Since the deprivation of personal liberty suffered by a plaintiff and all circumstances of aggravation attending it constitute elements of damage in an action for malicious prosecution, the present plaintiff’s version of the facts accompanying his arrest and imprisonment is clearly germane to his second cause of action. 54 C.J.S., Malicious Prosecution, section 112.'

G.S. 1-163 provides that “the judge may . . . amend any pleading . . . by inserting . . . allegations material to the case,” and G.S. 1-152 specifies that “the judge may likewise, in his discretion, . . . allow an . . . act to be done after the time limited, or . . . may enlarge the time.” These statutory provisions conferred upon Judge Bobbitt the discretionary power to extend the time for filing the amendment to the complaint to the date specified in his order. Smith v. Insurance Company, 208 N.C. 99, 179 S.E. 457.

The defendants insist with much earnestness and eloquence that Judge Bobbitt erred in permitting the plaintiff to file a pleading containing the first eight paragraphs of the amendment and in denying their motion to strike such paragraphs from the amendment even if he did possess discretionary power to permit the plaintiff to file an amendment to the complaint after the time limited in Judge Rudisill’s order. They advance these arguments to support their position: That when he recast his complaint, the plaintiff incorporated his version of the facts attending his arrest and imprisonment in his second cause of action by appropriate reference to the allegations of his first cause of action; that Judge Rudisill adjudged as a matter of law that the plaintiff’s version of these facts was *215 immaterial and irrelevant to bis second cause of action and prejudicial to tbe defendant Lawrence E. Brown, and struck out tbe first paragraph of tbe plaintiff’s second cause of action for tbat reason; tbat tbis ruling of Judge Rudisill, whether sound or unsound, became binding on tbe parties as “tbe law of tbe case” by tbe plaintiff’s failure to have it reviewed on appeal; tbat Judge Bobbitt’s action in permitting tbe plaintiff to file a pleading containing tbe first eight paragraphs of the amendment and in refusing to strike such paragraphs from tbe amendment was tantamount to a reversal of Judge Rudisill’s ruling because tbe first eight paragraphs of tbe amendment set out in specific detail tbe plaintiff’s version of tbe facts accompanying bis arrest and imprisonment; and tbat consequently Judge Bobbitt’s action is invalidated by tbe rule applied in Power Company v. Peacock, 197 N.C. 735, 150 S.E. 510, tbat one Superior Court judge cannot review tbe decision of another Superior Court judge upon a matter of law or legal inference.

Tbe position of tbe defendants is rendered untenable by tbe salutary principle tbat where a judicial ruling is susceptible of two interpretations, tbe court will adopt tbe one which makes it harmonize with tbe law properly applicable to tbe case. In re Summers, 79 Ind. App. 108, 137 N.E. 291; 49 C.J.S., Judgments, section 436.

While tbe record reveals tbat tbe defendants moved to strike tbe first paragraph of tbe plaintiff’s second cause of action on tbe ground tbat tbe allegations thereby “made a part of said cause of action by reiteration . . . are immaterial, irrelevant, and prejudicial to tbe defendant Lawrence E. Brown,” it does not compel tbe conclusion tbat Judge Rudisill made tbe erroneous adjudication tbat tbe ground assigned by tbe defendants for their motion was valid in law when be struck out “all of paragraph one of tbe second cause of action” without stating any reason whatever for bis ruling. In entering bis order, Judge Rudisill heeded tbe sage advice .which tbe Earl of Mansfield is reputed to have given those who wear tbe ermine: “Consider what you think justice requires, and decide accordingly. But never give your reasons; for your judgment will probably be right, but your reasons will certainly be wrong.”

When all is said, tbe order is susceptible of tbe construction tbat Judge Rudisill struck out paragraph one of tbe second cause of action merely because tbe plaintiff’s attempt to incorporate bis version of tbe facts attending bis arrest and imprisonment in bis second cause of action by reference to tbe allegations of bis first cause of action contravened tbe rule of court which provides tbat “every pleading containing two or more causes of action shall, in each, set out all tbe facts upon which it rests, and shall not by reference to others, incorporate in itself any of tbe allegations in them, except tbat exhibits, by marks or numbers, may be referred to without reciting their contents, when attached thereto.” Su *216 preme Court Rule No. 20 (2), General Statutes, Yol. 4, Appendix 1; Cherry v. Walker, 232 N.C. 725, 62 S.E. 2d 329; King v. Coley, 229 N.C. 258, 49 S.E. 2d 648; McIntosh on North Carolina Practice and Procedure in Civil Cases, section 433. This interpretation harmonizes the order with the legal principle that the deprivation of personal liberty suffered by the plaintiff and all circumstances of aggravation attending it constitute elements of damage in the action for malicious prosecution. It is likewise consistent with the inclusion in the order of the provision granting the plaintiff leave to amend his complaint. This provision indicates that Judge Rudisill contemplated that the plaintiff would revamp his second cause of action so as to conform the same to the rule of court.

Under this view, Judge Bobbitt’s order implements rather than repudiates Judge Rudisill’s ruling. This being true, Judge Bobbitt’s order is

Affirmed.