Tbe question presented by tbe appeal is tbe propriety of tbe ruling below denying tbe motion of tbe defendant Coacb Company to strike from tbe answer of tbe additional defendant Mabel Spivey tbe allegations which refer to a previous judgment rendered in ber favor as administratrix of Paul Spivey and against defendant Coacb Company for damages for the wrongful death of Paul Spivey as result of tbe collision between bis automobile and defendant’s bus. This judgment is pleaded now as res judicata and determinative of tbe question of tbe negligence of Paul Spivey in causing tbe collision, for tbe reason tbat tbe question of bis contributory negligence having been an issue in tbat suit and by tbe judgment decided adversely to tbe defendant, could not again be set up in a cross-action for contribution between tbe same parties.

Tbe rule seems to have been established that when in a cross-action by tbe defendant against an additional defendant for contribution as joint tort-feasor, it appears that in a previous action between them it bad been determined tbat the additional defendant bad not been contributorily negligent, tbe question could not again be raised in a suit between tbe same parties. Tarkington v. Printing Co., 230 N.C. 354, 53 S.E. 2d 269; Cannon v. Cannon, 223 N.C. 664, 28 S.E. 2d 240; Current v. Webb, 220 N.C. 425, 17 S.E. 2d 614; 2 Freeman on Judgments, sec. 670. In tbe opinion in tbe Tarhington case, where tbe facts were similar, Chief Justice Stacy stated tbe applicable rule as follows: “Tbe prior suit as between tbe then parties litigant determined tbe question whether tbe driver of tbe automobile was contributorily negligent or a joint tort-feasor with tbe owner and driver of tbe truck in bringing about tbe collision. Hence, as between tbe parties there litigant, this matter would seem to be res judicata.”

*54 The defendant Coach Company, however, contends the rule stated in Tarkington v. Printing Company, supra, was predicated on a finding by the jury on issue submitted that the driver of the automobile was not guilty of contributory negligence, and this rule should not be applied when the judgment was by consent. True, the judgment set up here was a consent judgment, but it does appear that in the former suit this defendant pleaded as an affirmative defense the contributory negligence of Paul Spivey, and the judgment adjudged that plaintiff recover of the defendant the sum of $4,000 in the suit for the wrongful death of Paul Spivey. There were no reservations in the judgment, and, nothing else appearing, this judgment constitutes a final determination of the issues raised by the pleadings. Jenkins v. Jenkins, 225 N.C. 681 (684), 36 S.E. 2d 233; Jefferson v. Sales Corp., 220 N.C. 76, 16 S.E. 2d 462; Stancil v. Wilder, 222 N.C. 706, 24 S.E. 2d 527. A judgment for the plaintiff under these circumstances without qualification or reservation would necessarily dispose adversely of an affirmative defense pleaded in bar by the defendant. 31 A.J. 107.

The general rule is stated in an elaborate note in 2 A.L.R. 2d 511, as follows: “As a general proposition, it is well settled that a valid judgment or decree entered by agreement or consent operates as res judicata, to the same extent as a judgment or decree rendered after answer and contest, and is binding and conclusive upon the parties, and those in privity with them.” It was said in Law v. Cleveland, 213 N.C. 289, 195 S.E. 809, “It is well settled that a consent judgment is just as valid and binding as a judgment rendered after trial of a cause.” Simmons v. McCullin, 163 N.C. 409, 79 S.E. 625; Lalonde v. Hubbard, 202 N.C. 771, 164 S.E. 359; Gibson v. Gordon, 213 N.C. 666, 197 S.E. 135.

This rule, however, would not apply here to the consent judgments entered in the suits against the defendant by Mabel Spivey individually, or as next friend of Linda Darnell Spivey, as it does not appear that they were parties to the suit by the personal representative of Paul Spivey, or that his contributory negligence was at issue in those suits; nor is contribution now sought from them as joint tort-feasors. Those suits do not seem to have any proper relation to the present action.

The court properly declined to allow the motion of defendant Coach Company to strike the first paragraph of the further answer and defense of Mabel Spivey, Administratrix, but the judgment should be modified to sustain this defendant’s motion to strike paragraph 2 thereof and exhibits B and C which were made parts of this paragraph.

As thus modified the judgment is

Affirmed.