The plaintiffs having sustained their injuries in the State of Virginia, their right to recover therefor must be determined by the law of that jurisdiction. Wise v. Hollowell, 205 N. C. 286, 171 S. E. 82; *781Baird v. Baird, 223 N. C. 730, 28 S. E. (2) 225; Harper v. Harper, and Wickham v. Harper, 225 N. C. 260, 34 S. E. (2), 185.

The defendant contends that at the time the plaintiffs were injured they were his guests within the meaning of the Virginia guest statute, which reads as follows: “No person transported by the owner or operator of any motor vehicle as a guest without payment for such transportation and no personal representative of any such guest so transported, shall be entitled to recover damages against such owner or operator for death or injuries to the person or property of such guest resulting from the operation of such motor vehicle, unless such death or injury was caused or resulted from the gross negligence or willful and wanton disregard of the safety of the person or property of the person being so transported on the part of such owner or operator.” Virginia Code of 1942, Section 2154 (232).

The plaintiffs contend, however, that when the defendant informed Harold Morse that he could not make the trip to New Jersey because he was without funds, and consented to go only after Harold Morse agreed to purchase all the gas and oil to be used on the trip, they were not guest passengers within the purview of the Virginia statute.

In our opinion, if the plaintiffs were not guest passengers within the purview of the Virginia statute, the evidence of negligence adduced in the trial below is sufficient to carry these cases to the jury, otherwise not. We do not think the evidence is sufficient to establish “gross negligence or willful and wanton disregard of the safety” of these plaintiffs at the time of their injury, which finding is a prerequisite to a recovery under the provisions of the Virginia statute. Hale v. Hale, 219 N. C. 191, 13 S. E. (2) 221; Keen v. Harmon, 183 Va. 670, 33 S. E. (2) 197; Woodrum v. Holland, 185 Va. 690, 40 S. E. (2) 169; Austin v. Austin, 186 Va. 382, 43 S. E. (2) 31; Hill v. Bradley, 186 Va. 394, 43 S. E. (2) 29; Reel v. Spencer, 187 Va. 530, 47 S. E. (2) 359; Miller v. Ellis, 188 Va. 207, 49 S. E. (2) 273.

The authorities are not altogether in agreement as to what facts and circumstances are necessary to destroy the relationship of host and guest under the provisions of guest statutes, where the passenger is riding in an automobile or other motor vehicle by invitation or permission of the owner or possessor thereof.

However, the weight of authority seems to be to the effect that where the owner of a vehicle insists upon or requests that a passenger obligate himself to share the expenses of a trip, and the passenger agrees to be so obligated, the agreement wall constitute such a “payment for transportation” as will defeat the relationship of host and guest. McMahon v. DeKraay, 70 S. D. 180, 16 N. W. (2) 308; Fortuna v. Sangster, 296 N. Y. 923, 73 N. E. (2) 40; Miller v. Fairley, 141 Ohio St. 327, 48 N. E. *782(2) 217; Sprenger v. Braker, 71 Ohio Ap. 349, 49 N. E. (2) 958; Pence v. Berry, 13 Wash. (2) 564, 125 P. (2) 645; Teders v. Rothermel, 205 Minn. 470, 286 N. W. 353; Smith v. Clute, 277 N. Y. 407, 14 N. E. (2) 455; Potter v. Juarez, 189 Wash. 476, 66 P. (2) 290; Beer v. Beer, 52 Ohio Ap. 276, 3 N. E. (2) 702; Copp v. Vanhise (1914; C. C. A. 9th), 119 F. (2) 691; Campbell v. Campbell, 104 Vt. 468, 162 A. 379, 85 A. L. R. 626; Kerstetter v. Elfman, 327 Pa. 17, 192 A. 663.

We think the opinion in the case of Hale v. Hale, supra, supports this view. There Barnhill, J., speaking for the Court, said : “The motorist who transports for pay or some other direct benefit is accountable as at common law, while the ‘host’ who transports his ‘guest without payment for such transportation’ is liable only for injuries caused by his gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct. The passenger is ‘a guest without payment for such transportation’ when there is no contractual relationship between the parties under which the passenger was obligated to pay for the transportation and there are no suificient facts to show that the transportation was contractually for the mutual benefit of both the passenger and the operator. Master v. Horowitz, 262 N. Y. 609, 188 N. E. 86, 95 A. L. R. 1182. It does not include persons who are being transported for the mutual benefit of both the passenger and the operator or owner of the car. However, the extent and nature of the reciprocal advantages which will exclude the passenger are not unlimited but are confined to certain definite relations, such as Master and Servant, and to tangible benefits accruing from the transportation—as in saving time for which he, as master, pays—facilitation of a servant’s work, or the like. Kruy v. Smith, 144 Atl. 304; Sullivan v. Richardson, 6 Pac. (2) 567; Crawford v. Foster, 293 Pac. 841 (Cal.); Master v. Horowitz, supra; Chaplowe v. Powsner, 175 Atl. 470 (Conn.), 95 A. L. R. 1177.”

