. R. R., 209 N. C., 432, 184 S. E., 31. Nevertheless, there appears to be no *94 federal authority which requires such apportionment. The appellant contends otherwise and relies upon Horton v. R. R., supra; Wilson v. Massagee, 224 N. C., 705, 32 S. E. (2d), 335; and Gulf C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. McGinnis, 228 U. S., 173, 33 S. Ct., 426, 57 L. Ed., 785, a Texas case. It should be noted that Texas has a statute which provides that damages awarded in an action for wrongful death may be apportioned by the jury. However, the Supreme Court of the United States held in the case of Central Vermont Ry. C. v. White, 238 U. S., 507, 59 L. Ed., 1433, that the decision in the McGirmis case, supra, means nothing more than that a jury may apportion the damages awarded and further held that there was nothing in the record in the McGinnis case, supra, “Which would support a ruling that a general verdict was invalid, or that the verdict could be set aside because it failed to fix the amount each beneficiary was to receive.

“Under Lord Campbell’s Act (9 & 10 Vict., ch. 93, s. 2) and in a few of the American states the jury is required to apportion the damages in this class of cases. Rut even in those states the distribution is held to be of no concern to the defendant, and the failure to apportion the damages is held not to be reversible error. (Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Stevens, 87 Va., 631 (1), 634, 46 L. R. A., 367, 34 S. E., 525; International & G. N. R. Co. v. Lehman, Tex. Civ. App., 72 S. W., 619, — certainly not unless the defendant can show that it has been injured by such failure. The employers’ liability act is substantially like Lord Campbell’s Act, except that it omits the requirement that the jury should apportion the damages. That omission clearly indicates an intention on the part of Congress to change what was the English practice so as to make the Federal statute conform to what was the rule in most of the states in which it was to operate. Those statutes, when silent on the subject, have generally been construed not to require juries to make an apportionment.” See also Kansas City S. R. Co. v. Leslie, 238 U. S., 599, 59 L. Ed., 1478; U. S. C. A., Title 45, sec. 51, note 880, et seq.

In view of the conclusion reached, it is unnecessary to discuss the other questions raised and argued.

We think, upon the facts presented on this record; the judgment of the court below must be upheld.

Affirmed.