Testing the evidence offered by plaintiff and so much of defendant’s evidence as is favorable to plaintiff, or tends to explain and make clear that which has been offered by the plaintiff, in this case, Rice v. Lumberton, 235 N.C. 227, 69 S.E. 2d 543, it may he fairly doubted that there is shown any evidence of actionable negligence on the part of defendant. Morris v. Transport Co., 235 N.C. 568, 70 S.E. 2d 845.

Here, as in the Morris case, the uncontradicted statement of defendant, offered in evidence by plaintiff through its witness, Patrolman Anthony, and explained by the testimony of defendant, refutes the theory of “a parking” of defendant’s tractor-trailer at the place of the collision in question, within the meaning of the statute G.S. 20-161 (a) as amended by Chap. 165 of 1951 Session Laws of North Carolina. (See discussion in the Morris case.)

Likewise as to permitting the tractor-trailer of defendant to be on the highway without lights. The factual' situation here is so similar to that in the Morris case that what is said there in this respect is applicable and appropriate here.

But if it be conceded that defendant was negligent in some respect alleged in the complaint, it is manifest that the driver of plaintiff’s tractor-trailer was negligent in the operation of it, and that such negligence was the proximate cause, or at least one of the proximate causes of the collision and property damage of which complaint is here made.

The ease comes within and is controlled by the principles enunciated and applied in Weston v. R. R., 194 N.C. 210, 139 S.E. 237, the Morris case, supra, and the list of cases cited in the Morris case at pp. 576-577, as well as in the case of Morgan v. Cook, ante, 477. Compare Hammett v. Miller, 227 N.C. 10, 40 S.E. 2d 480, and Clark v. Lambreth, 235 N.C. 578, 70 S.E. 2d 828.

Hence the judgment below is

Affirmed.

dissenting: "When I construe tbe evidence in tbe light most favorable to tbe plaintiff, I reach tbe deliberate conclusion that it makes out this case:

Tbe defendant knowingly permitted tbe rear end of tbe semi-trailer drawn by bis disabled road tractor to project onto tbe main traveled part of a congested highway on a dark and cloudy night. While so doing, be violated G.S. 20-134 by failing to exhibit a red tail light at tbe rear of bis semi-trailer, and G.S. 20-161 by failing to display red flares to warn approaching motorists of tbe impending peril. Tbe plaintiff’s northbound motor vehicle came upon tbe scene from tbe rear in tbe charge of a driver who was keeping a proper lookout and proceeding at a reasonable speed. As tbe plaintiff’s motor vehicle neared tbe rear of tbe defendant’s stationary and unligbted semi-trailer, it met a motor vehicle which was moving along tbe highway in tbe opposite direction. This southbound motor vehicle projected glaring headlights into tbe face of tbe plaintiff’s driver, blinding him and compelling him to fix bis gaze on tbe painted line marking tbe inner edge of bis traffic lane in order to avoid collision with tbe approaching vehicle. As a consequence of these events, tbe plaintiff’s driver was unable to see tbe stationary and unligbted semitrailer of tbe defendant in time to avoid striking it.

For this reason, I am of tbe opinion that tbe question of whether tbe defendant was guilty of actionable negligence and tbe question of whether tbe plaintiff’s driver was guilty of contributory negligence were for tbe jury.

I am unable to give my assent to tbe legal premise which necessarily underlies tbe decision of tbe majority — that tbe law imposes upon tbe nocturnal motorist tbe absolute and unvarying duty not to move a motor vehicle along a highway at all unless be has a complete knowledge of all obstructions lying ahead, no matter bow unexpeetable and unperceivable those obstructions may be. This legal premise requires of tbe nocturnal motorist an infallibility not possessed by any man who ever traveled over tbe earth’s surface by motor vehicle or otherwise.