In the case of McMahon v. DeKraay, supra, which was an action to recover for personal injuries sustained in Arkansas, the appeal presented the identical question now before us. The Arkansas statute, like the Virginia statute, excluded recovery except for gross negligence when the guest was transported “without payment for such transportation.” The Supreme Court of South Dakota said : “Reason, and these authorities, have induced the conclusion that notwithstanding the fact that a trip may have a social complexion, if the owner of the vehicle insists upon a prearrangement by which his passenger friend is obligated to share the expense, the provision thus made is for such a payment for the transportation as will defeat the relationship of host and guest under the Arkansas statute.”

In Smith v. Clute, supra, the Court of Appeals of New York, in considering whether or not a statute of the State of Montana, permitting a guest to sue only for gross negligence, precluded the plaintiff from recov*783ery, notwithstanding the existence of an agreement which required the plaintiff to pay her pro rata part of the expenses on a trip to California, the Court said : “The question whether sharing expenses of an automobile trip results in such benefit to the owner or operator as to take a passenger out of the purvieuv of a guest statute has been before the courts in a number of cases. Where there is no fixed understanding or agreement for sharing expenses, but merely a likelihood or a general statement by the passenger that he will pay his share, it is not sufficient . . ., and this court has so held. . . . On the other hand, where there is a definite agreement, as in the case at bar, a number of states have permitted recovery for ordinary negligence, holding the passenger who contributed toward the expenses was not a guest within the purview of the statute.” And the court held the plaintiff was not a guest within the purview of the Montana statute.

Likewise, the same court, in considering the Virginia statute in Fortuna v. Sangster, supra, held that the evidence in the case showed there ovas a fixed agreement between the passengers in the automobile involved and the owner and driver thereof, to pay a given proportion of the expenses of the trip which took such passengers “out of the class of gratuitous guests within the meaning of the Virginia statute. Motor Vehicle Code of Virginia, Sec. 2154, subsec. 232.”

The authorities seem to hold uniformly that the word “guest” within the meaning of the various automobile guest statutes, denotes one whom the owner or possessor of an automobile or other vehicle permits or invites to ride with him without receiving any remuneration or other benefit therefor, except such slight benefits as may be classed as mere courtesies. These authorities also hold that the voluntary offer or insistence of a guest to share the expenses of an automobile trip, or the voluntary purchase of gas and oil by such guest while on a trip, will not destroy the relationship of host and guest within the meaning or purview of automobile guest statutes. Such voluntary contributions to the expense of an automobile trip, will not ordinarily be construed as compensation or payment for transportation, but will be considered mere acts of courtesy. Hale v. Hale, supra; Fiske v. Wilkie, 67 Cal. Ap. (2) 440, 154 P. (2) 725; Brady v. Harris, 308 Mich. 234, 13 N. W. (2) 273; McDougald v. Coney, 150 Fla. 748, 9 So. (2) 187; Bushouse v. Brow, 297 Mich. 616, 298 N. W. 303; McCown v. Schrom, 139 Neb. 738, 298 N. W. 681; Mayer v. Puryear (1940 C. C. A. 4th), 115 F. (2) 675; Stephen v. Spaulding, 32 Cal. App. (2) 326, 89 P. (2) 683; Elliott v. Benner, 146 Kan. 827, 73 P. (2) 1116; Vance v. Grohe, 223 Iowa 1109, 274 N. W. 902; Master v. Horowitz, supra.

Each case must be decided in the light of its own facts. Here the evidence tends to show that the defendant was anxious to make this trip, but *784was without sufficient funds to do so. Whether or not the plaintiff, Harold Morse, and the defendant entered into an agreement which obligated Morse to purchase the gas and oil to be consumed on the trip and such agreement was made a condition or consideration, without which the defendant would not have undertaken the trip, is a question for the jury. If such a contract was made, we think payment of the gas and oil bills would constitute “payment for transportation” within the purview of the Virginia guest statute.

We deem it unnecessary to discuss and distinguish the additional authorities cited by the appellee.

The motion for judgments as of nonsuit should have been overruled.

Reversed.

concurring: I concur in the well-considered opinion written for the Court by J ustice Denny that the evidence shows the plaintiffs on this occasion were not “guests without payment” for the transportation, within the meaning of the Virginia statute, and that plaintiffs were entitled to go to the jury on the issue of ordinary negligence.

However, while it thus becomes immaterial on this appeal, I desire to express my disagreement with the statement in the opinion that, in the absence of such showing as to the status of the plaintiffs in relation to the transportation, the evidence was insufficient to be submitted to the jury on the question of gross negligence which, otherwise, would have been essential to the maintenance of plaintiffs’ action.

The plaintiffs’ evidence tended to show that the plaintiffs were injured as result of a collision between the defendant’s automobile in which plaintiffs were riding, and an automobile driven by the witness Whittle. The collision occurred on the night of 17 January, 1948, on the North-South U. S. Highway No. 1 near South Hill, Virginia. At this place the highway is surfaced with concrete 30 feet wide divided by white lines into three traffic lanes, and is substantially level and straight. At the time it was raining and had been for some time, and the windshield wiper on defendant’s automobile was not working properly, blurring the driver’s vision. Defendant’s automobile was proceeding north on the east lane at a speed of 45 miles per hour, behind three other automobiles proceeding in the same direction. The automobile driven by Whittle wras proceeding south in the center lane at a speed of 10 to 15 miles per hour, with headlights burning, and had been in that lane for 75 yards, Whittle intending to turn off to the left into a side road 33 yards south of the point where the collision occurred. The three automobiles in front of the defendant passed Whittle, and then suddenly the defendant turned his automobile with unchecked speed to his left into the center lane and ran almost head-on into Whittle’s car. This was done so quickly and when so close *785that Whittle had only time to “cut a little” to his left, and the right side of defendant’s automobile struck the right front of Whittle’s automobile. The Whittle car stopped on the highway about where it was struck, heading southwest, and the Walker car after the impact ran across and beyond the highway 60 feet and turned completely around heading south. Whittle testified, “I didn’t know whether he (defendant) was intending to pass the other cars or what, but he pulled out from behind the other cars” into the center lane in front of witness’ car and came “straight into me.”

The defendant did not testify and offered no evidence. The picture thus presented by plaintiffs’ evidence when viewed in the light most favorable for them shows the defendant under these circumstances of night, rain, wet pavement, and much traffic, with his vision obscured and blurred by rain on his windshield, driving at a speed of 45 miles an hour from the right-hand lane across the white line into the center lane in the face of a lighted oncoming automobile already in that lane (in violation of the Virginia statute), and driving “straight into” a head-on collision with it.

In my opinion this evidence would have been sufficient to have required submission of the question of gross negligence to the jury. According to the decisions of the Virginia Supreme Court which must be regarded here as authoritative in the interpretation of a Virginia statute, the distinction between ordinary and gross negligence is one of the degree of inattention, both differing from willful and intentional wrong. Wright v. Osborne, 175 Va. 442, 9 S. E. (2) 452; Thornhill v. Thornhill, 172 Va. 553, 2 S. E. (2) 318. “Whether the conduct of an automobile driven under given circumstances constitutes gross negligence is generally a question of fact for the jury.” Smith v. Turner, 178 Va. 172, 16 S. E. (2) 370. In that case the defendant drove his car at excessive speed across the path of the oncoming Smith car and without seeing or heeding its approach. It was held the question of gross negligence should have been submitted to the jury, and nonsuit was reversed.

It seems to be well settled that gross negligence is something more than simple or ordinary negligence and something less than willful, wanton and reckless conduct. It falls short of being such reckless disregard of probable consequences as is equivalent to a willful and intentional wrong. Thomas v. Snow, 162 Va. 654, 174 S. E. 837; Boggs v. Plybon, 157 Va. 30, 160 S. E. 77, 80. “What might be deemed ordinary care in one case may under different surroundings and circumstances be gross negligence. The policy of the law has relegated the determination of such questions to the jury under proper instructions from the court.” Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Ives, 144 U. S. 408 (417); Boggs v. Plybon, supra; Pool v. Kelly, 173 S. E. 537 (541): Mariotta v. Aycock, 174 S. E. 831; Yonkers v. Williams, 192 S. E. 753; Farfour v. Fahad, 214 N. C. 281 (287). The *786reference in Wise v. Hollowell, 205 N. C. 286, to wanton or culpable negligence which was the issue submitted in that case, does not affect the question of gross negligence under the present Virginia statute.

What constitutes gross negligence under this statute, when considered in relation to the varying circumstances in each case presented, has been discussed in numerous recent decisions by Virginia’s highest court. These, I think, support the view I have here expressed as to the evidence in this case. McGeehee v. Perkins, 188 Va. 116, 49 S. E. (2) 304 (decided Sept. 1948); Crew v. Nelson, 188 Va. 108, 49 S. E. (2) 326 (decided Sept. 1948); Masters v. Cardi, 186 Va. 261, 42 S. E. (2) 203; Smith v. Turner, 178 Va. 172, 16 S. E. (2) 370. See also Pepper v. Morrill, 24 F. (2) 320; Campbell v. Costin, 293 Mass. 225.

I concur in the view that the evidence in the case at bar warrants its submission to the jury on the issue of ordinary negligence, but I venture to express the opinion that the record here also affords evidence of gross negligence worthy of the consideration of the jury.

As the case goes back for trial on all the evidence, in the event defendant’s evidence should throw a different light on the relationship of the parties to the transportation, the question of the degree of negligence necessary to be shown may become important.

I am authorized to say that Justice Seawell and Justice Ervin join in this opinion.